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All of us are to an extent prisoners of our environments, trapped in
one or another set of parochial concerns. And the truth we retrieve is
inevitably qualified by the intellectual and emotional preoccupations
each of us, through our vocabulary and concepts, brings to bear on the
study of the past.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Every once in a while, the mass media report stories about intellectual
property piracy in China. These stories usually go as follows. For a long
time, the evil Chinese pirates have been freeriding on the creative genius
of Western authors and inventors. Engaging in unfair competition, these
pirates have brought about the greatest trade deficit in the United States
in years. Every year, the United States loses more than $2 billion of reve-
nues due to intellectual property piracy in China. Tired of this enormous
trade deficit and the millions of pirated copies of Microsoft Windows and
counterfeit Mickey Mouse T-shirts, the United States has finally decided
to mount a noble crusade against these lowly pirates. This crusade has
not only protected the United States's intellectual property interests, but
also brought to China the needed ethical values, technological develop-
ment, and global economic integration.
This story contains some truths, in particular the extent of the Chinese
piracy problem and the problem's adverse impact on the U.S. economy.
However, it omits several important aspects of the existing U.S.-China
intellectual property conflict. First, even though the crusade did not
receive much media coverage before the 1980s, this crusade has been an
ongoing effort since the turn of the twentieth century. So far, it has not
produced any effective results, apart from putting intellectual property
laws on statute books. Second, unfair competition is not the only reason
behind the piracy problem. China and the West harbor significant politi-
cal, social, economic, and cultural differences, which militate against
intellectual property law reforms in China. Without reforms that are sen-
sitive to these differences, the piracy problem will continue. Indeed, the
problem will exacerbate as the Chinese economy grows. Third, the cru-
sade has failed to convince the Chinese, in particular their leaders, of the
importance and benefits of intellectual property rights. Even worse, it
backfires on the United States's foreign trade and human rights policies.
In light of these significant omissions, the current U.S.-China intellectual
property debate "obscure[s] far more than... illuminate[s]."2 It baffles
American scholars, policymakers, the mass media, and the general public
1 PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA 198 (1984).
2 William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property Rights,
Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135, 135 (1997).
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and prevents them from understanding the roots of the Chinese piracy
problem.
To reconfigure the U.S.-China intellectual property debate, this Article
articulates the various differences between China and the West and
explains how these differences have contributed to the failure of the
United States's repeated conversion attempts. It also highlights the unde-
sirability for and ineffectiveness of forced conversion by juxtaposing the
piracy problem with one of Shakespeare's legal masterpieces, The
Merchant of Venice3 ("The Merchant"). By comparing China's experi-
ence in the international intellectual property community to Shylock's
predicament in the play, this Article seeks to challenge the readers' cul-
tural presumptions and invites readers to step outside their own world to
rethink the U.S.-China intellectual property conflict.
Part II of this Article describes the failure of the United States's
repeated attempts to convert China into a Western intellectual property
regime. This Part argues that the American intellectual property policy
toward China in the last two decades failed in the same way as it had
failed at the turn of the twentieth century. Part III examines the political,
social, economic, and cultural differences between China and the West.
This Part explains how these differences have primarily accounted for the
United States's failed conversion attempts. Part IV recounts the story of
Shylock's forced conversion in The Merchant and compares China's con-
version experience in the international intellectual property community
to Shylock's predicament in the Venetian court. This Part also examines
in depth the three major lessons the audience can learn from the play and
how these lessons can help avoid Shylock's painful experience. Using
The Merchant as a legal text, Part V applies Shakespeare's teachings to
the U.S.-China intellectual property conflict. This Part concludes that
Shakespeare's lessons in The Merchant provide valuable lessons for peo-
ple to understand the conflict and for policymakers to reshape their for-
eign intellectual property policy.
II. Tim UNITED STATES'S FAILED CONVERSION ArEMPTs
To understand why China has to be converted, one must realize that
China had not developed any intellectual property notion throughout its
millennia-long imperial history. The earliest effort to regulate publica-
tion and reproduction was through an edict issued by Emperor Wenzong
of the Tang dynasty in A.D. 835.' This edict "prohibited the unautho-
rized reproduction by persons of calendars, almanacs, and related items
3 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE (John Russell Brown ed.,
Arden Shakespeare 1955). All the quotes from The Merchant of Venice in this Article
are taken from this edition of the play.
4 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 13 (1995).
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that might be used for prognostication."5 Because the Chinese consid-
ered the emperor to be the link between human and natural events, this
prohibition was needed to protect the emperor against findings that
would have undermined the dynasty or predicted its downfall.6 By the
end of the Tang dynasty, the edict was further expanded to "prohibit[ ]
the unauthorized copying and distribution of state legal pronouncements
and official histories, and the reproduction, distribution, or possession of
'devilish books and talks' (yaoshu yaoyan) and most works on Buddhism
and Daoism."7 Rather than fostering creation and promoting authorship,
this edict was designed to sustain imperial power.
The Song dynasty expanded this portion of the Tang Code' to include
prepublication review and registration by "order[ing] private printers to
submit works they would publish to local officials."9 The principal goal of
this institution was "to halt the private reproduction of materials that
were either subject to exclusive state control or heterodox."'" In addition
to works covered by the Tang edict, prohibited materials included author-
ized versions of the classics, model answers to imperial service examina-
tions, maps, materials concerning the inner workings of government,
politics, and military affairs, pornography, and writings using the names
of members or ancestors of the imperial family in "inappropriate" literary
styles or in writings that were "not beneficial to scholars."" Like the
British Stationers' Company,' 2 this review and registration system was
mainly instituted to control the dissemination of ideas.
5 Id.; see also TANG CODE art. 110 ("All cases of possession of astronomical
instruments, maps of the heavens, esoteric books, military books, books on the seven
days, the Methods of the Great Monad, or the Methods of the God of Thunder by
private persons punish violators by two years of penal servitude."), translated in 2 THE
TANG CODE 78 (Wallace Johnson trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
6 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 13.
1 Id. (footnote omitted).
8 See generally 1-2 THE TANG CODE, supra note 5, for a collection and analysis of
the Tang Code. The Tang Code was significant for two reasons. First, it was the
oldest surviving code in China today. Although comprehensive legal codes were
enacted in the Qin and Han dynasties, most of these codes have been lost except
through scattered quotations found in other works. ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 12
(1998). Second, the Tang Code was the basis on which the later codes of the Song,
Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties were developed. Id.
9 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 13.
10 Id.
1: Id. at 13-14.
12 For comprehensive discussions of the British Star Chamber and the Stationers'
Company, see generally AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND
HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS (1899); CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS'
COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403-1959 (1960); MARCI A. HAMILTON, THE HISTORICAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 4-8 (Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property No. 5, 1999).
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In the trademark context, the dynastic codes "restrict[ed] the use of
certain symbols associated with either the imperial family (such as the
five-clawed dragon) or officialdom."' 3 They also "barred the imitation of
marks used by the ceramists of Jingdezhen and others making goods for
exclusive imperial use" and forbid certain craftspersons from exporting
their works.' 4 In addition, guild regulations, clan rules, and local laws
protected producers of tea, silk, cloth, paper, and medicines by register-
ing their brand names and symbols they had developed.' 5 Tight family
control and screening of employees were also used to protect the confi-
dentiality of vital manufacturing processes.' 6 Nonetheless, the dynastic
codes and the various regulations and control efforts did not result in any
formal, centralized intellectual property protection.'
7
Indeed, China did not attempt to introduce substantive intellectual
property protection until the early twentieth century. Such protection
arrived "with such inventions and novel ideas as the gunboat, opium,
'most favoured nation' trading status, and extraterritoriality."'" When
China first opened its coastal ports to Western trade in the 1840s, "there
was little foreign investment in China, and trade was confined to items
such as opium, tea, and raw silk, sold as bulk commodities, rather than
under brand names."19 While "there were periodic allegations of inferior
grades of tea being passed off as their more costly counterparts,"2 sub-
stantial problems of intellectual property piracy did not arise until
decades later. By the turn of the twentieth century, foreign imports and
investment had increased substantially, and intellectual property piracy
had become a serious problem.2'
To protect the intellectual property rights of its nationals, the United
States, which had recently acceded to the Paris Convention for the Pro-
13 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 15.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 16. One commentator noted the limitation of clan rules:
The clan rules, as guidance toward ideal conduct, could not be very effective
beyond a certain point, depending upon how well a given clan was organized and
operated. It seems that even the clans which were sufficiently well organized and
wealthy enough to have their genealogies printed did not have the necessary
organizational strength and appeal to make the clan rules rigidly binding upon
their members. The clan rules nonetheless had an impressive normative
influence, even upon members with little education.
Hu-chen Wang Liu, An Analysis of Chinese Clan Rules: Confucian Theories in Action,
in CONFUCIANISM AND CHINESE CIVILIZATION 16, 17 (Arthur F. Wright ed., 1964).
16 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 16.
17 Id. at 15.
18 PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 3 (1997).
19 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 33-34.
20 Id. at 34.
21 Id.
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tection of Industrial Property2 2 and had enacted the Chace Act2 3 to pro-
vide formal intellectual property protection to foreigners, used its
military and economic strength to induce China to sign a commercial
treaty in 1903.24 This treaty represented the United States's first attempt
to convert China into a Western intellectual property regime.25 It
granted copyright, trademark, and patent protection to Americans in
return for reciprocal protection to the Chinese.
26
Despite the 1903 treaty and similar commercial treaties with Britain
and Japan, 7 China did not introduce a substantive copyright law until
1910, a substantive patent law until 1912, and a substantive trademark law
until 1923.28 Though these laws existed on paper, they offered foreigners
very limited intellectual property protection. 9 In fact, due to increasing
industrialization, the growth of the urban elite, and the spread of literacy,
the piracy problem exacerbated despite successful negotiation of the
treaty and the introduction of new intellectual property laws.30
The failure of the United States's first conversion attempt can be attrib-
uted to several factors. First, the United States failed to consider the rele-
vance of its intellectual property model to China and premised the new
regime on a registration system.31 Hampered by problems that were
uniquely Chinese, such as geographical difficulties, high corruption, and
strong regional protectionism, the registration system turned out to be
substantially ineffective, rendering the new intellectual property laws vir-
tually unenforceable. Second, the United States was unable to convince
the Chinese government why intellectual property laws could benefit
China.32 Indeed, most Chinese officials, including the very powerful
Empress Dowager, were skeptical of the need for legal reforms. To these
officials, law reforms were merely "an unfortunate short-term expedient
22 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised in Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
23 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. Under the Chace Act, foreign,
nonresident authors could attain copyright protection in the United States if their
countries offered Americans similar protection.
24 Treaty for Extension of the Commercial Relations Between [China and the
United States], reprinted in TREATiES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING
CHINA 1894-1919 (J.V.A. MacMurray ed., 1921).
25 See Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 2, at 138 ("[The 1903
treaty represents] one of the first efforts by the United States anywhere to use its
strength bilaterally to bring about greater intellectual property protection.").
26 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 37-38.
27 Interestingly, out of these three commercial treaties, the 1903 treaty with the
United States was the only agreement that included patent protection. Id. at 37.
28 Id. at 41-42.
29 Id. at 42.
30 Id. at 43.
31 Id. at 2.
32 Id. at 49.
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needed to calm the restive masses and appease the treaty powers before
Qing power could be reasserted in its proper form."33 Finally, the United
States did not rally the support of Chinese holders of intellectual property
rights behind the new intellectual property regime.34 The United States
also failed to train Chinese officials with responsibilities in the field and
to educate the Chinese populace about the importance of, and rationales
behind, intellectual property rights.3 5
Instead, the United States "presumed that foreign pressure would suf-
fice to induce ready adoption and widespread adhesion to [the intellec-
tual property] laws."36 In the beginning, China was willing to comply
with the treaty because it naively assumed that introducing intellectual
property laws would put an end to the unequal treaties signed in the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century, in particular the extraterritoriality pro-
visions, 7 which allowed foreigners accused of crimes against Chinese
subjects to be tried in China according to their own laws by the represent-
atives of their home government.38 Once the Chinese government real-
ized that legal reforms would not affect China's semi-colonial status, it
lost interest in pursuing those reforms. In fact, the Chinese government
took advantage of the Western position and used legal reforms to provide
leverage against the treaty powers.39
During the Republican era, which immediately followed the fall of the
Qing dynasty, intellectual property rights managed to receive some legis-
lative attention. Shortly after Guomindang took power in 1928, they
promulgated a new copyright law, affording protection to books, music,
photographs, designs, sculpture, and other technical, literary and artistic
works."0 The Nationalist government also issued a new trademark law41
and promulgated the Measures to Encourage Industrial Arts, which
afforded protection to indigenous inventions.42 Notwithstanding these
efforts, "the decades of wars, famines and revolutions scarcely gave them
33 Id. at 47; see also IMMANUEL C.Y. Hso, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 411 (6th
ed. 2000) ("[The late Qing reforms were] a shrewd effort on the part of the dowager
to disguise her shame over her role in the Boxer catastrophe.").
34 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 49.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2.
37 While China was negotiating the commercial treaties with Britain, Japan, and
the United States, the treaty powers hinted that they might relinquish
extraterritoriality if they were satisfied with the state of the Chinese law and the
arrangement for its administration. Id. at 36.
38 Id. at 32. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of
extraterritoriality in China, see generally 1-2 GEORGE W. KEETON, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA (1969).
39 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 49.
40 Id. at 50.
41 Id. at 51.
42 Id. at 52.
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a chance to take root in China., 43 Moreover, the fact that the laws were
transplanted from abroad with scant alteration and that they presumed a
legal structure and legal consciousness that did not exist in China at that
time made implementation very difficult.'
After the Second World War, the prospects of intellectual property
protection became even gloomier. In 1949, the Chinese Communist
Party established the People's Republic of China. By the early 1950s, the
government had "nationalized industry and commerce, collectivized agri-
cultural production and embarked on a socialist command economy.,
45
In such a politico-juridical environment in which formal law and adminis-
trative bureaucracy were denounced,46 "the very notion of privately
owned monopolies or exclusive rights in the use of expressions, ideas and
names became meaningless."47 Even though China reopened its markets
in 1979 and allowed people to own limited private property, the Chinese
had yet to develop a respect for intellectual property rights.
Immediately after the reopening, China and the United States signed
the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of
America and the People's Republic of China48 ("1978 Agreement"),
marking the beginning of Western intellectual property protection in
post-Mao China. This Agreement provided that "each Party shall seek,
under its laws and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to
legal or natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and
trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark protection corre-
spondingly accorded by the other Party."49 The Agreement also pro-
vided that "each Party shall take appropriate measures, under its laws
43 FENG, supra note 18, at 3.
44 As Professor Alford explained:
Structurally, each of these laws granted rights only to those persons who had
registered their intellectual property with the appropriate governmental agencies
and further specified that such rights were to be enforced through recourse to the
nation's court system. Such a registration requirement may have made sense in
the foreign context from which it was borrowed. It was, however, far less
appropriate for China in the early twentieth century, given that, in the words of
Chiang Kai-shek himself, "when something arrives at a government office it is
yamenized-all reform projects are handled lackadaisically, negligently, and
inefficiently," and given the virtual absence of personnel trained to administer
such a registration system.
ALFORD, supra note 4, at 53 (footnote omitted).
45 FENG, supra note 18, at 3; see also Hso, supra note 33, at 652-55 (describing the
economic policies, land revolution, and agricultural reforms in China in the early
1950s).
46 See infra text accompanying notes 215-17 (discussing the lack of rule of law in
Maoist China).
47 FENG, supra note 18, at 3.
48 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, P.R.C.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 4652.
49 Id. art. VI (3), 31 U.S.T. at 4658.
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and regulations and with due regard to international practice, to ensure
to legal or natural persons of the other Party protection of copyrights
equivalent to the copyright protection correspondingly accorded by the
other Party."5 Pursuant to this Agreement, China became a member of
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") in 1980 and the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property5' in 1984.
China also promulgated a new trademark law52 in 1982 and a new patent
statute53 in 1984. Despite these new laws and multilateral agreements,
China afforded authors and inventors very limited protection.
5 4
Initially, the United States was willing to compromise its intellectual
property rights because the country was eager to lure China into the fam-
ily of nations.5 By the mid-1980s, however, American businesses became
impatient with the lack of improvement in intellectual property protec-
tion in China. 6 Urged by American business executives,57 the United
States Trade Representative ("USTR") placed China on the "Priority
Watch List" in 1989.58 In response to this designation, China passed a
50 Id. art. VI (5).
51 Paris Convention, supra note 22.
52 Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in THE LAW OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982, at 305 (1987).
53 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in THE LAWs OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1983-1986, at 65 (1987).
54 Although the new trademark and patent laws granted individuals rights over
their creations and inventions, these laws were designed mainly to promote "socialist
legality with Chinese characteristics." ALFORD, supra note 4, at 70. Uneasy about the
introduction of private property and the potential conflict between intellectual
property rights and the national interest, the Chinese government placed substantial
limits on the rights granted under the new statutes. Id.
55 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 152-53 nn. 67-68.
56 "At a 1985 meeting to the U.S.-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade
(JCCT), the U.S. for the first time expressed concerns about weak Chinese
[intellectual property rights] standards. In 1987, the U.S. put [intellectual property
rights] protection on the agenda for U.S.-China market access talks." Warren H.
Maruyama, U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Rule of
Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND
PRACTICE 165, 186 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
" See Daniel Southerland, U.S. Businesses Urge Trade Sanctions to Stop Piracy of
Soffi'are in China, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1989, at E7.
1s The Priority Watch List includes "countries whose actions, policies, and practices
meet some, but not all, of the criteria for priority foreign country identification.
These actions, policies, or practices warrant active work for resolution and close
monitoring to determine whether further Special 301 action is necessary." Paul C.B.
Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301
Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 95 (1994). By doing so, the United States
gained leverage in negotiations with China while it did not need to initiate a section
301 investigation.
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new copyright law59 and enacted new implementing regulations6" in 1990.
A separate set of computer software regulations6 ' followed in 1991.
Notwithstanding these legislative efforts, the United States found intel-
lectual property protection in China unsatisfactory. In April 1991, the
United States upgraded China to a "Priority Foreign Country. '62 A
month later, the Bush administration initiated an investigation under Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 197463 ("section 301"). To increase its lever-
age, the U.S. government also threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs of
$1.5 billion on Chinese textiles, shoes, electronic instruments, and
pharmaceuticals.64
Although China quickly responded with countersanctions of a similar
amount on American commodities, such as aircraft, cotton, corn, steel,
and chemicals,65 China succumbed to American pressure and signed the
Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United
States on the Protection of Intellectual Property66 ("1992 MOU") hours
before the deadline for imposing sanctions. Pursuant to the 1992 MOU,
59 Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter Copyright Law],
translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAV 128-42
(1996).
60 Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of
China, translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAW,
supra note 59, at 146-56.
61 Computer Software Protection Regulations of the People's Republic of China,
translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAW, supra note
59, at 188-97.
62 OFFICE OF USTR, 1995 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 54 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 NTE REPORT].
63 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994). Section 301 permits the President to investigate
and impose sanctions on countries engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the
United States's economic interests. The goals of the provision are to eliminate unfair
trade practices and to open foreign markets. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive
Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301
TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1, 4 (Jagdish Bhagvati & Hugh T.
Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter AGGRESSrVE UNILATERALISM].
64 Sheryl WuDunn, Nonstate Plants in China at Risk in U.S. Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1992, at A9.
65 David Holley, China Warns of Trade War with U.S. over Patents, Copyrights;
Economic Ties: 'Excessive' Demands May Lead to Higher Tariffs on American
Commodities Worth $1.2 Billion, Beijing Warns, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at A6.
66 Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United States
on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 677
(1995) [hereinafter 1992 MOU]; see also Stuart Auerbach, China, U.S. Reach Trade
Accord; Beijing Agrees to Curb Piracy of Products, Safeguarded Material, WASH.
POST, Jan. 17, 1992, at A24; Keith Bradsher, U.S. and China Reach Accord on
Copying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at D1.
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China amended the 1984 Patent Law, 67 promulgated new patent regula-
tions,6I and acceded to the Patent Cooperation Treaty.69 China also
acceded to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works 7° and ratified the Geneva Convention for Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Phonograms.7 In addition, it amended the 1990 Copyright Law,72
updated its trademark law, and adopted a new unfair competition law
that affords protection to trade secrets.7 3
By 1994, American businesses again complained about the lack of
intellectual property protection in China and the substantial losses
incurred as a result. According to then-USTR Mickey Kantor, enforce-
ment of intellectual property laws in China was "sporadic at best and
virtually non-existent for copyrighted works."'74 In June, the USTR once
again initiated a Special 301 investigation.75 Six months later, the Clinton
67 The new patent law extends the duration of patent protection from 15 to 20
years, affords protection to all chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and
agrichemical products, and sharply restricts the availability of compulsory licenses.
Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAWv, supra note 59, at 66-79; see also 1992 MOU, supra
note 66, art. 1(1), 34 I.L.M. at 677 (stating that China will exert its best efforts to
implement amendments to the Patent Law by January 1, 1993).
68 Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China,
translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAW, supra note
59, at 83-116.
69 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
70 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised in Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; see also 1992 MOU,
supra note 66, art. 3(1), 34 I.L.M. at 680-81 (stipulating that China will adhere to the
Berne Convention and will enact legislation authorizing such accession).
71 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 28, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309; see also
1992 MOU, supra note 66, art. 3(2), 34 I.L.M. at 681 (stipulating that China will
accede to and ratify the Geneva Convention).
72 The amended statute protects computer software programs as literary works for
50 years, removes formalities on copyright protection, and extends protection to all
works originating in a Berne country, including sound recordings that have fallen into
the public domain. See 1992 MOU, supra note 66, art. 3(4), 34 I.L.M. at 681.
73 Id. art. 4, 34 I.L.M. at 683.
74 Gregory S. Feder, Note, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China:
You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But You Can't Make It Drink, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 223,
242 (1996).
75 1995 NTE REPORT, supra note 62, at 54. Special 301 was enacted as part of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1994),
which amended section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Id. §§ 2411-2420. Special 301
requires the USTR to identify foreign countries that provide inadequate intellectual
property protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair or
equitable market access. Id. § 2242(a)(1)(A). Upon identification, the USTR must
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administration threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on more than $1
billion worth of Chinese imports. In response to the United States's
threat, China retaliated with a counterthreat of 100 percent tariffs on
U.S.-made compact discs, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and other prod-
ucts.7" China also threatened to suspend negotiations with American
automakers over the establishment of joint ventures in China for manu-
facturing mini-vans and passenger cars. Such establishment was one of
the top trade priorities of the Clinton administration.77 Hours before the
deadline, however, both countries reached a compromise by exchanging a
set of correspondence, which later constituted the Agreement Regarding
Intellectual Property Rights7" ("1995 Agreement").
The 1995 Agreement summarized the enforcement measures China
had undertaken in the past few months and those it would undertake in
the near future. It included a pledge to improve market access for Amer-
ican products and to promote transparency by publishing all laws, rules,
and regulations concerning limitation on imports, joint ventures, and
other economic activities.79 The Agreement also delineated the mutual
responsibilities that would be undertaken by both countries, such as train-
ing customs officers and bureaucrats, exchanging information and statis-
tics, and undertaking future consultations.
In addition, the Agreement provided a series of short-term and long-
term remedial measures, which included the establishment of the State
initiate within 30 days an investigation into the act, policy, or practice of the identified
country, id. § 2412(b)(2)(A), and request a consultation with the country regarding its
offending practices. Id. § 2413(a)(1). If the issues remain unresolved after six
months, id. § 2414(a)(3)(A), which may be extended to nine months under certain
statutory conditions, id. § 2414(a)(3)(B), the USTR may suspend or withdraw trade
benefits, impose duties or other restrictions, or enter into binding agreements that
require the offending nation to eliminate or phase out its offending practice or to
compensate the United States. Id. § 2411(c)(1).
76 Martha M. Hamilton, U.S. to Hit China with Stiff Tariffs; Sanctions Are Largest
Ever Imposed, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1995, at Al.
77 David E. Sanger, President Imposes Trade Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1995, at Al.
78 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, P.R.C.-U.S.,
34 I.L.M. 881 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Agreement]. The 1995 Agreement comprised
a letter from Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu i to
USTR Mickey Kantor, Letter from Wu Yi, Minster of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation, People's Republic of China, to Mickey Kantor, United States Trade
Representative (Feb. 26, 1995), in 1995 Agreement, supra, 34 I.L.M. at 882
[hereinafter Agreement Letter], and the Action Plan for Effective Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. Action Plan for Effective Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in 1995 Agreement, supra, 34 I.L.M.
at 887 [hereinafter Action Plan].
79 Agreement Letter, supra note 78, 34 I.L.M. at 884-86.
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Council Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights; ° the crea-
tion of Enforcement Task Forces;81 the adoption of a copyright verifica-
tion system that protects compact discs, laser discs, and CD-ROMs;82 the
requirement for title registration of foreign audiovisual products and
computer software in CD-ROM format;83 and the intensification of bor-
der control by customs officers.' It also provided for a six-month "spe-
cial enforcement period," during which intensive efforts would be
undertaken to crack down on the major infringers of intellectual property
rights and to target regions in which infringing activity was particularly
rampant at the time of the Agreement. 8'
Although the United States found early implementation of the Agree-
ment promising,8" the Agreement had become apparently inadequate by
80 The Working Conference was responsible for the central organization and
coordination of protection and enforcement of all intellectual property laws
throughout the country. Action Plan, supra note 78, § I[A], 34 I.L.M. at 887-89. It
was specially designed to target local protectionism and the vulnerability of the
Chinese judicial system to such a problem. See Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual
Property Rights in the P.R. C.: Impediments to Protection and the Need for the Rule of
Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 18 (1996) ("In drafting the 1995 MOU, it appears
that China and the U.S. understood that the weaknesses of China's judicial system
made it especially susceptible to localism."). In April 1998, the Chinese government
established the State Intellectual Property Office, a ministry-level branch of the State
Council. This Office took over the responsibility of the Working Conference. HONG
XUE AND CHENGSI ZHENG, SOFrwARE PROTECTION IN CnINA: A COMPLETE GUIDE
21-22 (1999).
81 These Task Forces consisted of administrative and other authorities responsible
for intellectual property protection, such as the National Copyright Administration,
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the Patent Office, police at
various levels, and customs officials. They were authorized to enter and search any
premises that allegedly infringed on intellectual property rights, review books and
records for evidence of infringement and damages, seal suspected goods, and
confiscate materials and implements directly and predominantly used to make
infringing goods. When infringement was found, the Task Forces had authority to
impose fines, to order a stoppage of production, reproduction, and sale of infringing
goods, to revoke production permits, to confiscate and destroy without compensation
the infringing goods and the materials and implements used to manufacture the
counterfeit products. Action Plan, supra note 78, § I[B][1], 34 I.L.M. at 890.
82 Id. § I[H], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
83 Id. § I[HJ[2][a], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
84 Id. § I[G], 34 I.L.M. at 900-03.
85 Id. pmbl., § I[C], 34 I.L.M. at 887, 892.
86 See Feder, supra note 74, at 245 ("In the first few months of the enforcement
period, U.S. government officials remarked that implementation of the Agreement
was 'very promising,' with Chinese government officials conducting 'massive raids'
against [intellectual property rights] infringers throughout the country."); see also
Helen Cooper & Kathy Chen, China Averts Trade War with the U.S., Promising a
Campaign Against Piracy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at A3 (reporting that many
considered the 1995 Agreement "the single most comprehensive and detailed
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November 1995.87 In May 1996, the Clinton administration again desig-
nated China as a Priority Foreign Country and threatened to initiate a
Special 301 investigation. 8 A couple of weeks later, the administration
announced its intention to impose about $2 billion worth of trade sanc-
tions on Chinese textiles, garments, consumer electronics, sporting goods,
and bicycles. Within thirty minutes of the announcement, China
responded with retaliatory sanctions of a similar amount on American
agricultural products, cars and car parts, telecommunications equipment,
and compact discs.8 9
Even though China and the United States eventually averted a poten-
tial trade war by reaching a new accord in the eleventh hour, such an
accord merely reaffirmed China's commitment to protect intellectual
property rights made under the 1995 Agreement." It neither included
any new terms nor increased market access for American products.9'
Even worse, as I have argued elsewhere, the 1996 Accord has demon-
strated the ineffectiveness of the American intellectual property policy
[intellectual property] enforcement agreement the U.S. had ever concluded"); Martha
M. Hamilton & Steven Mufson, Clinton Hails Accord with China on Trade: Piracy
Enforcement Provision Called Tough, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al ("This is a
strong agreement for American companies and American workers." (statement of
William Clinton, President of the United States)).
87 Paul Blustein, U.S. Warns China to Step Up Efforts Against 'Piracy,' WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at B13. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, then-deputy USTR Charlene Barshefsky stated that,
despite the raids on retailers of pirated goods and the efforts to establish intellectual
property courts, "China's overall implementation of the agreement falls far short of
the requirements of the agreement." Id.; see also OFFICE OF USTR, 1996 NATIONAL
TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 54 (1996) ("U.S. and other
foreign industry representatives reported that pirated and counterfeit goods exported
from China to third markets continued at the same or even higher levels than before
conclusion of the 1995 [intellectual property rights] enforcement agreement ....").
88 Richard W. Stevenson, U.S. Cites China for Failing to Curb Piracy in Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1996, at D4.
89 Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, U.S. and China Announce Tariff Targets as Both
Nations Step Up Trade Rhetoric, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1996, at A3 [hereinafter
Cooper & Chen, U.S. and China Announce Tariff Targets].
90 See China Implementation of the 1995 Intellectual Property Rights Agreement,
June 17, 1996, P.R.C.-U.S., at http://wvw.mac.doc.gov/TCC/DATA/index.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2001). The terms of the Accord included the closing of pirate plants,
criminal prosecution for those who violate intellectual property regulations, a special
enforcement period where police assume responsibility for the investigation of piracy,
improved border surveillance by customs officers, and a registration system for
compact disc manufacturers. See id.
91 Cf. CHENGSI ZHENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA:
LEADING CASES AND COMMENTARY xxvi (1997) ("In the 1996 Sino-U.S. negotiations,
what the USTR really wanted was not the impossible short term elimination of pirate
copies, but access to the Chinese markets for its cultural products.").
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toward China 92 and the increasing reluctance of the Chinese government
to bow down to foreign pressure in the intellectual property arena.93
Since the 1996 Accord, the Chinese government has made substantial
efforts to improve intellectual property protection in the country, in the
hope that China will be able to join the World Trade Organization
("WTO") in the very near future.94 In light of these increased efforts, the
U.S. government has shelved its coercive policy and has not imposed any
new section 301 sanctions. However, intellectual property piracy is still
rampant in China today. Every year, the United States loses more than
$2 billion of revenues due to intellectual property piracy in China alone.9"
92 The following pattern of events illustrates well the ineffectiveness of the
American intellectual property policy toward China. The United States begins by
threatening China with trade sanctions. In response, China retaliates with
countersanctions of a similar amount. After several months of bickering and
posturing, both countries come to a last minute compromise by signing a new
intellectual property agreement. While intellectual property protection improves
during the first few months immediately after the signing of the agreement, the piracy
problem revives once international attention is diverted and the foreign push
dissipates. Within a short period of time, American businesses again complain to the
United States government, and the cycle repeats itself. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates
to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-first Century, 50
Ai. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001), for a discussion of this pattern of events.
93 Id.
94 These measures included the issuance of the Regulations on Certification and
Protection of Famous Trademarks and the Regulations on the Protection of New
Plant Varieties, the inclusion of a section on intellectual property crimes within the
Criminal Law, the reorganization of the State Patent Bureau into the State
Intellectual Property Office, and the establishment of intellectual property research
and training centers. See id. (describing the various measures the Chinese
government had undertaken to improve intellectual property protection in the
country).
95 Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998,
at D1 [hereinafter Faison, China Turns Blind Eye]; see also OFFICE OF USTR, 2000
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 50 (2000)
(reporting that significant problems exist with the enforcement of intellectual
property laws at the grassroots level in China); Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in
the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 11 (2000) ("Although the level of
copyright piracy seems to have decreased recently in China due to aggressive
campaigning by copyright owners, trademark counterfeiting continues to increase."
(footnote omitted)); Tom Korski, AV Piracy Still "Rampant" Despite Crackdowns,
Chinese Authorities Say, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D3 (Jan. 21,
1998) ("[P]iracy of audio-visual products in China remains 'rampant' despite
expanded police raids on black marketeers . . . ."); Steven Mufson, Piracy Still Runs
Rampant in China; Yet Industries Oppose Asking for Sanctions, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
1998, at E3 ("Despite the 1996 accord, the value of pirated goods in China grew to an
estimated $ 2.8 billion in 1997 from about $ 2.3 billion in 1996, according to the
International Intellectual Property Alliance.").
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As the Chinese economy grows, these losses may continue to increase
even if the piracy problem does not worsen.
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE WEST
Since the mid-1980s, the U.S.-China intellectual property conflict has
entered into the public debate. This conflict has also been frequently dis-
cussed and debated in Congress, in particular during those times when
the renewal of China's most-favored-nation status was in question.
Despite the importance of this issue, the public debate thus far has been
one-sided, focusing primarily on the unfair competition aspect.
Undeniably, there are some greedy Chinese who are eager to free ride
on the creative efforts of Western authors and inventors. However, greed
alone cannot explain this century-old intellectual property conflict. To
understand the roots of the conflict, one must focus on the significant
political, social, economic, and cultural differences between China and
the West, which continue to frustrate the United States's conversion
efforts and the intellectual property law reforms in China. Unless the
Chinese government introduces reforms that are sensitive to these differ-
ences, the piracy problem will continue.
A. Confucianism and Cultural Practices
For more than 2000 years, the Chinese had been heavily influenced by
Confucianism,96 which provided "the blueprint of an ideal life"'97 and the
yardstick against which human relationships were to be measured.9" To
the Chinese, the past was not only a reflection of contemporary society,
but also the embodiment of cultural and social values.99 By encountering
96 "Although Taoism and Buddhism were also influential in some periods and in
some aspects of life, Confucianism had never been displaced as the basic philosophy
of the Chinese state and society-until the beginning of the twentieth century."
CHmN, supra note 8, at 9. As Professor Yao pointed out insightfully:
On many occasions Confucianism gained strength and positive influence from[the general changes in political, social, economic, religious, and cultural life], yet
on other occasions it suffered from the breakdown of the social fabric and
responded by becoming either more flexible or more dogmatic. Throughout the
history of the Chinese dynasties, Confucianism changed and adapted itself to new
political and social demands, and these changes and adaptations are as important
as the teachings of the early Confucian masters.
XINZHONG YAO, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFUcIANIsM 4 (2000). For excellent dis-
cussions of Confucianism, see generally CONFuciANISM AND CHINESE CIVILIZATION,
supra note 15; YAO, supra. For excellent collections of essays discussing Chinese phi-
losophy and the Chinese mind, see generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHINESE PEO-
PLE (Michael Harris Bond ed., 1986); UNDERSTANDING THE CHINESE MIND: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS (Robert E. Allinson ed., 1991).
97 YAO, supra note 96, at 50.
98 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 20.
99 Id. at 26.
PIRACY, PREJUDICE, AND PERSPECTIVES
the past, one could understand the Way of Heaven,"' obtain guidance to
future behavior,'' and find out the ultimate meaning of human exis-
tence. 10 2 One could also transform oneself and build his or her moral
character through self-cultivation.0 3 Thus, materials and information
about the past had to be put in the public domain for people to borrow or
to transmit to younger generations. 0 4 Because intellectual property
rights allow a significant few to monopolize these needed materials, they
prevent the vast majority from understanding their life, culture, and soci-
ety. Intellectual property rights therefore "contradict[ ] traditional Chi-
nese moral standards.', 10 5
Unlike Westerners today, the Chinese in the imperial past did not con-
sider copying or imitation a moral offense. Rather, they considered it "a
noble art,"1 6 a "time-honored learning process' 07 through which people
100 YAO, supra note 96, at 50 ("Confucians believe that in the classics, heavenly
principles are revealed to them and that by studying these classics and books they will
be able to understand the Way of Heaven and by applying it to human life they can
establish the Way of humanity.").
101 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 26; see YAO, supra note 96, at 50 ("The customs and
events of the past are believed to serve as a mirror of the present and the guide to the
future.").
102 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 25 ("The essence of human understanding had long
since been discerned by those who had gone before and, in particular, by the sage
rulers collectively referred to as the Ancients, who lived in a distant, idealized 'golden
age."'); YAO, supra note 96, at 139 ("The Way (dao) is fundamental to the Confucian
view of the world, concerning the question of the ultimate meaning of human
existence."); see also STEPHEN OWEN, REMEMBRANCES: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
PAST IN CHINESE LITERATuRE 15 (1986) ("[T]he experience of the past roughly
corresponds to and carries the same force as the attention to meaning or truth in the
Western tradition.").
103 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 20 (noting that the past served as "the instrument
through which individual moral development was to be attained"); THE ANALECTS OF
CoNFuCIus bk. XVII, 4 (Arthur Waley trans., Vintage 1989) [hereinafter
ANALECrS] ("A gentleman who has studied the Way will be all the tenderer towards
his fellow-men; a commoner who has studied the Way will be all the easier to
employ." (internal quotations omitted)); YAO, supra note 96, at 30 ("Confucian
Learning is the study of the Way of Heaven both in the inner self and in external
practices. The only purpose of learning is the promotion of virtuous action and the
cultivation of a moral character .. ").
104 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 20 ("The indispensability of the past for personal
moral growth dictated that there be broad access to the common heritage of all
Chinese.").
1o Patrick H. Hu, "Mickey Mouse" in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in
Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 81, 104 (1996).
106 Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement. Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VArD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 619 (1996) [hereinafter Hamilton,
TRIPS Agreement]. A case in point is the art of linmo, a technique of hand-copying a
master's work. As Professor Feng described:
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manifested respect for their ancestors. 108 At a very young age, Chinese
children were taught to memorize and copy the classics and histories. 0 9
On the one hand, such undertaking would instill in the youngsters famil-
ial values, filial piety, and respect for their cultural legacy. On the other
hand, copying was practically needed to ensure success in the imperial
civil service examinations," 0 which emphasized the knowledge of the
Confucian Four Books and the Five Classics.1 ' Success in those exami-
nations would not only bring power and glory to the candidates, but
would also bring honor to their families, districts, and provinces.
When the Chinese grew up, they were by training compilers, as com-
pared to composers.11 "Having memorized vast sequences of the classics
Hand-copying (linmo) of a master's work is a pedagogical regimen in traditional
Chinese painting and calligraphy. As practised, linmo is usually done with the
same tools and materials (brush, ink, pigments, paper, etc.) as the original. It
differs from tracing, in that it involves not only demanding skills and discipline,
but vigorous mental process and effort to absorb and express the master's
technique, style and spirit. Hence good linmo is considered an art on its own
right.
FENG, supra note 18, at 62. Because of the importance of this art, the Copyright Law
includes a special linmo exception. Copyright Law, supra note 59, art. 22(10).
107 Hu, supra note 105, at 104.
108 See J. DAVID MURPHY, PLUNDER AND PRESERVATION: CULTURAL PROPERTY
LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 30 (1995); see id.
("Chinese writers, artists, and creators in all areas of knowledge had significant
reverence and attachment for the past which resulted in legitimized copying."); id. at
31 ("[Forgeries were not always stigmatized; emulation was regarded as a form of
appreciation."); see also ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 254
(1952) ("Admiration induces imitation; the closer the imitation, the narrower the
dividing line between it and outright copying.").
L09 See JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION 1800-1985, at
28 (1987) ("To prepare for the [civil] examinations a boy began at age seven or so and
in about six years memorized the Four Books and Five Classics, which totaled 431,000
characters."); see also YAO, supra note 96, at 50 (noting that Confucian followers were
required to learn the texts by heart).
110 FAIRBANK, supra note 109, at 28. For an overview of the civil service
examination in imperial China, see generally Hsi, supra note 33, at 75-80. For a
comprehensive discussion of the civil service examination systems in the Tang, Song,
Ming, and Qing dynasties, see Mu CH'IEN, TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN IMPERIAL
CHINA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 48-53, 77-80, 109-13, 134-37 (Chti-tu Hstieh & George
0. Totten trans., 1982).
"I This emphasis was mainly due to the Chinese belief that knowledge of the past
demonstrated one's ability to resolve problems of the present. ALFORD, supra note 4,
at 21-22. The Confucian Four Books include The Analects, The Book of the Mean,
The Book of Mencius, and The Great Learning. The Five Classics refer to The Book
of Odes, The Book of History, The Book of Changes, The Book of Rites, and The
Spring and Autumn Annals.
112 JoHN KING FAiRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 100-01
(1998).
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and histories, they constructed their own works by extensive cut-and-
paste replication of phrases and passages from those sources."113 To the
Chinese, the classics and histories constituted the universal language 14
through which they communicated." 5 Although their unacknowledged
quotation may be considered plagiarism today, the Chinese in the impe-
rial past regarded such a practice as an acceptable, legitimate, or even
necessary, component of the creative process. Indeed, Chinese writers
from early times saw themselves more as preservers of historical record
and cultural heritage than as creators.1 6 Even Confucius, one of the
greatest philosophers of all time, proudly acknowledged that he had
"transmitted what was taught to [him] without making up anything of
[his] own."117
To a very great extent, this compiling tradition was similar to that held
by Westerners before the emergence of the contemporary notion of
authorship in the eighteenth century. 8 Unlike contemporary writers,
"[m]edieval church writers actively disapproved of the elements of origi-
nality and creativeness which we think of as essential component of
authorship. 'They valued extant old books more highly than any recent
elucubrations and they put the work of the scribe and the copyist above
that of the authors.'"" Although writers in later periods changed their
attitudes toward originality and creativeness, they did not espouse mod-
em attitudes toward plagiarism. Rather, like the Chinese people, they
regarded imitation as the sincerest form of flattery and a necessary com-
113 Id. at 101.
114 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 26 (noting that allusion and reference to the
classics and histories constituted "a sophisticated cultural shorthand" that was
potentially accessible throughout the Sinicized world); JOSEPH LEVENSON,
CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE: A TRILOGY xvii (1968) (noting that
citation to the classics was "the very method of universal speech").
115 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 26.
116 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 112, at 101; see also YAO, supra note 96, at
53 (noting that the Old Text School of Confucianism considered Confucius a
preserver of early writings -who transmitted those writings to later generations).
117 ANALECTS, supra note 103, bk. VII, 1 (emphasis added and internal
quotations omitted).
118 See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OvNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
(1993); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author,' 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDS. 425
(1984). For an excellent collection of essays examining the concept of authorship, see
generally THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW
AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
119 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFr vARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SOCIETY 53 (1996) (quoting ERNST P.
GOLDSCHMIDT, MEDIEVAL TExTS AND THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE IN PRINT 112
(1943)).
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ponent of the creative process.'2 0 For example, in The Defence of Poesy,
Sir Philip Sidney maintained that poetry "is an art of imitation... [and]
counterfeiting."'' Likewise, "Shakespeare engaged regularly in activity
that we would call plagiarism but that Elizabethan playwrights saw as
perfectly harmless, perhaps even complimentary."' 22
Finally, the Chinese subscribed to the Confucian vision of civilization.
Under this vision, the family constituted the basic unit of human commu-
nity, and the world was an outgrowth of this basic unit.'23 Emphasizing
familial values and collective rights,' the Chinese did not develop a con-
cept of individual rights. They also did not regard creativity as individual
property. Instead, they considered creativity as a collective benefit to
their community and the posterity. 25 Having a strong disdain for com-
120 See id. at 54.
121 SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, THE DEFENSE OF POESY (1595), in THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 479, 483 (M.H. Abrams ed., 6th ed. 1993)
(footnote omitted); see also ROSE, supra note 118, at 13.
122 BOYLE, supra note 119, at 230 n.12; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 382 & n.3 (1988) ("Shakespeare was by
modem standards a plagiarist, but by the standards of his time not.... A competing
playwright, Robert Greene, called Shakespeare 'an upstart Crow, beautified with our
feathers."); see also LINDEY, supra note 108, at 72 ("Borrowing flourished in
sixteenth-century England. It was often flagrant enough to constitute plagiarism. The
Elizabethans did not bother to devise plots, incidents and characters; they lifted them
from their predecessors and from each other."). As Professor Boyle pointed out,
Shakespeare's "plagiarism" is the main reason why critics doubt the authorship of
what we attribute to Shakespeare. See BOYLE, supra note 119, at 230 n.12; see also
JOHN MICELL, WHO WROTE SHAKESPEARE? (1999) (examining questions concerning
the authorship of Shakespeare's plays and sonnets); James Boyle, The Search for an
Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. Rv. 625 (1988) (examining the
similarities between textual indeterminancy and the notion of romantic authorship).
123 See YAO, supra note 96, at 33 ("[Confucian ethics] takes virtues as the
cornerstone of social order and world peace. Its logic is that the family is the basic
unit of the human community and that harmonious family relationships will inevitably
lead to a harmonious society and a peaceful state.").
124 For discussions of the Chinese communitarian perspective, see generally
DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST
ASIA (2000); CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. Theodore de Bary & TV
Weiming eds., 1998); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael
C. Davis ed., 1995); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R.
Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).
125 Hu, supra note 105, at 104; Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intellectual Property in
the P.R.C.: Progress Problems, and Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140, 160
(1994) [hereinafter Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals]; see ALFORD, supra note
4, at 29 ("[T]rue scholars wrote for edification and moral renewal, rather than
profit.").
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merce,126 they greatly despised those who created works for sheer
profit.1 27
B. Socialist Economic System
While the Communist government did not emphasize Confucianism
until very recently, 2 ' its view on the function of creative works is similar
to that of the Confucianists. 129 Under the socialist economic system,
property belongs to the State and the people, rather than private owners.
Authors thus create literary and artistic works for the welfare of the
State, rather than for the purpose of generating economic benefits for
themselves. 3 Indeed, in a socialist society, "owning property is tanta-
mount to a sin. Thus, stealing an object that is owned by someone else is
less corrupt than owning it outright yourself."''
This aversion of private property was particularly strengthened by the
numerous mass campaigns and endless class struggles that took place dur-
ing the Mao era. Among the various mass campaigns, the Great Proleta-
riat Cultural Revolution was the most severe and devastating.'32 During
the Cultural Revolution, the government heavily criticized scientists,
126 Merchants were considered the lowest among the four social classes in a
traditional Chinese society. These four classes were, in descending order, scholar-
official (shih), farmer (nung), artisan (kung), and merchant (shang).
127 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 29 ("[T]he Confucian disdain for commerce fostered
an ideal ... that true scholars wrote for edification and moral renewal rather than
profit."); see also Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 15, 36-56 (1993) (discussing how Confucianism smothered the
impulse to commercial profit).
128 See Win. Theodore de Bary, Preface to CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 124, at xvi-xvii (discussing the recent revival of Confucianism by the
Chinese leaders); see also YAO, supra note 96, at 274-79 (describing the recent revival
of Confucian values).
129 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 56 (arguing that the Soviet model "reflected
traditional Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property"); see also PETER HOWARD
CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 25
(1997) ("Mao had no wish to rid society of the many useful Confucian 'virtues'.
Rather, he intended to retain them whilst removing their association with
Confucianism.").
130 Hu, supra note 105, at 104; see also Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual
Property in China and the Former Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International
Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 11 (1998) ("The Soviet model reflected
traditional Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property and expounded the socialist
belief that by inventing or creating, individuals were engaging in social activities based
on knowledge that belonged to all members of society.").
131 Tiefenbrun, supra note 130, at 37-38.
132 See CHEN, supra note 8, at 30-33, for a discussion of the impact of the Cultural
Revolution on the Chinese legal system and profession. See generally JUNG CHANG,
WILD SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA 273-443 (1991), for an insightful
personal account of the Cultural Revolution.
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writers, artists, lawyers, and intellectuals and routinely condemned them
to harsh prison terms.'33 Fearing political repercussions, many Chinese
became "unwilling to acknowledge their personal role in [creative and]
inventive activity.' 1 4 Instead, they used pseudonyms and put pure and
non-identifying labels, such as "Red Flag," "East Wind," and "Worker-
Peasant-Soldier," on their products.135
Even worse, many Chinese developed contempt for authorship and
remuneration from creative efforts. As one comrade would argue during
the Cultural Revolution, "[i]s it necessary for a steel worker to put his
name on a steel ingot that he produces in the course of his duty? If not,
why should a member of the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting
his name on what he produces?' 1 6 Even though Deng Xiaoping and
other Chinese leaders tried to rehabilitate the intelligentsia after the Cul-
tural Revolution by enhancing their positions and facilitating their
endeavors,137 these reforms have yet to cultivate respect for intellectual
property rights.
C. Self-strengthening Worldview
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, China was constantly
attacked by Western powers. Under the Treaty of Nanjing of 1842, which
was signed after China's defeat in the Opium War, China ceded Hong
Kong Island to Britain and was forced to open five coastal ports to West-
ern trade.'3 Since the Opium War, China had experienced repeated
attacks by Western imperialist powers and was forced to sign unequal
treaties giving out significant economic and territorial concessions. Such
submission eventually led to the "Scramble for Concessions" in 1898, in
which foreign imperialist powers carved the country "into leased territo-
ries and spheres of interest, within which they constructed railways,
opened mines, established factories, operated banks, and ran all kinds of
exploitive organizations.' 1 9
Desperate to save the country, the Chinese adopted a self-strengthen-
ing worldview, under which attaining independence and liberating the
133 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 63-64.
134 Id. at 64.
.35 Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People's Republic of
China, 21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 259, 272 (1986).
136 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 65.
137 Id.
138 Treaty Between China and Great Britain, Signed at Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842,
China-Gr. Brit., reprinted in YASH GHAi, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDR: THE RESUMP'rION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 504-07
(1997).
139 Hso, supra note 33, at 344.
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nation became the country's first priority. 4 ° In the beginning, self-
strengthening was mainly limited to diplomatic, military, and industrial
reforms. 4' After China's defeats in the Sino-French War in 1885 and the
Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Chinese reformers realized the inadequacy of
limited modernization and the need for drastic institutional changes.
Inspired by successful reforms introduced by Peter the Great and
Emperor Meiji, these reformers advocated radical reforms of the civil ser-
vice examinations, education, and political institutions. 42 Unfortunately,
due to the reformers' inexperience and the strong conservative opposi-
tion in the imperial court, these reforms remained largely futile.
4 3
The 1911 Revolution led to the abdication of the Manchu Emperor,
ending 268 years of Qing rule and more than 2000 years of imperial
dynasties.'" Notwithstanding the founding of the new republic, China
had yet to experience peace, order, or unity. In fact, "the early republi-
can years were characterized by moral degradation, monarchist move-
ments, warlordism, and intensified foreign imperialism."' 4 Frustrated by
China's backwardness and its semi-colonial status, the new intelligentsia,
many of whom were trained in the West or were influenced by Western
philosophy, advocated "a radical change in the philosophical foundations
of national life." In particular, they "called for a critical re-evaluation of
China's cultural heritage in the light of modern Western standards, a will-
ingness to part with those elements that had made China weak, and a
determination to accept Western science, democracy, and culture as the
foundation of a new order.'
146
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Repub-
lic of China. Despite the change in government, the self-strengthening
worldview persists. Subscribing to this worldview, many Chinese
believed it was right to freely reproduce or to tolerate the unauthorized
reproduction of foreign works that would help strengthen the country.'
47
Some of them also believed that copying was needed, or even necessary,
for China to catch up with Western developed countries. Thus, one could
140 Xiang Rui Gong, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: The Chinese View
Under the Notion of One Country, Two Systems, in THE HONG KONG BILL OF
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 492 (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993).
141 The Self-strengthening Movement lasted from 1861 to 1895. See Hso, supra
note 33, at 261-312, for a discussion of the Self-strengthening Movement.
142 See id. at 355-86, 408-18, for a discussion of political reforms in the late Qing
period.
143 See id. at 380-84 for a discussion of the failure of the Reform Movement of
1898.
144 Id. at 474.
145 Id. at 493.
146 Id.
147 See Sidel, supra note 135, at 271 (noting the use and application by the Chinese
of technology, techniques, and products developed in more advanced countries
without paying any royalties).
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easily find bookstores containing "special" rooms selling pirated works
from Western publishers. 4 ' One could also find Reference News
(Cankao Xiaoxi) providing translated excerpts from foreign news materi-
als published abroad.'49 Even today, the Chinese sometimes refer to
pirated computer programs "as 'patriotic software,' out of a belief that it
speeds the nation's modernization at little or no cost."' 50
D. Skepticism, Xenophobia, and Nationalism
Before the Opium War, the Chinese regarded foreigners as "outer
barbarians" and believed the country had no need for foreign objects,
manufactures, and ideas.15' Ignorant and complacent, Emperor Qianlong
of the Qing dynasty told King George III of England: "We possess all
things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for
your country's manufactures.' 52 A couple of centuries later, the scien-
tific progress and military prowess of Western powers had proven
Qianlong wrong. In fact, they brought China two centuries of tremen-
dous pain and humiliation. It was not until the resumption of sovereignty
in Hong Kong in 1997 that China was able to recover from all the unequal
treaties signed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Although China's defeats in the Opium War and the subsequent Arrow
War had awakened the Chinese and made them aware of their country's
backwardness, many Chinese, in particular those in the imperial court,
were still skeptical of Western technology, ideas, and institutions.153
Indeed, "[t]he great majority of the scholar-official class regarded foreign
affairs and Western-style enterprises as 'dirty' and 'vulgar,' beneath their
148 See Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 1081,
1082 (1996) (describing "special" rooms in bookstores that sell pirated works to local
Chinese people).
149 See DANIEL C. LYNCH, AFTER THE PROPAGANDA STATE: MEDIA, POLITICS,
AND "THOUGHT WORK" IN REFORMED CHINA 133 (1999).
150 James Cox, U.S. Firms: Piracy Thrives in China, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1995, at
2B.
151 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 30-31; see also Hso, supra note 33, at 142 ("The
Chinese attitude toward foreign trade was an outgrowth of their tributary mentality.
It postulated that the bountiful Middle Kingdom had no need for things foreign, but
that the benevolent emperor allowed trade as a mark of favor to foreigners and as a
means of restraining their gratitude."). See id. at 130-34 for a discussion of the
Chinese tributary mentality.
152 Letter from the Qianlong Emperor to King George III of England, Oct. 3,
1793, quoted in Hso, supra note 33, at 161.
153 See Hso, supra note 33, at 289 ("Western machines and industrial management
were alien to the traditional Chinese mentality."); see also id. 281-82 (discussing the
conservative opposition within the imperial court).
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dignity."' 54 As a result, China's early modernization efforts were limited
to firearms, ships, machines, communications, mining, and light indus-
tries, and "[n]o attempts were made to assimilate Western institutions,
philosophy, arts, and culture."' 55 Indeed, the skepticism of the conserva-
tive Qing court was one of the main reasons for the failure of these mod-
ermization efforts. 56
While skepticism toward Western objects and ideas made the Qing
court reluctant to introduce modernization reforms, the xenophobic and
nationalist sentiments among the Chinese populace 157 made implementa-
tion of those reforms difficult. To a very great extent, the Chinese nation-
alist and xenophobic sentiments were "a reaction to the humiliation that
China suffered under the hands of Western imperialism."' 158 These senti-
ments began to grow after China's defeat in the Opium War, which led to
rapid inflation and an influx of foreign goods.' 9 Subsequent foreign
attacks and signings of unequal treaties also resulted in the unpopular
invasion of Christianity and unwanted presence of foreign troops, minis-
ters, consuls, missionaries and traders in China.' 60
By the turn of the twentieth century, foreign industries and investments
had dominated almost all modern industries and enterprises in China.'61
Such domination disrupted the self-sufficient agrarian economy, dis-
placed the native handicraft industries, 162 and shattered traditional family
1'4 Id. at 289-90; see also id. at 289 ("[M]en of talent and integrity usually steered
clear of foreign matters and enterprises; only the lesser characters were willing to
associate with the modernization projects . . .
155 See id. at 287.
156 See id. at 289-90 (discussing the social and psychological inertia that hampered
the Self-strengthening Movement).
157 For discussions of nationalist sentiments in China, see generally CHINESE
NATIONALISM (Jonathan Unger ed., 1996); YONONIAN ZHENG, DISCOVERING
CHINESE NATIONALISM IN CHINA: MODERNIZATION, IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 154 (1999) [hereinafter ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM].
158 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 157, at 154.
15' See Hso, supra note 33, at 223-24 (describing the socio-economic impact of the
Opium War on the Chinese people).
160 Id. at 388. The Treaties of Tianjin in 1858 allowed for the free propagation of
Christianity in the interior. The Conventions of Beijing in 1860 further granted
missionaries the right to rent and buy land to build churches. Protected by the flag
and the treaties, the missionaries moved about freely in China.
161 See id. at 432-35 (describing the foreigners' dominating role in modem Chinese
industries and enterprises). "84 percent of shipping, 34 percent of cotton-yam
spinning, and 100 percent of iron production were under foreign control in 1907, while
93 percent of railways were foreign-dominated in 1911." Id. at 436.
162 Professor Hsfi described how the impact of foreign goods and investments on
the Chinese economy:
The influx of foreign commodities under preferential customs and the right of
foreigners after 1895 to engage in local manufacturing disastrously affected the
native handicraft industries and agrarian economy. Foreigners dominated
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relationships.'63 Added to these hardships were floods in Shandong,
Sichuan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui and a severe draught in northern
China.'6 4 Fueled by socio-economic distress and nationalist sentiments,
the Chinese vented their frustration on foreigners and foreign enter-
prises.'65 Notable outbursts of anti-foreign sentiments in the late Qing
and Republican period included the Tianjin Massacre of 1870,' 66
Chinese public utilities, communications, mining, banking, and other modern
enterprises. Their factories, by virtue of vast capital and mass production,
outsold Chinese rivals even in distant villages. As common an agricultural
product as cotton was marketed by foreigners more cheaply than the Chinese
could produce it. Farm women who traditionally weaved as a secondary vocation
were thrown out of work, and farmers had increasing difficulty eking out a living.
Id. at 427-28.
163 Professor HsUi described the adverse impact of foreign goods and investment on
familial relationships:
The clan and family could no longer provide help and comfort to those members
who became unemployed, sick, and destitute. The displaced handicraft worker
or the peasant left for the city, where he slipped from family and clan control; if
lucky enough to find a new life, his meager income hardly sufficed to support his
own dependents, let alone the clansmen. The ties between such a man and his
clan became attenuated. Very often the wife and children of such a man were
forced to work in a different city just to scrabble out a living, thereby scattering
further not only clansmen but even immediate family members. Little wonder
that old familial relationships broke down under the impact of the foreign
economic invasion.
Id. at 428.
164 Id. at 390.
165 As Professor Hsti described:
By the end of the 19th century, the country was beset by bankruptcy of village
industries, decline of domestic commerce, rising unemployment, and a general
hardship of livelihood. Many [Chinese] attributed this sorry state of affairs to
evil foreign influence and domination of the Chinese economy .... Victims of
natural calamities as well as superstitious scholars and officials blamed the
misfortune on the foreigners, who, they insisted had offended the spirits by
propagating a heterodox religion and prohibiting the worship of Confucius, idols,
and ancestors. Foreigners were accused of damaging the "dragon's vein" (lung-
mai) in the land when they constructed railways, and of letting out the "precious
breath" (pao-chi) of the mountains when they opened mines. The gentry held
foreigners responsible for destroying the tranquility of the land and interfering
with the natural functioning of the "wind and water" (feng shui, geomancy), thus
adversely affecting the harmony between men and nature.
Id. at 389-90.
166 The Tianjin Massacre arose out of rumors that French missionaries bewitched
Chinese children, mutilated their bodies, and extracted their organs to make
medicine. In response to those charges, a Qing official inspected the orphanage.
After the official had found no truth to the wild charges, the French consul, armed
with a pistol, confronted the Chinese, demanding justice for the priests and sisters.
The mob soon went out of control, killed the French consul and his assistant, and
burned the church and the orphanage. Ten sisters, two priests, and two French
officials were killed. Three Russian traders lost their lives by mistake. And four
British and American churches were destroyed. See id. at 299-302 for a description of
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the Boxer Uprising in 1900,167 and the May Fourth Movement in
1919.168
During the Mao era, xenophobia and nationalism were primarily used
"to mobilize domestic resources to catch up with advanced Western pow-
ers and prevent China's further victimization.' ' 169 Keenly aware of
China's misfortunes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Mao and
his followers were "national Communists at heart."'7 ° Like the reformers
in the Qing period, they had "a burning desire to restore China's rightful
position under the sun, to achieve the big power status denied it since the
Opium War, and to revive the national confidence and self-respect that
had lost during a century of foreign humiliation."'' Nonetheless, the
repeated power struggles within the Chinese leadership made Mao's
dreams unfulfilled.
When Deng Xiaoping returned to power in the late 1970s, he adopted a
different and more pragmatic approach. Instead of putting "politics in
command," Deng saw economic wealth as the foundation of China's
power.172 "According to Deng, whether China could have a rightful
place in the world of nations depended on China's domestic economic
development.' 17 Although his predecessors emphasized national unity,
Deng believed that "national unity depended on whether China could
catch up with the developed countries."' 74 Thus, he vigorously pushed
for the Four Modernizations, 175 the renewal of diplomatic and commer-
the anti-Christian feelings among the Chinese that led to the Tianjin Massacre of
1870.
167 During the Boxer Uprising, members of a fin-de-sincle secret society, backed
by Empress Dowager, brutally murdered missionary families, foreign ministers and
diplomats, and Chinese converts. They also besieged embassies and burned churches
and shops that sold foreign merchandise and books. See id. at 386-418 for an
overview of the Boxer Uprising in 1900.
16S The May Fourth Movement began as a mass demonstration by students in
Beijing protesting the verdict of the Versailles Peace Conference, which allowed
Japan to retain Shandong, a territory leased to Germany in 1898 and occupied by
Japan during the First World War. The demonstration was so powerful and far-
reaching that it evoked an immediate national response. In addition to pressuring the
Chinese delegation to reject the treaty, the Chinese boycotted Japanese products and
stopped taking Japanese streamers. Dockhands in China also refused to upload
Japanese goods. See id. at 501-05 for an overview of the May Fourth Movement in
1919.
169 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 157, at 17.
170 Hso, supra note 33, at 660.
171 Id. at 660-61.
172 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 157, at 17.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 The Four Modernizations aimed to develop China's world-class strength in
agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense by 2000. See Hso,
supra note 33, at 803-14 for a comprehensive overview of the Four Modernizations.
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cial ties with the United States, Japan, and other Western developed
countries,176 and the establishment of Special Economic Zones. 77
With the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, many commentators sug-
gested that there might be a resurgence of xenophobic and nationalist
sentiments. According to these commentators, "a new ideology is neces-
sary as faith in Marxism or Maoism declines[,] and nationalism, if handled
properly, can justify the political legitimacy of leadership."' 78 These com-
mentators cited as evidence the two recent bestsellers, China Can Say
No 79 and Behind a Demonized China,' the Chinese reaction to the
United States's bombing of their embassy in Belgrade,' 8 ' and China's
recent standoff with the United States over the collision between its jet
fighter and a U.S. reconnaissance plane.'
8 2
E. Censorship and Information Control Policy
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the
Communist government has exercised very strict control over the dissem-
176 See id. at 858-69 for a discussion of the Open Door Policy adopted by the
Chinese Communist Party in December 1978.
177 The special economic zones seek to experiment with new economic forms
within the framework of "socialist modernization." These zones allow for a
substantial role for foreign investment in the private economy. Peter K. Yu,
Succession by Estoppel: Hong Kong's Succession to the ICCPR, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 53,
104 n.293 (1999) [hereinafter Yu, Succession by Estoppel]; see also George T. Crane,
'Special Things in Special Ways' National Economic Identity and China's Special
Economic Zones, in CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 157, at 148 (exploring China's
economic identity as revealed in debates surrounding the establishment and
expansion of special economic zones).
178 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 157, at 2; see also id.
at 17 (arguing that the rise of nationalism in post-Mao China is "a response to the
'Chinese problems' that post-Mao China has encountered").
179 QIANG SONG ET AL., ZHONGGUO KEYI SHUO BU [CHINA CAN SAY No] (1996).
180 XIGUANG Li ET AL., YAOMOHUA ZHONGGUO DE BEIHOU [BEHIND A
DEMONIZED CHINA] (1997).
181 Although the United States insisted that the bombing was accidental and
apologized for the incident, many Chinese considered the bombing a deliberate attack
to slow down China's rise in world affairs and to wam China against challenging
American hegemony. STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA'S PLAN TO DOMINATE
ASIA AND THE WORLD 81 (2000); see also John Pomfret & Michael Laris, China
Suspends Some U.S. Ties; Protesters Trap Ambassador in Embassy, WASH. POST, May
10, 1999, at Al (reporting on the anti-American protests outside the U.S. embassy
after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade).
182 See John Pomfret, New Nationalism Drives Beijing; Hard Line Reflects Public
Mood, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at Al (attributing the recent standoff with
Washington to the growing nationalist sentiments among the Chinese people);
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Many Voices for Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at Al
(noting that anti-American feelings are running high in China).
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ination of information and the distribution of media products.' 83 The
logic behind such control is that, as an instrument of political indoctrina-
tion and mass mobilization,' 84 media not only has the ability to create an
atmosphere conducive to political development, but can also help mobil-
ize the masses and foster political struggle.'" 5 Thus, information control
and content regulations are needed to ward off those politically sensitive
materials that would destabilize the country and the Communist
regime.' 8 6 Today, "[t]he media business and the publishing industry are
among the most heavily regulated industries in [China]."'18
7
Consider imported films for example. As the Motion Picture Exhibi-
tors Association of America alleged, "China has an unofficial, unwritten,
'shadowy' system of quotas for films, video, and television."' 88 Initially,
183 See YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN
THE PARTY LINE AND THE BoTroM LINE 19 (1998) [hereinafter ZHAo, MEDIA,
MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY] (noting that the Chinese Communist Party "exercised
strict control over its publications from the very beginning"); Shaozhi Su, Chinese
Communist Ideology and Media Control, in CHINA'S MEDIA, MEDIA'S CHINA 75, 77
(1994) (noting that the Chinese Communist Party "pays utmost attention to
ideology"). But see LYNCH, supra note 149 (describing how a combination of
property rights reforms, administrative fragmentation, and technological advance has
caused the Chinese authorities to lose some of its control over propagandistic
communication).
184 ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 183, at 2.
185 Su, supra note 183, at 77.
186 Among the most politically sensitive materials at the moment are articles
inciting the independence of Taiwan and Tibet, stories about political dissidents,
materials promoting Falun Gong, and The Tiananmen Papers. THE TIANANMEN
PAPERS: THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION TO USE FORCE AGAINST THEIR
OWN PEOPLE-IN THEIR OwN WORDS (Andrew J. Nathan & Perry Link eds., 2001).
187 Anna S.F. Lee, The Censorship and Approval Process for Media Products in
China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 127, 127 (Mary L.
Riley ed., 1997); Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 56, at 355 ("Media and all
media products, are heavily regulated in China."); see also Peter K. Yu, Barriers to
Foreign Investment in the Chinese Internet Industry, GIGALAW.COM, Mar. 2001, at
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-20O1-03-pl.html (discussing content
regulations in the Chinese Internet Industry).
188 Butterton, supra note 148, at 1105-06. As one commentator explained:
Government monopolies have essentially controlled all aspects of the Chinese
film industry, from production to distribution and exhibition, by way of the
Ministry of Culture and related agencies. The China Film Distribution and
Exhibition Bureau and its subsidiaries, in collaboration with the central
government, have determined times, places, dates and terms under which films
are shown in Chinese cinemas, and censorship has been performed by the
Ministries of Culture, Information and Film, Television and Radio. Contrary to
standard industry practice in most of the world, China until very recently refused
to permit the licensing of foreign motion pictures in exchange for a percentage of
gross receipts; instead, it imposed a flat sales scheme, demanding that it be
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the Chinese authorities imposed a sales scheme in which all imported
films would be licensed at a low, flat rate.'89 In 1994, they replaced this
scheme by allowing ten recent blockbusters to be distributed on a reve-
nue-sharing basis. 9 During the U.S.-China intellectual property talks in
1996, the Chinese authorities further eliminated this ten-imports-per-year
quota.' 91 They also ended the monopoly of China Film Distribution and
Exhibition Company over film distribution and allowed Chinese film stu-
dios to sign cooperative agreements with U.S. film producers to distribute
foreign motion pictures.' 92 Although the government soon backpedaled
on its new policy,193 the film industry is opening up as China prepares to
enter the WTO. On November 15, 1999, China and the United States
signed the U.S.-China Bilateral Market Access Agreement. 94 Under the
agreement, China promised to "allow[ ] at least 20 films annually into
allowed to pay US$ 3000 for rights in each film, a figure that is astonishingly
modest by world standards. Moreover, all prints of films so licensed have had to
be made in Chinese film laboratories according to the regulations of the China
Film Bureau. Nor have the Chinese observed the conventional distinction
between authorization for home as opposed to commercial use, which has led to
the widespread Chinese practice of showing home-licensed videos in public
displays.
Id. at 1106 (footnotes omitted); Lee, supra note 187, at 137 ("Only work units with
import authorization are allowed to engage in the import of foreign films."); Riley,
supra note 187, at 358 ("Only a publishing unit with the authorized capacity to import
audio-visual products may import such products."). See generally Mary Lynne Cal-
kins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 291-96
(1999), for a discussion of the importation and censorship of non-Chinese films in
China.
189 Butterton, supra note 148, at 1106.
190 OzIicE OF USTR, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 42 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 NTE REPORT]; Calkins, supra note 188,
at 291; see also Seth Faison, A Chinese Wall Shows Cracks; Hollywood Scrambles as
Film Barriers Start to Fall, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1995, at D1 (reporting on the
liberalization of the Chinese film industry). "Among the movies imported under this
new system were The Lion King, The Fugitive, and True Lies." Calkins, supra note
188, at 291 (footnotes omitted).
191 Lisa Atkinson, What's Entertainment? CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 38.
192 Id.; Riley, supra note 187, at 365. As a result of this new policy, "the
Changchun Film Studio won the rights to distribute Waterworld, and the Shanghai
Film Studio signed a deal to distribute Toy Story. Movies such as The Piano,
Schindler's List, Forrest Gump, and True Lies earned high revenues at Chinese box
offices." Calkins, supra note 188, at 293 (footnotes omitted).
193 Shortly after the announcement of the new policy, the Central Propaganda
Department issued an order demanding self-criticism of the policy of importing large
quantities of U.S. movies. Bian He, Why Prohibit the Importation of Foreign Movies,
CHINA Focus, Aug. 1, 1996, available at 1997 WL 11751443.
194 2001 NTE REPORT, supra note 190, at 42.
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China on a revenue-sharing basis. China also agreed to open theaters
and distribution to foreign investment."'19
Apart from imported films, the Chinese authorities place heavy restric-
tion on imported books and audiovisual products. Under the Chinese
regulations, wholly foreign-owned enterprises are forbidden to sell books,
for "[s]uch activities might expose foreigners to 'internal' publications
and other sensitive materials which foreigners are not permitted to
see." '196 In addition, they "are not allowed to engage in the publication or
reproduction sector."' 97 Instead, they must form a joint venture with a
state-approved Chinese publishing or reproduction unit. 9 As with other
local Chinese publishing or reproduction units, these joint ventures are
subject to re-registration every two years.' 99 They must also abide by the
various censorship laws and regulations, which list in details the type of
contents prohibited by the government. 0 °
Due to this stringent information control policy, many media products
are not available even if there is great demand in the Chinese market.2 °'
Unable to purchase these products in the open markets, some consumers
may settle for black market products or pirated goods.2"2 Although these
infringing substitutes are often inferior to the genuine products, many
consumers do not have counterparts to compare with or to select from. 3
195 Id. at 62.
196 Lee, supra note 187, at 148; Riley, supra note 187, at 377.
197 Lee, supra note 187, at 132; Riley, supra note 187, at 373.
198 Lee, supra note 187, at 132; Riley, supra note 187, at 373.
199 Lee, supra note 187, at 132; Riley, supra note 187, at 361.
200 Lee, supra note 187, at 129-30 (discussing the censorship procedures practiced
by Chinese authorities); Riley, supra note 187, at 357-59 (same).
201 See Robert B. Frost, Jr., Comment, Intellectual Property Rights Disputes in the
1990s Between the People's Republic of China and the United States, 4 TUL. J. INT'L &
Coeip. L. 119, 132 (1995) ("[W]hen China stalled the import of the film, 'True Lies,'
because of the looming trade war, a cinema in Shenzhen had already begun showing a
pirated copy." (footnote omitted)); Erik Eckholm, Spider-Man Springs into China
with More Than Comics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at E2 (reporting that pirated
video compact discs of X-Men were available in China even though the film itself was
not approved for commercial screening); see also 2001 NTE REPORT, supra note 190,
at 55 ("Pirates find ways to get VCDs and DVDs of blockbuster films into the
Chinese market almost immediately after the films are released theatrically in the
United States.").
202 See Butterton, supra note 148, at 1105-06 (noting that the film import quota has
"been a fertile ground for pirate practices"); Derek Dessler, Comment, China's
Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving International Standards, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 181, 232 (1995) ("Commentators argue that ... market access
barriers facilitate intellectual property piracy and impede enforcement."); Frost, supra
note 201, at 132 ("The United States claims that this limitation produces a vacuum
effect which creates a large demand for pirated films.").
203 See 2001 NTE REPoRT, supra note 190, at 55 (noting that "consumers are often
unaware that they are purchasing [intellectual property right]-infringing goods");
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As time passes, the Chinese market would become saturated with infring-
ing substitutes. Even if the market barriers are finally removed, foreign
manufacturers may have great difficulty in entering the market.20 4
F. Laws with Chinese Characteristics
Finally, the Chinese have an entrenched tradition of regarding laws as
an inefficient, arbitrary, and cumbersome instrument for governance.0 5
As Confucius explained in the Analects: "Govern the people by regula-
tions, keep order among them by chastisements, and they will flee from
you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order
among them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect and come to
you of their own accord., 2 ' Although many considered this tradition a
Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 2, at 137 (noting that the piracy
problem in Shanghai "has reached such proportions that officials in Shanghai have
found it necessary to take to the airwaves to inform citizens of where they can shop
without fear of purchasing fakes").
204 As one commentator explained:
If the Chinese more fully relaxed or lifted barriers to market participation by
foreign [intellectual property rights] owners, those foreign owners could sell their
own goods in China and thereby displace, at least to some extent, pirate products
that now have Chinese markets to themselves. Moreover, absent such barriers,
some U.S. producers could both sell their "authentic" products in the Chinese
market, and also monitor, if not police, infringement themselves on an in-country
basis. Such market access adjustments would have application in a number of
areas.
Butterton, supra note 148, at 1105.
205 See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 8, at 93 ("[T]he concept and doctrines of legality,
unlike the precepts of Confucianism, had never occupied a central role in traditional
imperial China. There has not existed a legal culture with elements like officials'
fidelity to law or citizens' consciousness of their legal rights .... "); id. at 128 (pointing
out that the legal profession was despised, stigmatized, or sometimes even outlawed
in imperial China); FENG, supra note 18, at 10 ("[T]here is ... an entrenched
Confucian-strategist tradition which regards formal lav as an inefficient and
cumbersome instrument for governance."); Berkman, supra note 80, at 39 (noting the
Chinese "preference for death rather than bringing a lawsuit"). But see PHILIP C.C.
HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE QING
(1996) (pointing out that state law and Qing courts played a very important role on
community mediation and noting that parties would resort to courts when community
or kin mediation failed); William P. Alford, Law, Law, What Law? Why Western
Scholars of China Have Not Had More to Say About Its Law, in THE LIMITs OF THE
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 45 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter LIMiTs OF
THE RULE OF LAw] (exploring why Western scholars of Chinese history and society
have neglected or mischaracterized the effect of law upon Chinese life).
206 ANALECrs, supra note 103, bk. II, 3 (footnote omitted). "The Confucianists
criticized the hedonistic pleasure-pain psychology relied on by the Legalists, which,
the Confucianists argued, would lead people to think only in terms of their self-
interest and make them litigious, trying to manipulate the laws to suit their own
interests." CHEN, supra note 8, at 9.
PIRACY, PREJUDICE, AND PERSPECTIVES
Confucian legacy, such an aversion to law can be actually traced back to
the Western Zhou period (1122-771 B.C.), during which rituals were
emphasized.2 °7
Under this tradition, the Chinese lived by the concept of 1i (rites),
rather than the concept of fa (law). Broadly defined, 1i extended beyond
one's proper conduct or etiquette and covered the whole range of politi-
cal, social, and familial relationships that encompass a harmonious Con-
fucian society.2"' People who were guided by this concept always
understood their normative roles, responsibilities, and obligations to
others. They were also ready to adjust their views and demands in order
to accommodate other people's needs and desires, to avoid confrontation
and conflict, and to preserve harmony.20 9 As a result, litigation and pro-
motion of individual rights became unnecessary in a Confucian society.
207 William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger's
Uses and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEx. L. REv. 915, 930 (1986) (tracing the
Chinese aversion to litigation to the Western Zhou period); Berkman, supra note 80,
at 39 n.177 ("The normative aversion to litigation stretches back to pre-unified China,
as indicated in the Book of Changes, dated approximately 1000 B.C." (citing I CHING,
OR BOOK OF CHANGES 28-30 (Richard Wilhelm trans., Princeton Univ. Press, 3d ed.
1967))); Butterton, supra note 148, at 1108 ("The concept, though it is widely
identified with the teachings of Confucius (551-479 B.C.), antedated him and appears
to have been established in Chinese bureaucratic thought and the larger culture
during the Western Zhou Period (1122-771 B.C.), if not before."); see also GRAY L.
DORSEY, JURISCULTURE: CHINA 87 (1993) (discussing the need for new philosophy
created by the disintegration of feudal society in the Western Zhou period).
208 As one commentator explained:
The "relationships" of Confucian society consist of connections between various
types of political, social and familial roles. The roles are also normative,
embodying prescriptions that tell those who play the roles how they ought to act
when playing them. Thus, the role of father embodies a norm of proper fatherly
behavior; the role of friend embodies a norm of friendship; and similarly, other
norms are expressed for the other fundamental roles of wife, child, ruler, subject,
elder brother and younger brother. Eventually, Confucianism reduced all
relationships to a finite set of fundamental relationships that were presumed to
be exhaustive, the so-called Five Relations which obtained between father and
child, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, ruler and subject, and friend
and friend. The li expressed the rules of conduct involved in all of these basic
relationships, and, at bottom, the li were about the obligations between parties to
relationships.
Butterton, supra note 148, at 1109-10.
209 Id. at 1109; see also Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Milton Katz ed., 1957) ("The
proper disposition with regard to one's interests is the predisposition to yield rather
than the predisposition to insist."), quoted in JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCrION 62,65
(1968); Alice Tay, The Struggle for Law in China, 21 U. BRIT. COLuM. L. REv. 561,
562 (1987) ("Chinese tradition personalizes all claims, seeing them in the context of
social human relationships."); Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in
Contemporary Chinese Courts, in LiMrrs OF THE RuLE OF LAW, supra note 205, at
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In contrast to li, "fa is a penal concept; it is associated with punishment,
serving to maintain public order through the threat of force and physical
violence."2 1 Unlike the Confucianists, the Legalists believed that it was
impossible to teach people to be good. Thus, fa is needed to tell people
what to do and to induce them to do what they should do. Except in the
Qin dynasty in the third century B.C., fa ]ia (legalism) has never been the
dominant Chinese ideology.21 ' In fact, the Chinese always viewed fa
unfavorably and associated it with the harsh and despotic Qin rule, which
unified China and centralized its bureaucracy.212 They assumed that
"when government leans heavily on fa to reinforce its authority, it does so
because it has no effective ability to rule by li.' '21 To the Chinese, fa
should always be employed as the last resort.2 14
During the Mao era, formal laws were denounced as "inherently
bureaucratic, hampered by legislative formalities and fed on professional
163, 168 ("Today, litigation in the public courts is still viewed with disfavor in China,
for it represents a breakdown in relationships that should be avoided. Ideally, broken
relationships should be restored, but litigation makes restoration difficult.").
210 Butterton, supra note 148, at 1110.
211 Nevertheless, the adoption of Confucianism as the orthodoxy and the rejection
of Legalism did not mean the abolition of laws. "All the dynastic empires subsequent
to the Qin dynasty continued to develop codes of law and legal institutions. There
was thus a coexistence of both 1i and fa in traditional China...." CHEN, supra note 8,
at 11.
212 Butterton, supra note 148, at 1108; see also DORSEY, supra note 207, at 125-30
(discussing legalism in the State of Qin). As one commentator explained:
The intellectual roots of fa are in the Legalist movement-a group of political
philosophers primarily active in the China of the fourth and third century B.C.,
who held that social order could only be maintained by the use of law as a tool
for manipulating society. The Qin dynasty adopted the Legalist philosophy and
effectively integrated and centralized the whole of the Chinese Empire in the
third century B.C. (221-209 B.C.). The Qin ruled with the aid of a harsh penal
law and brutal tactics, and developed a vast administrative law bureaucracy to
manage the empire they had created. They thus shaped an image of the "rule of
law" as brutal and rigid, and that image endured throughout the greatest period
of Confucian influence from the first century A.D. to the development of civil-
law criminal codes during the late nineteenth-century portion of the Qing
dynasty (1644-1912 A.D.) and the beginning of the Republican period following
the 1912 [sic) revolution, when the last incarnation of those codes was enacted.
Butterton, supra note 148, at 1110 (footnote omitted).
213 Butterton, supra note 148, at 1110.
214 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 10 ("Public, positive law was meant to buttress,
rather than supersede, the more desirable means of guiding society and was to be
resorted to only when these other means failed to elicit appropriate behavior.");
CHEN, supra note 8, at 11 ("[Fa] is to be employed as a last resort to maintain social
order when 1i has failed to do so."); Berkman, supra note 80, at 32 n. 144 ("The
Confucian ideology ... saw law as an instrument of last resort necessary to punish
those who could not follow the normative ideal of social harmony arising from the
many social relationships within society.").
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interests, slow to come, rigid in procedure, prone to ramifying into techni-
cal details and yet unable to cover all the circumstances of the ever-
changing social relationships." '215 To replace this "defective" legacy, Mao
instituted socialist laws that "operate within the boundaries of policy
directives, under the guidance of policy principles and supplemented by
various policy tools (such as a Party or government circular or notice)." '216
"Throughout the Cultural Revolution and until Mao's death in 1976, law
was simply a mechanism for implementing Party policy, interpreted and
reinterpreted to reflect the direction of the prevailing political winds." '217
Even today, laws are still considered a "concrete formulation of the
Party's policy." '218 As "a summary of practical administrative and judicial
experience, '  laws do not "necessarily constitute a detailed, compre-
hensive and self-containing rule system, justifiable on ideological as well
as jurisprudential grounds, with coherent principles and well-defined con-
215 FENG, supra note 18, at 10; see also CHEN, supra note 8, at 93 ("[T]he ideology
of Marxism-Leninism, not even to mention Mao Zedong Thought, is ambivalent
about the positive contributions of law, particularly outside the realm of the struggle
against counter-revolutionaries, class enemies and criminals.").
216 FENG, supra note 18, at 10.
217 Berkman, supra note 80, at 35; see also Perry Keller, Sources of Order in
Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 711, 713 (1994). As one commentator explained:
Law became an instrument of Mao and the CCP and was used to suppress
"counterrevolutionaries" and protect Mao's power. The seemingly daily
fluctuations in Mao's political, economic, and social policies destroyed any sense
of predictability in law. On the eve of Deng Xiaoping's reform movement, China
was a nation of rule by men-or more specifically by one man, Mao-rather than
law. Equally important, the Cultural Revolution had instilled in the masses the
cynical view that lav was a concern of the government, not the people, and a tool
to create social stability and advance political agendas rather than a mechanism
to protect rights.
Berkman, supra note 80, at 35; see also RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR
THE RULE OF LAv 1 (1994); Jerome Alan Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's
Republic of China: An Introduction, 79 HARv. L. REv. 469, 470-71 (1966); Shao-
Chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao-
Tse Tung's Influence, 68 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356 (1977).
218 FENG, supra note 18, at 10. As Professor Feng explained:
The CCP policy. .. is more than a political guideline. It is a strategy of social
control maintained by a set of long-standing propaganda, training, experiment,
inspection and enforcement procedures, with its own formality, etiquette,
pedigree and convention. Its objective is that all operators or decision-makers
(administrators and judges included) can "unify thinking" and act pursuant to the
policy "spirit" where concrete rules are inadequate, in conflict or lacking. As a
result, new analyses, interpretations, applications and initiatives are formed,
giving rise to new concrete rules. Some of the rules eventually mature into
statutory provisions. That is why "policy and strategies are", in Mao's words,
"the Party life".
Id.
219 Id. at 11.
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cepts."22 They can also be "incomplete, incoherent, ideologically com-
promising, as well as broadly and vaguely termed pending further
administrative and judicial experience in its implementation."22'
Furthermore, laws are intended to be flekible2. 2 and can be formulated
"on an interim or trial use basis. ' 223 Given the rapid social and economic
changes, laws will likely fall behind policies.224 Statutory provisions that
are effective in one year may therefore be outdated in the following year
had a new policy or a new law been implemented in the relevant or
related areas. To determine the applicability and effectiveness of a provi-
sion, one must examine all the laws and supplementary documents,
including administrative rules and judicial interpretations, in all the rele-
vant and related areas.22 5 In most cases, the more specific and updated
provisions prevail.
Chinese laws "are generally broadly drafted, leaving the detailed rules
to be provided by the relevant administrations under the State Coun-
cil."'226 Thus, "it is often the detailed administrative implementing rules
that provide the concrete information about the definition, limits, and
practical implication of legal rights established in the laws., 227 Contrary
220 Id.
221 Id.; see also CHEN, supra note 8, at 90 ("[N]o effective system has yet been
evolved to deal with the problem of inconsistencies between legal norms derived from
different sources."); CoRNE, supra note 129, at 55 ("[I]n the PRC there is no concept,
as exists in Western legal systems, that law or delegated legislation can be struck down
on the basis of uncertainty."); Claudio Ross & Lester Ross, Language and Law:
Sources of Systemic Vagueness and Ambiguous Authority in Chinese Statutory
Language, in LIMrrs OF THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 205, at 221 (regarding
vagueness as a structural characteristic of Chinese law).
222 See CoRNE, supra note 129, at 93-145 (discussing flexibility as a characteristic of
Chinese laws); Woo, supra note 209 (examining how the historic Chinese preference
for discretion and informality in the distribution of justice has been retained and
reflected in the judicial decisionmaking process and in the procedural rules); see also
Butterton, supra note 148, at 1113 ("To many, the shifting sands of 'flexibility' and ad
hoc adjustments are synonymous with a host of corrupt business practices.").
223 FENG, supra note 18, at 11. "[A]mong the 713 pieces of laws and administrative
regulations enacted in the period 1979-1985, 25% were of... provisional nature."
CmN, supra note 8, at 89.
224 FENG, supra note 18, at 11; see also CoRNE, supra note 129, at 189 ("[L]aw in
China tends to take on the colour of policy in the course of its implementation. Those
who implement law are the same as those who were responsible for the
implementation of policy under the pre-legal order.").
225 FENr, supra note 18, at 11.
226 Id. at 12; see also CoRNm, supra note 129, at 54 ("The laws [in China] are
expressed in terms of general standards which fail to deal wvith obvious problems of
implementation. Real clarity exists only at the level of administrative rules and
circulars.").
227 FENG, supra note 18, at 12; see also CoRNE, supra note 129, at 239 ("The
existence of discretion allows administrative bodies to apply laws in a way that is
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to Western beliefs and expectations, these rules sometimes exceed the
explicit provisions of the laws they are supposed to explain. They may
also add rights and rules that were not previously conceived by the legis-
lature when it adopted the laws. 22' Nevertheless, the Chinese lacked a
concept of separation of powers229 and found these expansions and modi-
fications acceptable.
consistent with underlying normative expectations held by the regulators. The
manner of implementation is completely different from what Westerners would
expect from the ostensibly familiar principles that are embodied in the law.").
228 FENG, supra note 18, at 13; see also CORNE, supra note 129, at 147 ("The
general principle of legislative consistency emphasizes consistency with the 'spirit'
rather than with the 'letter' of the relevant higher law or laws. This is also true with
respect to consistency with the PRC Constitution."). As one commentator explained:
[I]n the Chinese legal system a rule or regulation is not considered to conflict
with the Constitution per se or with rules or regulations enacted by other
administrative or legislative bodies at the same or higher level, even if it appears
to do so on its face, as long as it fulfills the primary condition of being within the
enacting organ's entrusted or inherent power. It is this principle that defines the
approach that judicial, administrative and legislative institutions have taken in
respect of this issue.
Id. at 148.
229 See XIANFA art. 128 (1982) (amended Mar. 29, 1993) ("The Supreme People's
Court is responsible to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee.
Local People's courts at various levels are responsible to the organs of state power
which created them."); RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURT AND
LEGAL PROcESs: LAWv WITH CHINESE CHARACrERISTICS 8 (1997) ("[T]he
governmental congresses and standing committees are comprised of members
primarily selected by Party members through a separate Party congress mechanism.
Party committees, such as the Political-Legal Committee, 'supervise' the public
security (police), procuratorates, and the courts."); id. at 35 (arguing that the
constitutional basis of the judicial system in China "is not separation of powers, but
on the contrary it is a 'division of functions and responsibilities' under the unified
guidance of the organs of state power, i.e., the people's congresses, as guided by the
Chinese Communist Party, 'in accordance with the law"'); CHEN, supra note 8, at 48
("The orthodox view expressed in textbooks is that... the Chinese socialist political
system manifests the principle of the unity of deliberation and execution (yixing heyi)
which Marx used in discussing the Paris Commune Movement of 1871."); CoRNE,
supra note 129, at 141 ("Administrative interpretation is not only the most important
mode of legal interpretation in the PRC, it is in effect an authoritative supplement
and accretion to legislation."); id. at 253 ("The trial judge is very susceptible to
[outside] pressures, both internal and external to the court, as his decision is only
preliminary and may at any time be overridden by an adjudication committee within
the local people's court under the principle of democratic centralism."); Berkman,
supra note 80, at 23 ("When Chinese officials speak of judicial independence they
may be using a lexicon familiar to westerners, but they certainly do not intend to
connote the separation of powers usually equated with the democratic definition.");
see also CORNE, supra note 129, at 287 ("China's lack of an independent legal
tradition and the current low status of the courts will make it very difficult to extricate
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IV. THE MERCHANT OF VENICE
Through the imagination, art evinces what purely didactic speech can-
not-the "sensation" of an experience never had, a world never seen.
Conjuring up that which has not been experienced, it poses a challenge
to the participant's preconceived and preordained world view. At a
level similar to sympathy.., the imagination takes one beyond one's
preexisting conceptions and intuitions about life, power, and reality.2 3°
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the United States has made
repeated attempts to convert China into a Western intellectual property
regime. So far, these conversion attempts have failed. To highlight the
undesirability for and ineffectiveness of forced conversion, this Article
juxtaposes the Chinese piracy problem with one of Shakespeare's legal
masterpieces, The Merchant of Venice. By comparing China's experience
in the international intellectual property community to Shylock's predica-
ment in the Venetian court, the Article seeks to challenge the readers'
cultural presumptions and invites readers to step outside their own world
to rethink the U.S.-China intellectual property conflict. This Article
hopes that readers can draw on Shakespeare's teachings and use his valu-
able lessons to resolve, or at least minimize, this century-old conflict.
This Part first recounts the story of Shylock's forced conversion in The
Merchant. It then examines in depth the three major lessons within the
play and how these lessons can help avoid Shylock's painful experience.
A. The Story
The Merchant begins when Bassanio needs to finance his trip to Bel-
mont to court a young heiress named Portia. Although Antonio is willing
the courts from the webs of party and governmental influence which permeate their
decision making processes and undermine their value as a supervisory institution.").
One commentator explained the operation of the adjudication committee and the
intertwining relationship between the Party and the judiciary:
An institutional aspect clearly foreign to students of American constitutional law
are China's Adjudication Committees. Minor, non-politically sensitive cases can
be handled by individual judges, or a collegiate bench of judges and lay persons,
generally free from interference by other court officials. However, cases deemed
to be of importance, perhaps those involving difficult legal issues, significant
economic disputes, sensitive political matters, or highly charged public issues, are
handled by individual judges on advice of the particular court's Adjudication
Committee. While the individual judge will hear the case, following consultation
the Committee may direct the judge to enter a particular verdict, invite the judge
to seek more information from the parties, or report the case to a higher level
court for guidance. The Committee consists of the president of the court, the
vice-president, the head and deputy head of the various specialized chambers,
and some ordinary judges. Members of the Committee are also likely to be Party
members, and thus the influence of the CCP should be assumed in all decisions.
Berkman, supra note 80, at 22-23.
230 Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REv. 73, 88 (1996).
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to help his friend, his wealth has been locked up in various business ven-
tures. On Bassanio's behalf, he borrows money from his business rival,
Shylock. Taking advantage of Antonio's needs, Shylock sets up a scheme
whereby he will lend Antonio money without interest. However, if
Antonio cannot repay him within three month's time, he will cut from
Antonio a pound of flesh in any part of the body that pleases him. Confi-
dent about his ability to repay Shylock in two months' time, Antonio
agrees to the bond immediately.
During the intervening months, all of Antonio's ships sink in the ocean.
Bankrupt by the loss, Antonio cannot repay Shylock upon the due date.
Meanwhile, Shylock's daughter, Jessica, elopes with a Christian named
Lorenzo, taking with her Shylock's money and jewels. Aggrieved by the
loss of his daughter and the ducats, Shylock is determined to "have [his]
bond" (3:3:5). He takes Antonio to the court and asks for the forfeit.
At trial, Portia, now Bassanio's wife, appears in disguise in the learned
Judge Balthazar, who has been sent to help the Duke adjudicate the case.
Portia assures Shylock that the bond is valid and earns respect and praise
from him. Portia then extols the celestial quality of mercy and begs Shy-
lock to show mercy upon Antonio. After failing to convince Shylock, she
appeals to his monetary interests and allows Bassanio to offer him three
times, and then nine times, the principal. Believing that he has Antonio
"on the hip" (1:3:41) and the law on his side, Shylock refuses both and
asks the court for the fatal penalty.
When Portia realizes that she cannot change Shylock's mind and that
he is determined to kill Antonio for revenge, she turns the tables on him.
Holding the law to its literal meaning, A la Shylock, Portia makes one of
the most ridiculous interpretations ever in contract law.231 Shylock can
have his pound of flesh,232 but no more, no less.233 Furthermore, if Shy-
231 See DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS?: SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL
APPEAL 70 (1994) ("Ihe bond must have implicitly authorized what was necessary
for Shylock to get his pound of flesh, that is, the shedding of Antonio's blood. Portia's
interpretation is like granting an easement on land without the right to leave
footprints."); Peter J. Alscher, Staging Directors for a Balanced Resohtion to "The
Merchant of Venice" Trial Scene, 5 CARDOZO STUDS. L. & LrERATURE 1, 12 (1993)
(regarding Portia's interpretation as "legalistic hair-splitting [that] renders injustice to
the original bond language"). As Peter Alscher pointed out: "Both Antonio and
Bassanio understand the plain meaning of the moneylender's intentions. Bassanio
was spontaneously fearful while Antonio was overly confident that his ships would
come home a month before the bond was due.... [Antonio] even accepted the bond
language in the spirit of a merry bond and says that the Hebrew grows kind."
Alscher, supra, at 12.
232 Professor Shapiro argues that Shylock intends circumcision as the forfeit of the
bond. See JAMES SHAPIRO, SHAKESPEARE AND THE JEWS 121-26 (1996). According
to Shapiro, it was the Christians, who believe in the Pauline concept of circumcision
of the heart, that misread Shylock's intentions. See id. at 126-28.
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lock sheds a drop of Antonio's blood, the State will confiscate Shylock's
lands and goods.
Unable to revenge, Shylock decides to cut his losses by asking for three
times the principal, the bargain Bassanio has previously offered him.
Insisting that Shylock "shalt have justice more than thou desir'st"
(4:1:311-12), Portia denies Shylock's request. Reluctantly, Shylock
demands the principal and asks the court to grant him leave. Again, Por-
tia insists on strict justice and rejects his demand: "He hath refus'd it in
the open court, / He shall have merely justice and his bond" (4:1:334-35).
As a result, Shylock loses his money, his bargain, and his opportunity to
get rid of his business rival.
Unfortunately, due to Shylock's alien status, "[t]he law hath yet
another hold on [him]" (4:1:343). The Alien Statute provides:
If it be proved against an alien, / That by direct, or indirect attempts I
He seek the life of any citizen, / The party 'gainst the which he doth
contrive / Shall seize one half his goods, the other half / Comes to the
privy coffer of the state, / And the offender's life lies in the mercy /
Of the duke only, 'gainst all other voice (4:1:344-52).
Because of his attempt to kill Antonio, Shylock has to forfeit half of his
wealth to the State and the other half to Antonio.
Once again, Portia interposes and begs the Duke to show mercy upon
the poor Jew. Without any hesitation, the Duke pardons Shylock's life
and reduces half of his penalty to a mere fine. Expecting a similar
response,234 Portia asks Antonio if he will show the Jew any mercy. Sur-
prising many, Antonio not only takes away the Duke's earlier conces-
sions, but also increases Shylock's penalty. Under the new verdict, which
the Duke concurs, Shylock has to give half of his wealth to Lorenzo and
to leave the other half for Antonio's use, thus giving Antonio a "lifelong
interest-free loan" that competes directly against Shylock's usury prac-
tice.235 In addition, Shylock has to bequeath all his present and future
wealth to Lorenzo and Jessica after his death.236 Even worse, he has to
233 A nineteenth century jurist pointed out that "unless the contract specifically
excluded blood, the strictest definition of 'a pound of flesh' would have allowed for
any blood, sinews, tissue, and bone that might have come with it, 'nearest the heart."'
Alscher, supra note 231, at 12; see also Jay L. Halio, Portia: Shakespeare's Matlock, 5
CARDOZO STUDS. L. & LrrRATURE 57, 59 (1993) ("Legally, one naturally assures
that Shylock is entitled to take his forfeiture along with everything else necessary
(implied though not specified) to exact it.").
234 Contra Harold C. Goddard, The Three Caskets, in SHAKESPEARE: The
Merchant of Venice 142, 159 (John Wilders ed., 1969) [hereinafter CASEBOOK]
("Portia quickly interposes, as if afraid that the Duke is going to be too merciful,
going to let her victim off too leniently.").
235 MARTIN D. YAFFE, SHYLOCK AND THE JEWISH QUESTION 78 (1997).
236 Richard Weisberg, Antonio's Legalistic Cruelty: Interdisciplinarity and "The
Merchant of Venice," 25 COLLEGE LITERATURE 12 (1998).
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convert to Christianity, a faith he has rejected and always despises. Los-
ing his wealth, daughter, and religion, Shylock is completely defeated and
leaves the stage a broken man.
Undeniably, bad acts and guilty minds deserve punishment.237 No mat-
ter how much a person hates his or her business rival, attempted murder
is not justified. Nonetheless, the final verdict far exceeds the punishment
Shylock deserves.238 Indeed, had it not been for the Alien Statute and
237 As Daniel Kornstein pointed out in his imaginary appeal, Shylock's punishment
can be, for example, a voided bond. The court can void the bond under the following
theories: (1) The bond is against public policy. KORNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 70-71.
(2) The bond violates existing usury laws. Id. at 71. (3) The bond is a fraud. See id.
at 72 ("Shylock proposed the penalty clause to Antonio as a jest."). (4) The bond
lacks mutual intent of contracting parties. See id. ("Shylock himself told Antonio that
the bond was 'in a merry sport' and not meant seriously... ." (citation omitted)). (5)
The bond is a gambling contract. See id. at 72 ("Shylock's refusal to accept generous
repayment is evidence that the bond is not an ordinary commercial guarantee at all,
but truly a gamble of Antonio's life."). Moreover, in light of Bassanio's offer of three
times the principal of debt, Portia may refuse the equitable remedy of specific
performance on the ground that Shylock has an adequate remedy at law for damages.
Id. at 71.
238 Whether Shylock deserves his punishment depends on how one perceives the
character. For four centuries, critics have intensely debated Shakespeare's original
intentions with respect to the character. However, "the author, whatever his or her
intentions, cannot control any more than critic can the play of language," because
words spill over and reach beyond their immediate point and place. Martin Coyle,
Introduction to THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 1, 5 (Martin Coyle ed., 1998) [hereinafter
NEw CASEBOOK]. "Each reader reads not only a text but himself or herself, his or her
particular set of cultural assumptions." BILL OVERTON, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE:
TEXT & PERFORMANCE 13 (1987). After learning about the atrocities during the
Holocaust, the audience can hardly watch or read the play the same way as the
Elizabethans did. JOAN OZARK HOLMER, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE: CHOICE,
HAZARD AND CONSEQUENCE 220 (1995); see also LAWRENCE DANSON, THE
HARMONIES OF The Merchant of Venice 129 (1978) ("Now it was almost inevitable
that the Shylock of the modem stage, being conceived at once as 'the type of a
persecuted race' and as an individual, should have become a 'gentleman' and not a
villain."). One commentator even suggested that a reader of the late twentieth
century had to focus exclusively on the alternative world of Belmont to avoid any
potential suggestions of injustice. Graham Holderness, Comedy and The Merchant of
Venice, in NEw CASEBOOK, supra, at 23, 27.
Regardless of how one perceives Shylock, one should be careful not to define the
play in terms of which party deserves the blame and which the absolution. As
Professor Ryan explained:
To define the play in terms of which party deserves the blame and which the
absolution, with readings and productions swinging now to Shylock and now to
the Christians, is to miss the point. What is at stake is the deeper recognition
that, through the revenge plot and the trial, through the ironies and
contradictions they lay bare, an apparently civilised society is unmasked as
premised on barbarity, on the ruthless priority of money values over human
values, of the rights of property over the elementary rights of men and women.
20011
42 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1
Shylock's alien status,239 he would not have received such a heavy punish-
ment. Thus, the trial scene and the final verdict have disturbed many
theatergoers, readers, and critics.24° The trial becomes even more dis-
turbing when it is held in Venice, which many have considered "a model
for an ideal economic coexistence between subjects and aliens" in the
Elizabethan Age.24' While some directors cut out the final act to empha-
size the inequity of the trial,242 others wrote sequels243 and offered inter-
pretations that reconciled Shylock to the Christian community.
244
Several years ago, lawyers, academics, and students gathered at Hofstra
The point lies not in the vindication of the Jew at the expense of the Christians,
or the Christians at the expense of the Jew, but in the critique of the structural
social forces which have made them both what they are, for better or for worse.
Kiernan Ryan, Re-reading The Merchant of Venice, in NEW CASEBOOK, supra, at 36,
39-40.
239 See JOHN GROSS, SHYLOCK: A LEGEND & ITS LEGACY 37 (1992) ("Until the
end of the eighteenth century no Jew, however long his ancestors had lived in the city,
could become a Venetian citizen.").
240 See id. ("Despite its otherwise happy ending or perhaps because of it,
Shakespeare's Venetian comedy leaves us unsettled and perplexed over the place of
the Jew in the modem city."); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER
STRATGmIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 104 (1992) [hereinafter WEISBERG, POETHICS]
("I would be willing to wager-my soul upon the forfeit-that most of these
theatergoers avoided comedy for at least a few nights thereafter.").
241 GRoss, supra note 239, at 183.
242 See Alscher, supra note 231, at 3 ("[C]utting out the entire post-trial Christian
cast was the director's literary justice for the gross legal trickery they saw in Portia's
calculatedly defeating the Jew.") Critics have generally attributed this notorious cut
to Henry Irving. However, unlike what critics argued, Irving did not drop the fifth act
for literary reasons, but for pragmatic reasons-to make room for a sentimental one-
act trifle called Iolanthe. Except for the brief two-month period, when he substituted
the final act with Iolanthe, Irving presented The Merchant intact with five acts.
GROSS, supra note 239, at 153-54. Today, critics generally regard such a cut as a
"serious mistake." KORNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 82; see also WEISBERG, POETHICS,
supra note 240, at 94-104 (emphasizing the significance of Act V).
243 For example, in St. John Ervine's play, The Lady of Belmont, Shylock becomes
a different man and has benefited from his new Christian faith. When asked by Portia
if he can forgive what they have done to him, Shylock responds, "I must forgive. We
must all forgive, because we have so much to be forgiven." GRoss, supra note 239, at
228-29. In Louis Untermeyer's cynical epilogue, The Merchant of Venice Act VI,
Shylock and Antonio become business partners. Id. at 271. In Ludwig Lewisohn's
The Last Days of Shylock, Shylock reconciles with Jessica, whom Lorenzo has
deserted. Id. at 271-72.
244 See Alscher, supra note 231 (offering an alternate staging that brings about a
credible reconciliation between Shylock and Antonio); Susan Oldrieve, Marginalized
Voices in "The Merchant of Venice," 5 CARDOZO STUDS. L. & LITERATURE 87, 99
(1993) (suggesting that Shylock may be the "holy hermit" who accompanies Portia
and Nerissa back to Belmont).
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University to appeal Shylock's case after the case was first tried 400 years
ago. 2
45
To many of these sympathizers, Shylock is a social victim, a "noble and
dignified martyr to popular prejudice. '2 46 Like King Lear, he is "[m]ore
sinn'd against than sinning." '247 "Shylock is not only a Jew; he is a symbol
for any group that feels itself oppressed., 248 His actions are mainly the
result of the suffering, humiliation, injustice, and prejudice he and his
tribe have received.249 The real culprit behind such actions is not hate or
revenge, but the Alien Statute, which "protects the Christian Antonio
from the punitive consequences of anything he said or did against Shy-
lock, while it incriminates Shylock for any self-defensive action he took to
maintain his human dignity., 25° Encouraging prejudice against the Jews,
the Alien Statute is akin to Jim Crow, Nuremburg,
251 or Vichy laws. 252
B. The Lessons
Shylock's conversion is painful but hardly inevitable. Even though
Shakespeare did not tell the audience whether Shylock could avoid his
painful conversion, The Merchant provides valuable lessons as to how one
can lead a noble life and what type of world one should seek to attain.
245 See LAWv AND THE ARTS 149-235 (Susan Tiefenbrun ed., 1999) (collecting the
briefs of, and analysis on, Shylock's appeal staged at the Hofstra University School of
Law); see also KoRNsTEIN, supra note 231, at 83-85 (outlining Shylock's imaginary
appeal).
246 LINDA RozMovrrs, SHAKESPEARE AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN LATE
VICTORIAN ENGLAND 79 (1998); see also ROBERT SCHNEIDER, SHYLOCK, THE
RoM1AN: UNMASKING SHAKESPEARE'S The Merchant of Venice (1999) (comparing
Shylock to "a noble Roman in comic mask" Id. at 188).
247 KoRNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 66 (quoting WILIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING
LEAR act 3, sc. 2); see also id. at 79 (arguing that Shylock is "not a cardboard figure of
evil, but a complex and somewhat sympathetic man who has suffered much");
RozMovlTs, supra note 246, at 7 (arguing that Shylock is "an outsider by choice as
much as by compulsion").
248 KORNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 81.
249 Id. at 79; see also Alscher, supra note 231, at 10 ("Antonio's hostility is the only
quality of mercy Shylock experiences in the Rialto.").
250 Alscher, supra note 231, at 16. Under a textual analysis, the Alien Statute can
even be applied for mere intentions to act. See KORNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 80.
Since property is the foundation of life, Shylock's seeking repayment of Antonio's
debt may already constitute a contrivance against a citizen's life, even if Shylock does
not ask for interest. Id. Thus, the Alien Statute gives Christians a "license to take
whatever they will, by request or force, from contriving aliens" and perpetuates
vengeance by dehumanizing the Jew and exonerating the Christians. See id.
251 KORNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 81.
252 Richard H. Weisberg, Confiscated Jewish Property in Vichy, France: An
Attempt to Understand Through Shakespeare, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 591 (1998); see
also RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996).
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Had Shylock and the Christians followed these teachings, the play might
have a different, and possibly less problematic, ending.
1. Who Chooseth Me, Must Give and Hazard All He Hath
"Who chooseth me, must give and hazard all he hath" (2:7:16) is one of
the most important lessons in the play. This lesson is embodied in the
lottery of caskets, which Portia's father has devised to test the inner char-
acter of his daughter's suitors. In this lottery, there are three metal cas-
kets, each symbolizing a different set of living values. The suitor who
picks the right casket will marry Portia; the one who picks the wrong cas-
ket will have to leave Belmont immediately and to remain unmarried for
the rest of his life. While the prize is rich, the sacrifice is great. Thus, six
coward suitors have decided to leave Belmont without even trying the
caskets.
The first suitor who is bold enough to try the lottery is the Prince of
Morocco. Despite his courage and noble birth, he fails to understand the
give-and-take nature of a marital relationship. He mistakes Portia as a
treasured object that many men desire, rather than as a partner for whom
he is willing to give and hazard. He also compares her to his previous
courageous exploits and emphasizes how he "would o'erstare the sternest
eyes that look: / Outbrave the heart most daring on earth: / Pluck the
young sucking cubs from the she-bear, / [and] mock the lion when a roars
for prey / To win the[ ] lady" (2:1:27-30). Dismissing the lottery as a
"blind Fortune" (2:1:36), he interprets the metals literally and selects the
casket based on the worth of his conquest. He picks the golden casket
and loses his suit.
Unlike Morocco, the Prince of Arragon fails because he is so preoccu-
pied with himself that he could not possibly love.253 To him, Portia is not
a conquest, but a prize he deserves. While Morocco is willing to conquer
the lottery, Arragon believes he deserves Portia as of right. Without even
reading the inscriptions, he rejects the leaden casket. "[B]ase lead"
(2:9:20) is too incomparable to his self-worth. Once again, Arragon fails
to understand the give-and-take nature of a marital relationship. Thus,
he selects the wrong casket and loses his suit.
By contrast, Bassanio understands the true nature of a marital relation-
ship. Instead of seeing marriage as a take-taken conquest in which he
acquires his wife as a treasured object or a well-deserved prize, he is pre-
pared to "give and hazard all he hath" (2:7:16) for the sake of a successful
relationship. Being able to see the meaning Portia's father has intended,
Bassanio becomes the Jason who wins the "golden fleece" (1:1:170).
Critics have argued that Bassanio may have selected the right casket
because of Portia's song, which suspiciously rhymes with "lead." Some of
these critics even regarded Bassanio as an opportunist, who plans to use
253 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 105.
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Portia's wealth to repay his debt. Pointing to Bassanio's speech about "a
lady richly left" (1:1:161), his plea to Antonio for "the means / To hold a
rival place with" (1:1:174) other suitors, and his extravagance over Laun-
celot's elaborate livery,254 these critics questioned Bassanio's internal
values.
However, "a clue is but a clue. [It] is not an answer. The success of the
communication of the clue depends on the nature of the recipient. '" 255
Despite similar clues-"led" (2:1:13), "hazard" (2:1:44), and "hazard"
(2:9:18)-both Morocco and Arragon fail to select the right casket.255 In
fact, as John Russell Brown pointed out, "dowry was frankly discussed in
planning any Elizabethan marriage., 257 Though a popular dramatist,
Shakespeare could not ignore this established tradition without sacrific-
ing the genuineness of his characters. Moreover, the accelerating rhythm
toward the end of the scene seems to suggest the dramatist's intention to
push the scene from Venice to Belmont.25s Thus, the rhetorical structure
of Bassanio's speech strongly suggests that Portia's qualities are listed in
ascending, rather than descending, order of importance.259
To understand Bassanio's inner values, one must therefore focus on the
latter half of Bassanio's speech, where he notes that Portia is "[o]f won-
drous virtues" (1:1:163) and is comparable to "Cato's daughter, Brutus'
Portia" (1:1:166). Portia's virtues, rather than her wealth, are what Bassa-
nio treasures. His sense of values is even more evident when Bassanio
"refuses to claim his prize until Portia herself chooses to ratify his tri-
254 OVERTON, supra note 238, at 22.
255 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 99.
256 Cf. HOLMER, supra note 238, at 100. Professor Holmer argues that the clues for
the golden and silver caskets should be differentiated from those of the leaden casket,
which Shakespeare intentionally created. As she explained, "[tlhe subliminal bias for
the language of the leaden casket in [Portia's] speech reveals how central that choice
is to her own life, not just because the choice is momentous but because the values
inherent in that choice are her values-humility, hazard, and self-sacrifice." Id.
257 John Russell Brown, Introduction to SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at xlvii; see
also HOLMER, supra note 238, at 107 (arguing that there is a wide acceptance in
Elizabethan England that "marriage among members of the higher classes should
uphold economic and social considerations, the equitable or advantageous joining in
matrimony of persons who are reasonably alike in nobility of family and estate").
258 As Lawrence Danson pointed out:
Portia's wealth is mentioned first but quickly and almost by the way; her beauty is
mentioned next, with heavier stress; and finally her virtue-fairer than the word
"fair" itself. The accelerating rhythm of the progression seems to push the scene
forward, striving to reach beyond the boundaries of this scene into the next, into
that Belmont we as audience are privileged to reach even before the new Jason.
DANSON, supra note 238, at 43.
259 Daniel H. Lowenstein, Book Review, The Failure of the Act: Conceptions of
Law in The Merchant of Venice, Bleak House, Les Miserables, and Richard
Weisberg's Poethics, 15 CARIozo L. Rav. 1139, 1159 n.91 (1994).
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umph."26 Practicing what the casket says, "Bassanio hazards it all for
Portia's confirmation." 26' Careful readers may even notice that Bassanio
is the first person in the play to utter the word "hazard" (1:1:151) and
"the only Venetian who does not instinctively hate Shylock."262 Structur-
ally, Shakespeare emphasized Bassanio's wise choice by foiling it against
Morocco's and Arragon's ill-advised selections.2 63
When the scene returns to Venice, similar values are tested in the form
of a trial. In this controversial trial, which many commentators have criti-
cized as implausible264 and illogical,265 both Shylock and Antonio are
tested for their ability to show mercy. As Portia explains, the "quality of
mercy is ... [the] mightiest in the mightiest" (4:1:180-84). "It blesseth
him that gives, and him that takes" (4:1:183). "When mercy seasons jus-
tice" (4:1:193), salvation is at hand. Thus, one should always show mercy.
Shylock fails to understand the need for mercy,266 so he loses the legal
battle, his money, his daughter, and his religion.
260 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 107. Professor Holmer pointed out that Bassanio
"has... been forthright with Portia about how financially poor a gentleman he is
because he has no wealth except his bloodline." Id. However, her observation is
problematic, because Bassanio does not reveal his financial troubles until he receives
Antonio's letter, which announces Antonio's impending death.
261 Id. at 114.
262 ALLAN BLOOM & HARRY V. JAFFA, SHAKESPEARE'S POLITICS 26 (1964). As
Professor Bloom pointed out, Bassanio "always treats [Shylock] like a man,
indifferent to the doctrines which separate them. He is surprised and shocked at
Shylock's conduct; he does not expect it, and even encourage it, as does Antonio." Id.
Notwithstanding his insightful observation, one have to wonder whether Bassanio
treats Shylock well because he needs to borrow money from Shylock.
263 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 102.
264 As W.H. Auden pointed out:
Even in the rush of a stage performance, the audience cannot help reflecting that
a man as interested in legal subtleties as Shylock, would, surely, have been aware
of the existence of this law and that, if by any chance he had overlooked it, the
Doge surely would very soon have drawn his attention to it. Shakespeare, it
seems to me, was willing to introduce what is an absurd implausibility for the
sake of an effect which he could not secure without it ....
W.H. Auden, Brothers and Others, in CASEBOOK, supra note 234, at 224, 234; see also
Harley Granville-Barker, The Merchant of Venice, in TiE MERCHANT OF VENICE:
Critical Essays 3, 3 (Thomas Wheeler ed., 1991) [hereinafter CRITICAL ESSAYS) ("The
Merchant of Venice is a fairy tale. There is no more reality in Shylock's bond and the
Lord of Belmont's will than in Jack and the Beanstalk."); John Middleton Murry,
Shakespeare's Method: The Merchant of Venice, in CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra, at 37, 38
(characterizing The Merchant of Venice as "a true folk story").
265 See POSNER, supra note 122, at 94 ("The lack of realism in the play's treatment
of law extends to the procedures as well as the substance of law.").
266 See HOLMER, supra note 238, at 68 ("One reason Shylock does not see the
wisdom of mercy when Portia advises him to 'consider this' is his blindness to his own
need of it." (citation omitted)).
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Shakespeare reinforced his losses by coupling it, subtly, with the defeat
of Morocco and Arragon.267 As Professor Holmer pointed out:
The gold and silver choices of Morocco and Arragon serve as dra-
matic analogues for Shylock's own choices of what he desires and
thinks he deserves: his gold and silver gain of usury and his assump-
tion of deserving fleshly revenge according to the rigour of the law.
Like Morocco and Arragon, who literally reject the leaden chest,
Shylock symbolically rejects it because he considers the true wisdom
of giving and hazarding mere foolishness, insisting rather on personal
gain, whether of earthly treasure or flesh. Both Morocco and
Arragon ironically err exactly where they think they excel, just as
Shylock does when he is undone by the letter and strict justice. Like
Morocco and Arragon, self-preoccupation blinds Shylock to his own
presumptive egotism. These mis-choosers defeat themselves.26
In addition, the play provides remarkable similarities between the
princely suitors' literal interpretation of the caskets and Shylock's literal
faith and rigid interpretation of the law,26 9 Morocco's discovery of "[a]
carrion Death" (2:7:63) reminds the audience of Shylock's epithet as "the
old carrion" (3:1:32),270 and Arragon's emphasis on his deserts parallels
Shylock's emphasis on his self-righteousness ("What judgment shall I
dread, doing no wrong?" 4:1:89). Indeed, Shylock's ultimate fate vividly
demonstrates the threatening inscriptions on the caskets: "Shylock does
not get what he desires, the pound of flesh or thrice his loan; he does not
get what he deserves, the bare principal; he is put in the position of giving
and hazarding all he hath.",
271
While most critics and audiences focused on Shylock's inability to give
and hazard, they tended to overlook Antonio's similar weakness, which is
evident in his behavior toward Shylock in the Rialto and his failure to
show mercy during the trial. In the Rialto, Antonio curses Shylock, treats
him like a dog, and spits upon his Jewish gabardine. Even after Shylock
has promised to lend him three thousand ducats, Antonio insists that he
will continue to treat Shylock badly. Likewise, when Portia asks him to
show mercy on Shylock at the end of the trial, he refuses. 2  In fact, he
267 Id. at 106.
268 Id. But see POSNER, supra note 122, at 97 (defending Shylock's insistence on
strict justice); KoRNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 74 (same).
269 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 146.
270 Id. at 104.
271 Id. at 244.
272 See, e.g., Alscher, supra note 231, at 17 (arguing that Antonio has several
chances to show mercy to Shylock or to intercede against the Alien Statute, but he
refuses); Marci A. Hamilton, The End of Law, 5 CARDOZO STUDS. L. & LITERATURE
125, 125 (1993) ("Antonio, the play's putative Christ .... utterly fails to fulfill his
promise of redemption."); Oldrieve, supra note 244, at 94-95 (arguing that Antonio
has shown no mercy to Shylock); Charles Spinosa, Shylock and Debt and Contract in
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aggravates the penalty and takes away the concessions the Duke has
made earlier. While the Duke gives Shylock almost half of his present
and future wealth to use and bequeath as he pleases, Antonio takes all
and requires him to bequeath all the profits for the rest of his lifetime to
the daughter and son-in-law he has completely disowned.273 Antonio
also requests that Shylock be immediately converted to Christianity.
Instead of showing mercy, Antonio takes away his money, his practice of
usury, and his religion. To emphasize Antonio's weakness, one director
addressed Portia's "quality of mercy" speech to both Antonio and
Shylock.274
Some critics have defended Antonio by citing as evidence his generos-
ity to Bassanio and his fellow Christians. To these critics, "[a] kinder gen-
tleman treads not the earth" (2:8:35). However, they overlooked the
Christian teaching that one should not only love one's friends, but should
also love one's enemies.27 5 Indeed, Shakespeare used Antonio and Shy-
lock as foils to each other so that they could be compared in terms of
"The Merchant of Venice," 5 CARDOZO STUDS. L. & LiTEATURma 65, 77 (1993)
(arguing that Antonio "cannot live up to his own words"); see also YA=, supra note
235, at 77 ("Antonio's rendering of mercy to Shylock is... neither unconstrained nor
unconstraining.... In the name of mercy, Antonio stipulates a series of contractlike
conditions, each one a quid pro quo.").
Many commentators disagreed and argued that Antonio has shown mercy, at least
in Elizabethan terms. See, e.g., Halio, supra note 233, at 61. As Professor Richard
Knowles pointed out to the Author, there were plenty of religious martyrs in
Elizabethan England who chose to be executed rather than to convert from
Catholicism to Anglicanism. Thus, Shylock has been offered a reasonable alternative,
even if this alternative is only merciful in contrast to the death penalty with which
Shylock is threatened. Despite the forcefulness of these arguments and the fact that
they are well supported by historical facts in Elizabethan England, Antonio's "mercy"
is still problematic because it is based on his own values and his wrongful and
arrogant assumption that his values are universal for everybody, including Shylock.
Cf. OVERTON, supra note 238, at 33 ("[B]oth the 'justice' and 'mercy' are strictly
Venetian. Shylock's treatment only appears merciful in contrast to the dire penalties
with which he is threatened and in accordance with a Christian perspective.");
Lowenstein, supra note 259, at 1170 ("If the sentence is assumed to be cruel, Antonio
and the Duke may fairly be charged with insensitivity .... ").
273 Contra HOLMER, supra note 238, at 229 ("Despite his present situation of
lamented poverty, Antonio selflessly creates a trust that will stead Shylock during his
lifetime and his offspring after his death.... Antonio assumes a generous fatherly
role in providing for the offspring of his would-be murderer .. ").
274 See Alscher, supra note 231, at 11 ("If the pivotal Quality of Mercy speech is
not addressed both to Antonio and Shylock simultaneously in Court, there is no hope
of any credible justice or redemption there.").
275 See Matthew 5:43-44 (King James) ("Ye have heard that it hath been said, thou
shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your
enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for them
which despitefully use you, and persecute you.").
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their situations, motives, words, and deeds.2 76 Compared to Portia and
Bassanio, who acknowledge their own weaknesses, both Antonio and
Shylock are "unenlightened about themselves as well as others, and both
err in the direction of proud self-righteousness." '277 While "Shylock
believes he is right to practise usury as he does and to hate Antonio for
his opposition[,] Antonio just as strongly believes he is right to hate and
ridicule Shylock for the same practice., 278 Small wonder Shakespeare
presented him as an odd man out in the final act,279 who imports legalistic
jargons from Venice to Belmont and promises to serve as a surety for
Bassanio's unconditional love for Portia. With such a portrait, Shake-
speare invited the audience to compare Antonio to the lonely Shylock
who creeps from the stage in the earlier act.2"' Among all the fourteen
Shakespearean comedies, Antonio is "the only major character... who is
not wed by play's end.",2
8
'
Up to this point, all the major characters except Portia have been
tested. To demonstrate her values and to test whether Portia can practice
what she preaches, Shakespeare staged a mock trial in Belmont, which
immediately follows the main trial in Venice. At the end of the Venetian
trial, Bassanio and Gratiano are caught between their promises to keep
their rings and their need to reward the lawyer and the clerk for the great
deeds they have done to their best friend. Promises are important, but so
is friendship. Upon Antonio's instigation, they break their oaths and give
away the rings that epitomize their marriages.
When they return to Belmont, their wives, who are no longer disguised,
feign their discovery and start a quarrel. Portia's dissatisfaction with her
276 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 143; see also POSNER, supra note 122, at 109 ("[I]n
his joylessness, wvifelessness, melancholy anti-Semitism, and essential solitariness,
[Antonio] is almost the Christian mirror of Shylock."); SCHNEIDER, supra note 246, at
95 ("Shylock and Antonio are complementary antitheses, opposite sides to a single
coin-inverse reflections of a common ideal that can be inferred from the play, but
which the play does not reveal directly.").
277 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 143.
278 Id. at 144.
279 "Antonio has no future in Belmont, despite Portia's polite but somewhat
cursory welcomes. As the inner circle's only confirmed bachelor, he simply does not
fit in any longer. . . ." Alscher, supra note 231, at 29. What Antonio misses is
underscored by Gratiano's last word in the play, the "ring." Id.
280 Auden, supra note 264, at 240; Graham Midgley, The Merchant of Venice: A
Reconsideration, in CASEBOOK, supra note 234, at 193, 207. Contra R.F. Hill, 'The
Merchant of Venice' and the Pattern of Romantic Comedy, in CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra
note 264, at 139, 158 (arguing that the action of the play seems to deny that Antonio is
an isolated figure).
281 Alscher, supra note 231, at 6. But see HOLMER, supra note 238, at 253 ("By not
giving Antonio a wife, Shakespeare continues to dramatise the claims of love in
friendship as well as romance, even until the final moments of his festive
conclusion.").
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husband is understandable. During the trial, Bassanio repeatedly offers
Portia's money to Shylock to redeem Antonio. He also tells Antonio that
he would sacrifice his own life, his wife's, and the entire world just to save
the royal merchant. Even after Antonio has regained his freedom, Bassa-
nio forgets the promise he has made to his wife and gives the lawyer his
ring.
Nonetheless, Portia understands the celestial quality of mercy and for-
gives her husband once she has taught him a lesson. Leading by example,
Portia not only teaches the audience the need to forgive, but also suggests
to them how the tension in the earlier act can be avoided had Shylock
and Antonio learned to forgive. By emphasizing the importance of
mutual trust and forgiveness, the ring episode provides "an admirable
tonal modulation between Act IV and Act V"'2 2 and "bring[s] the play
full circle., 283
2. May the Outward Shows Be Least Themselves
Throughout The Merchant, things are not what they seem. For exam-
ple, Shylock is repeatedly referred to as "the Jew" and insists on his relig-
ious differences ("I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk
with you, and so following: but I will not eat with you, drink with you,
nor pray with you," 1:3:30-33). Yet, he dines with the Christians and has
knowledge of the New Testament. Bassanio holds the key to the decep-
tive caskets and earns the virtuous Portia. Yet, his behavior and extrava-
gance suggest his inadequacy. Antonio, the noble merchant, is referred
to as the "kinde[st] gentleman [who] treads.., the earth" (2:8:35). Yet,
he fails to forgive Shylock or to show Shylock any mercy when he has the
opportunity to do so. Indeed, there are many other places where Shake-
speare explored and emphasized the difference between appearance and
reality. To narrow its focus, this section discusses the caskets, the trial,
and the ring episode, each of which poses a difficult trap for the audience.
In the casket test, both the metals and the mottos are deceiving. While
gold is what most people want and desire, Portia's portrait is found in the
leaden casket. The first two suitors fail to understand the distinction
between appearance and reality. Thus, they fail to appreciate this
"obscure grave" (2:7:51). Although Morocco asks Portia not to misjudge
him by his skin color, he ironically emphasizes that his blood is as red as
that of any fair-skinned creature. Focusing on the literal significance of
the metal, rather than its substance, he picks the golden casket and loses
his suit. Likewise, Arragon deceives himself by focusing on the motto of
the casket, rather than its underlying meaning. Though recognizing that a
fool chooses by "the fond eye" (2:9:27), he rejects the leaden casket with-
282 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 272.
288 Id. Contra WEISBERG, PonTHics, supra note 240, at 104 (arguing that Act V
has reversed the metaphysics of the play, leaving the audience wondering whether
Shylock's values are somehow better, more direct, and more forceful).
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out even considering the meaning of the metal or the motto. In the end,
he who tries to distinguish himself from "the fool multitude" (2:9:26) ends
up being one of them. The silver casket rightly rewards him with a blink-
ing idiot's head. By contrast, Bassanio understands the distinction
between appearance and reality. Putting the metal and the motto
together, he shows the audience the real meaning behind the caskets.
Even after he is awarded Portia's portrait, he reminds the audience of the
difference between the real person and the "counterfeit" (3:2:105): "Yet
look how far / The substance of my praise doth wrong this shadow / In
underprizing it, so far this shadow / Doth limp behind the substance"
(3:2:126-29). Thus, he deserves to select the right casket.
While the deceptiveness of the casket test is obvious to most audience,
the trial is more difficult and has confused many. In this trial, the plaintiff
and the defendant are indistinguishable. The judge even has to ask,
"Which is the merchant, and which the Jew?" (4:1:170). At the end, the
plaintiff and the defendant reverse their roles, and what starts as a civil
trial ends up being a criminal one. Moreover, the two figures that are
most qualified to give justice are biased. Although Portia appears to be a
"Daniel" (4:1:219) and a "[m]ost rightful judge" (4:1:297), she is in fact
corrupt, racist,2 4 and self-serving. 285 She hardens Shylock's resolve to
284 David D. Saxe, Shylock, Portia and a Case of Literary Oppression, 5 CARDOZO
STUDS. L. & LITERATURE 115, 118 (1993). But see BLOOM & JAFFA, supra note 262,
at 42 (arguing that Portia's reaction to Morocco's complexion demonstrates to the
Elizabethan audience her "healthy tastes"); HOLMER, supra note 238, at 103 ("Judged
by today's standards [Portia's] remark would seen as arguably racist. Yet Portia's
remark is obviously not intended to be intellectually demeaning but rather physically
preferential. If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, Portia is letting us know that she
finds the less familiar less attractive."); E.E. Stoll, Shylock, in CASEBOOK, supra note
234, at 47, 48 ("Now a popular dramatist, even more than other artists, cannot play a
lone hand, but must regard the established traditions of his art, the rooted sentiments
and prejudices of the public.").
285 Portia is interested in settling Bassanio's debt to Antonio and to finish the trial
so that both she and Bassanio can return to Belmont to consummate their marriage.
She also has a monetary interest in the outcome of the trial. It is her money that
Bassanio is using to repay Shylock. KORNsTEIN, supra note 231, at 77; see id. ("Portia
herself is not what she seems. As the wife of Antonio's best friend, for whom the loan
was made, she is anything but a disinterested judge."); OVERTON, supra note 238, at
37 ("The reason for [Portia's] insistence [on the moral law] is not only to save
Antonio but to safeguard her marriage."); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(a) (1990) ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances where: the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party. .. ."); In re Sims, 462 N.E.2d 370, 375 (1984) ("When a
Judge acts in such a way that she appears to have used the prestige and authority of
judicial office to enhance personal relationships, or for purely selfish reasons, or to
bestow favors, that conduct is to be condemned whether or not the Judge acted
deliberately and overtly.").
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enforce the bond (4:1:200-02), "entraps [him] by allowing him to believe
he has the same petition rights as a citizen,"2 6 and brings up the Alien
Statue even after Shylock has withdrawn his demand for a pound of
flesh.287 The Duke is equally prejudiced.2"8 Although he says that he
cannot deny Shylock the bond because of its negative implications for
Venice, he possesses the power to delay the trial, to grant pardon, and to
apply the Alien Statute to prevent Shylock from hurting Antonio. In
fact, when the Duke refuses to "do a great right a little wrong" (4:1:212)
lest he damages Venice's reputation, he sets a notorious precedent by
allowing Christians to persecute the Jews by using the Alien Statute.
The ring episode is the most deceptive of all, baffling even the most
sensitive audience and critics. As Professor Weisberg pointed out, in the
final act, the characters "ha[ve] become just as legalistic as the Jew whose
legalism they had sought to banish."2 9 Instead of talking about love and
music, they emphasize commitments, oaths, and promises. Thus, one can-
not discount Shylock's residual effect.29 ° Spooking in the background as
if he is "an unappeased ghost,"29' Shylock reminds the audience about
the harsh reality confronting those who only focus on law and commit-
ments. Through Shylock the ghost, Shakespeare invited the audience to
think deeply about their living values. Should one live by law, commit-
ment, and promises? Or should one live by love, music, and harmony?
Unsurprisingly, the key to these important questions are found in the
character who is the most unlikely to have the answer. Gratiano, who
"speaks an infinite deal of nothing" (1:1:114), gives the audience the
answer in the last two lines of the play: "Well, while I live, I'll fear no
other thing / So sore, as keeping safe Nerissa's ring" (5:1:306-07). The
most important thing in life is mutual trust and forgiveness, which the
ring signifies. These two qualities are the sine qua non of a successful
human relationship. All the legalistic jargons, oaths, promises, and com-
mitments are just deceptive appearances that misguide people. To
amplify this message, Shakespeare not only concluded the play with the
286 Alscher, supra note 231, at 15-16.
287 KoRNSTIN, supra note 231, at 81.
288 Halio, supra note 233, at 58.
289 WEISBERG, PoETmos, supra note 240, at 104.
290 See id. at 102 ("Shylock may be gone, but his mediated approach to
commitment lingers on.").
291 Sigurd Burckhardt, The Merchant of Venice: The Gentle Bond, in CASEBOOK,
supra note 234, at 208, 209; Norman Rabkin, Meaning and Shakespeare, in CRn=CAL
ESSAYS, supra note 264, at 103, 110 (arguing that Shylock "haunt[s] our memories
during the suddenly etherialized and equally suddenly trivialized final episodes as we
try to reach a simple position on the fairness of his treatment, or even on the truth of
his response to it"); see also WEISBERG, PoETHics, supra note 240, at 104 ("Shylock is
gone but not forgotten."). Contra Midgley, supra note 280, at 193-94 ("Shylock is
forgotten completely by the lovers beneath the stars ....").
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word "ring," but also reinforced it by a couplet, a double entendre, and
two bawdy puns.
3. Let the Sounds of Music Creep in Our Ears
While the first two teachings concern human virtues and proper aspira-
tion of life, the final teaching concerns Shakespeare's platonic worldview.
Under this worldview, "[t]he ideal society ... is one in which each citizen
does the task allotted to them within the natural community, and in terms
of their natural disposition of soul." ' As Shakespeare explained
through Antonio, we all live in one cosmos, "[a] stage, where every man
must play a part" (1:1:78). In order to function in this cosmos and to
appreciate our position within the community, we must strive for har-
mony and "let the sounds of music / Creep in our ears" (5:1:55-56). Oth-
erwise, the "muddy vesture of decay" (5:1:64) would engulf us and would
disconnect us from the higher immortal world.293 Throughout the play,
this need for harmony is demonstrated through the interdependence
between Venice and Belmont and between all the major characters and
through the characters' appreciation of music.
The contrasts between Venice and Belmont are striking. "Venice is...
most closely associated with the sea, even interwoven with it; and Bel-
mont suggests a more airy height, a finer element." '294 "Venice is the
scene of tragedy; Belmont is . . . a land of music, love, and 'holy
crosses."' 29 5 The Venetians believe in hate, prejudice, and revenge; the
Belmontians and their guests desire love, music, and harmony. The
Venetians have troubles with money and speak in legal jargons and com-
mercial terms; the Belmontians have boundless wealth and allude to the
Classics and Greek mythologies. In sum, "Belmont ... is a utopia. What
is not possible in Venice is possible here. 296
Although commentators have analyzed the play in terms of these polar
contrasts,2 97 these contrasts "do not solely oppose but also temper each
other."'2 9 For example, the play begins in Venice but ends in Belmont. It
292 IAN WARD, SHAKESPEARE AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 142 (1999).
293 BLOOM & JAFFA, supra note 262, at 30.
294 G. Wilson Knight, Tempest and Music, in CASEBOOK, supra note 234, at 81, 82-
83.
295 Id. at 83.
296 BLOOM & JAFFA, supra note 262, at 30.
297 See, e.g., id.; Knight, supra note 294, at 82-83; Kenji Yoshino, The Lawyer of
Belmont, 9 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 183, 185 (1997) ("[T]he play presents itself as a
parade of binaries . . . that may be seen as a sequence of paired and conflicting
spheres of activity.").
298 HOLMER, supra note 238, at 5; see id. at 44 (arguing that Venice and Belmont
are "purposefully interrelated"). As Professor Holmer explained:
There is ... no real thematic dichotomy between Belmont and Venice because
the theme of appearance and reality in Belmont also occurs in Venice (as in
Shylock's feigning good will toward Antonio in his 'merry' bond, and Lancelot's
20011
54 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1
is the Venetian gentleman who liberates the Belmontian heiress from her
father's will. Without the Venetian bond and moneylender, this heiress
would still be trapped within the casket scheme. By contrast, it is the
Belmontian heiress who rescues the Venetian merchant from his predica-
ment. It is also she who saves Venice "from the deadly logic of its own
constitution." '299 Moreover, the deceiving Venetian bond doubles the
Belmontian caskets. The controversial trial in Venice paves the way for a
reenactment in Belmont. The melancholic merchant in Venice parallels
the unhappy heiress in Belmont. The alien Jew at the end of the trial
mirrors the lonely bachelor at the end of the play. And Venetian justice
provides the context for Belmontian mercy.3"' Without the interactions
between the two places, there will be no marriage, no trial, and, the most
important of all, no play.
Like Venice and Belmont, the characters are dependent on each
other.3 1 Portia depends on her father's will, Bassanio's life, and her
maid's cheerfulness. Bassanio depends on Antonio's generosity, Portia's
love, and Shylock's loan. Antonio depends on Bassanio's friendship and
Portia's dramatic rescue. Lorenzo depends on Jessica's love and Portia's
"manna" (5:1:294). Gratiano depends on Bassanio's support and Ner-
issa's affection. Old Gobbo depends on Launcelot's care and support.
Venice's reputation depends on the learned Balthazar. Shylock's fate
depends on the Duke and Antonio. Indeed, as Professor Weisberg aptly
pointed out, most of the characters in the play are unable to "conclude
their affairs without the mediation of a third character.,
30 2
Because of this interdependence, attaining harmony is very important.
While harmony is present in all immortal souls, it only exists in those
mortal beings that have music in their souls. Those who do not attain this
immortal virtue have "spirit... dark at night" (5:1:86) and "affections
dark as Erebus" (5:1:87). They are "fit for treasons, stratagems and
spoils" (5:1:85) and are not to be trusted. Among these people are
Antonio and Shylock. While Antonio dislikes masques, Shylock orders
Jessica to lock up the doors and windows of his house lest "the sound of
shallow foppery enter / [his] sober house" (2:5:35-36). To highlight
and Jessica's adoption of disguise), and the themes of justice and mercy in Venice
also occur in Belmont (for example, strict justice governs the penalties for loss in
the casket test, with no mitigation, but mercy tempers the penalties for loss of the
betrothal rings at the play's end).
Id.
299 Burckhardt, supra note 291, at 212.
300 See Halio, supra note 233, at 60 ("For without that context-without justice-
mercy is empty, meaningless. It turns into sentimentality and becomes
counterproductive, resulting in injustice. Fully to understand and value mercy, we
need first of all to understand and grasp justice in all its rigor.").
301 Max Plowman, Money and the Merchant, in CASEBOOK, supra note 234, at 77,
80.
302 WEISBERG, POETHICS, supra note 240, at 95.
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Antonio's and Shylock's weaknesses, Shakespeare left the two characters
alone when he harmonized the discordant elements at the end of the
play."' Shylock is excluded from beautiful Belmont, and Antonio has an
awkward presence on the island.
V. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY TOWARD CHINA
In the past, people looked to canons of books when they confronted
problems in their lives or when they thought about their personal
goals.30 4 Among one of these canons is the works of William Shake-
speare. Being "an eminently political author,"305 Shakespeare not only
helped people understand their world, but also gave them insights into
how a good regime and a good ruler should be.30 6 His works also "pro-
vide the necessary lessons concerning human virtue and the proper aspi-
rations of a noble life." 307
In light of the close resemblance between Shylock's painful experience
in The Merchant and China's forced conversion in the international intel-
lectual property community, The Merchant may provide valuable insights
into how China and the United States can resolve, or at least minimize,
their intellectual property conflict. Using The Merchant as a legal text,
this Part applies Shakespeare's teachings to the U.S.-China intellectual
property conflict. It concludes that Shakespeare's lessons in The
Merchant provide valuable lessons for people to understand the conflict
and for policymakers to reshape their foreign intellectual property policy.
A. The Two Countries Must Give and Hazard All They Have
Since China began its contact with the West in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, the United States has made repeated attempts to convert China into
a Western intellectual property regime. These attempts have ranged from
commercial treaties to threats of trade sanctions and from threats of non-
renewal of most-favored-nation status to opposition to entry into the
WTO. So far, all attempts have failed. Despite the increased efforts by
the Chinese government to combat piracy and the public's heightened
awareness of intellectual property rights, piracy remains rampant in
China. Every year, the United States loses more than $2 billion of reve-
nues due to intellectual property piracy in China. 0s Thus, scholars,
303 Graham Holderness, Shakespeare on Marx, in THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 57,
95 (Nigel Wood ed., 1996).
304 See BLOOM & JAFFA, supra note 262, at 1.
305 Id. at 4; see also POLITICAL SHAKESPEARE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
MATERIALISM (Jonathan Dollimore & Alan Sinfield eds., 2d ed. 1994) (collecting
essays that explored the meaning of Shakespeare's plays within different social
contexts).
306 BLOOM & JAFFA, supra note 262, at 5.
307 Id. at 2.
308 Faison, China Turns Blind Eye, supra note 95.
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policymakers, and commentators have called for a critical assessment and
reformulation of the existing American intellectual property policy
toward China.
As Shylock has demonstrated in The Merchant, forced conversion is
always painful, uneasy, and problematic-and, most of the time, ineffec-
tive. Even though Shylock is converted at the end of the trial, there is no
indication that he will "presently become a Christian" (4:1:383). In fact,
the cultural history of his tribesmen suggests otherwise. Consider, for
example, the expulsion of the Jews from England by King Edward I in
1290. Right after the expulsion, the Jews immediately returned to the
country.30 9 Similarly, the conversion and persecution attempts of the
Jews during the Spanish Inquisition were futile. Even though the surviv-
ing Jews became outwardly Christians, they retained their Jewish affilia-
tions and covertly practiced their religious ceremonies.31 ° Instead of
destroying their faith and practices, the conversion experience had actu-
ally increased the awareness of their cultural identities,311 thus making
later conversion attempts even more difficult.
Because forced conversion is both undesirable and ineffective, the
United States must abandon its coercive intellectual property policy
toward China.31 2 Instead, it needs to "give and hazard" some of its short-
term profits and economic advantage to induce China toward a new intel-
lectual property regime. For example, American manufacturers and pub-
lishers can price their products lower in China than in other Western
developed countries. 31 3 They can also provide better products or post-
309 GROSS, supra note 239, at 62.
310 Id. at 32. As John Gross pointed out, a handful of Marranos had made their
way from Spain or Portugal to England during the reign of Henry VIII. Id.
311 RozMovITs, supra note 246, at 86.
312 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
313 See id.; see also MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL
COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 81 (1998); John
Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A Communications-Based
Approach to IPR Protection in China, il CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 56, at 409, 433 ("Today, various multinationals have
started discovering that one way to stop pirates from their activities is to offer them
an honest alternative." (emphasis added)); Don Goves, Warner Bros., MGM Dips into
China Vid Market, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 21, 1997, at 1 (stating that Warner Bros. and
MGM have entered into a licensing deal with a Chinese government-owned
conglomerate to release low-priced video products dubbed in Mandarin). Such
bargain pricing is particularly important for educational products, where access to
those products is crucial to the country's development and for raising the living
standards of its people. Considering that the Chinese can only afford lower priced
products, bargain pricing would also be economically sound as long as these bargain
products do not enter the United States as grey market goods. In fact, American
businesses can lower their business costs by manufacturing their products in China,
thus taking advantage of the lower labor, production, and distribution costs.
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sale benefits that are not available to purchasers of counterfeit goods,
such as warranty service, replacement part guarantees, free upgrades, and
contests or giveaways.314
In addition, the United States needs to be patient while China is under-
going transition to a new intellectual property regime.' 5 The effort to
foster serious, widespread, and long-term adherence to a new regime
"entails significant transformations in people's attitudes toward intellec-
tual creation, toward property, toward rights, toward the vindication of
such rights through formal legal action, toward government and so
forth."" '6 The new intellectual property laws were not enacted in China
until the mid-1980s. Even if one ignores the inertia of China's longstand-
ing compiling tradition,317 the public's general understanding of intellec-
tual property is still vague and weak.318 Thus, one cannot expect drastic
and immediate changes in Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property
rights or the sudden emergence of institutions needed to nurture and sup-
port those attitudes.31 9
Moreover, a lower price and thus a lower profit margin would eventually take away
the counterfeiters' incentives to make pirated goods. The smaller price difference
between legitimate and illicit products would also discourage the local Chinese people
from buying counterfeit products, provided the consumers can distinguish between
the two.
314 Providing these post-sale benefits "would, in the mind of [the] consumers,
warrant the higher prices paid for such legally manufactured goods." Doris Estelle
Long, China's IP Reforms Show Little Success: IP Enforcement Remains Problematic,
but Clever Owners Can Beat the Odds, IP WORLDWIDE, Nov.-Dec. 1998; see also
Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 313, at 432 (citing the success of a comic book
publisher in competing directly against pirates by upgrading the quality of its graphics
and paper and by including prizes with each issue); see also Yu, From Pirates to
Partners, supra note 92 (emphasizing the importance of providing post-sale benefits).
315 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
316 Willam P. Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 21
(1994) [hereinafter Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter]; see also
ROBERT SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 193-
96 (1990) (discussing the difficulty of changing the mindset of the people in less
developed countries concerning how they perceive intellectual property rights).
317 See supra text accompanying notes 106-22 (discussing China's compiling
tradition).
318 See Hu, supra note 105, at 110.
319 Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter, supra note 316, at 21; see
Carole Ganz Brown & Francis W. Rushing, Intellectual Property Rights in 1990s, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 1, 14 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole
Ganz Brown eds., 1990) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS] ("[I]ncreased
protection is not to be expected tomorrow, and the movement will be evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. Strategies to advance protection should take long-range
approaches, say, a five to ten year time frame."); Marcus W. Brauchli & Joseph Kahn,
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The United States can also give and hazard by helping China integrate
into the global economy. To accelerate such integration, the United
States can convince the Chinese leaders why economic integration will
benefit China and improve its standing in the international community. 
20
It can also treat China with the status appropriate to a major power by
supporting China's participation at the G-7 and G-8 meetings,321 by
encouraging Chinese membership and active participation in interna-
tional organizations, and by accelerating China's entry into the WTO.
322
Intellectual Property: China Moves Against Piracy as U.S. Trade Battle Looms, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995, at 1 ("[Building a functional intellectual property regime is]
like building a house.... You can have the house structure all set up, very beautiful.
But then, you need electricity and water pipes. That takes more time." (quoting Li
Changxu, head of China United Intellectual Property Investigation Center)); see also
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, (providing a 5-year
transitional period for less developed countries and a 11-year transitional period for
least developed countries).
320 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
321 See Final Report of the Eighty-ninth American Assembly, in LIVING WITH
CHINA: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH-FIRST CENTURY 295, 301 (Ezra F.
Vogel ed., 1997) [hereinafter LIvING WITH CHINA]. The G-7 is an informal forum of
seven major industrialized countries-Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United States, and the United Kingdom. Since 1998, the G-7 and the Russian
Federation have met as the G-8 to discuss global economic issues.
322 See Jerome A. Cohen & Matthew D. Bersani, Leveling the Playing Field for
U.S. Firms in China, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN
INTERESTS 107, 110 (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994) [hereinafter
BEYOND MFN]; David M. Lampton, A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing
and the Global Order, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 321, at 120, 137; Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see also Joint United States-China Statement, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1680 (Oct. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Joint Statement] ("The
United States and China agree that China's full participation in the multilateral
trading system is in their mutual interest."); id. (agreeing "to intensify negotiations on
market access, including tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, standards and
agriculture and on implementation of WTO principles so that China can accede to the
WTO on a commercially meaningful basis at the earliest possible date"); China's
WTO Accession: American Interests, Values and Strategies: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 1 (2000), available at http://Avxvxv.
ustr.gov/speech-testbarshefsky/barshefsky-.t34.pdf (statement of USTR Charlene
Barshefsky) ("China's WTO accession is a clear economic win for the United
States."); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, China Policy: Means and Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 1997, at A15 ("China's admission to the World Trade Organization-on
commercially acceptable conditions-is probably our single most effective means of
shaping a more open, market-oriented China."). But see RICHARD BERNSTEIN &
Ross H. MUNRO, THE COMING CoNFLIcT WITH CHINA 211 (Vintage Books 1998)
(arguing against WTO membership for China); James V. Feinerman, Free Trade, Up
to a Point, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1999, at A15 (discarding myths concerning China's
accession to the WTO); James Mann, Our China Illusions, AM. PROSPECT, June 5,
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Given the very specialized nature of intellectual property laws, it is also
important that the United States give and hazard its legal expertise with
respect to drafting, implementing, and enforcing intellectual property
laws.323 In providing such assistance, the United States needs to be care-
ful about the laws and legal ideas they will bring into China, because laws
and ideas usually "bring their specific motivating values with them." 324
2000, at 22 (arguing that China's entry into the WTO would likely disappoint the
American business community); Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership
of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 339
(1993) ("Bilateral agreements provide the most workable vehicle for addressing the
contentious issues surrounding intellectual property protection."); Ashoka Mody,
New International Environment for Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISONS, supra note 319, at 203, 255 ("In the short-run, bilateralism is proving
more effective than multilateral efforts in furthering U.S. interests. Bilateralism is
quicker and allows more focused and tailored responses."). See generally CHINA IN
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT
(Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998) for a collection of essays discussing China's accession
to the WTO.
"Involving China in the WTO and obtaining deadlines for compliance (even if
allowing for longer transition times than one would want) is preferable to having
China outside the WTO, with no deadlines for compliance whatsoever." Lampton,
supra, at 137; see MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE
TAIL: CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 41 (1999) ("WTO is by no
means a panacea to China's economic problems, but both China and the world
trading community will be better served if China is a member."); Margaret M.
Pearson, China's Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime, in
CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 161, 195 (Elizabeth Economy
& Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999) [hereinafter CHINA JOINS THE WORLD] ("[W]ithout
China in the WTO the United States loses a key forum for seeing that China adheres
to the rules of the regime."). Being an emerging world power, China "will more likely
to adhere to international norms that it has helped to shape." Sam Nunn, Address to
the American Assembly, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 321, at 277, 285. Indeed,
"[g]lobal commerce can ill afford to have a major player like China not playing by
market rules and conventions. If China is allowed to pirate whatever products and
technology it chooses, the international system could well break down." Julia Chang
Bloch, Commercial Diplomacy, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 321, at 185, 200;
see also Julia Cheng, Note, China's Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS
Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1941, 2005
(1998) ("Admitting China into the WTO will encourage China to enforce its
[intellectual property] protection and enhance the international community's position
to contain China's piracy problem.").
323 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
324 Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some
Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 205 (1994); see ROBERT B.
SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 34 (1978) ("Legal transplants
practically never work."); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative
Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1, 27 (1974) ("[A]ny attempt to use a pattern of law outside
the environment of its origin... requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but
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For example, the United States copyright law-in particular the 1976
Copyright Act-is filled with compromises struck among American inter-
est groups that participated in the drafting process.325 A verbatim trans-
plant of this statute into China would not only be inefficient, but could be
indeed harmful, if China were not facing similar interest group pressure
or had similar needs or concerns. In fact, a verbatim transplant would
ignore those important problems that continue to hamper intellectual
property law reforms in China.32
6
Moreover, as its assistance efforts to the former Soviet Union and East-
ern and Central Europe have demonstrated, the United States needs to
pay special attention to how it gives and hazards. "[D]epending on how
donors design and deliver assistance, and the relationships they develop
with recipients, aid can either help to bridge the gap or serve to widen
it."'3 27 In fact, assistance can be competitive 32" and may dominate power
also of its social, and above all its political, context."); Herbert H.P. Ma, The Chinese
Concept of the Individual and the Reception of Foreign Law, 9 J. CHINESE L. 207
(1995) (discussing the cultural barrier to the reception of Western laws in China); Julie
Mertus, Mapping Civil Society Transplants: A Preliminary Comparison of Eastern
Europe and Latin America, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 921 (1999) (arguing that foreign
legal experts bring with them their own cultural, social, and political misconceptions);
Neil Winstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REv. 217, 274 (1998) ("[A] legal rule or doctrine often operates
quite differently, or carries very different symbolic content, when transplanted from
the source to the host jurisdiction. Even if a rule is transplanted word-for-word, it
may effectively be' modified in substance or simply rendered irrelevant in the host
country.").
325 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 857, 859 (1987); see also Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to
Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & Errr. L.J. 29, 53 (1994) ("The only way that copyright
laws get passed in this country is for all the lawyers who represent the current
stakeholders to get together. . .This process has produced laws that are unworkable
from the vantage point of people who were not among the negotiating parties."
(footnote omitted)); Netanel, supra note 324, at 225-26 (arguing that copyright law
represents an uneasy accommodation of competing interests and theoretical premises,
which makes direct transplant difficult and uncomfortable); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric
and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. Rnv. 1197 (1996) (arguing that American
copyright protection expands as a result of interest group politics and the need for the
nation's elite to protect the status quo).
326 These problems include the difficulty in monitoring a large territory, in
collecting evidence of infringement, and in collecting judgments; widespread
corruption; abuse by government officials; different values placed on intellectual
property infringement; the indistinguishability between public and private entities;
local protectionism; and the decentralization of government. See Yu, From Pirates to
Partners, supra note 92.
327 JAINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE STRANGE CASE OF
WESTERN AID TO EASTERN EUROPE 1989-1998, at 6 (1998); id. at 7 ("In some
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relations. 29 As feminist commentators pointed out, by giving a gift that
Antonio cannot reciprocate, Portia settles once and for all Antonio's
ambiguous relationship with Bassanio,33° thus "ensur[ing] that her mar-
riage to Bassanio will be conducted upon hers and not Antonio's terms or
the terms of the patriarchal system under which she was wed." '331
Even though Shakespeare encouraged people to give and hazard with-
out expecting any return, his ideal world would not be attainable if every-
body just took without giving. Thus, China, like the United States, must
give and hazard. While China has neither economic profits nor legal
expertise to give and hazard, it can adjust its self-strengthening
worldview, tone down its xenophobic skepticism toward Western institu-
tions and intellectual property rights, and modify its concept of absolute
national sovereignty.
So far, many Chinese, including their leaders, considered intellectual
property rights as "goodly apple[s] rotten at the heart" (1:3:96). Accord-
ing to these people, the West has specifically designed intellectual prop-
erty rights to protect its hegemony,332 to drain the Chinese purse,33 3 and
to slow down China's economic progress and its rise in world affairs.
33 4
instances, unwitting donors sustained and even reinforced those legacies through their
sheer misunderstanding of them.").
328 See Karen Newman, Portia's Ring: Unruly Women and Structures of Exchange
in The Merchant of Venice, in NEw CASEBOOK, supra note 238, at 117, 118 ("[G]ift
giving can be competitive ....").
329 Id. at 122; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Asians Worry That U.S. Aid Is a New
Colonialism, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1998, at A4 (reporting the concerns of the Asian
countries that the American assistance efforts may create a new form of colonialism).
330 Newman, supra note 328, at 124-25.
331 Oldrieve, supra note 244, at 99.
332 Lampton, supra note 322, at 121; see Yue Ren, China's Perceived Image of the
United States: Its Sources and Impact, in THE OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
FOLLOWING THE 1997-1998 SUMMITS: CHINESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
SECURITY, TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE 247,262 (Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S.
Cheng eds., 1999) ("From the Chinese point of view, Washington is sensitive to any
power that might pose a challenge to its hegemonic position.").
333 Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global
Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1993) (stating that the less
developed countries consider intellectual property rights as a means of draining their
scarce government resources).
"' See Elizabeth C. Economy, China's Environmental Diplomacy, in CHINA AND
THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FACES THE NEW MILLENIUM 264, 281
(Samuel S. Kim ed., 4th ed., 1998) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD] ("[T]here
was increasing discussion in the Chinese media suggesting that sustainable
development was part of a master plan by the advanced industrialized countries (and
especially the United States) to contain China by forcing it to slow the pace of
economic growth in order to protect the environment."); Paul H.B. Godwin, Force
and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-first Century, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD, supra, at 171, 178 ("Beijing is convinced that at the heart of U.S. strategy is
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Like "devil[s who] cite scriptures for [their] purpose" (1:3:93), the West
seeks to import these "Trojan horses" to divide China, to erode its cul-
tural identity,"3 5 and to ensure that the nation "follow the path of the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe-toward economic decay,
social unrest, and political instability." '36
However, this perspective is not only misguided, but overlooks the
merits of Western institutions, which are important to the country's strat-
egy of economic development, foreign investment, and interstate rela-
tions.3" 7 In fact, adopting an intellectual property regime that
harmonizes with Western notions will provide the needed incentives for
Chinese authors and inventors to invent, commercialize, and market their
the intent to delay, if not prevent, China's emergence as great power in the twenty-
first century; that the United States views China as the principal contender for the
predominant position of the United States in Asia."); Michel Oksenberg, Taiwan,
Tibet and Hong Kong in Sino-American Relations, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note
321, at 53, 56 ("[The Chinese leaders] believe that foreign leaders tend to be reluctant
to welcome China's rise in world affairs and would prefer to delay or obstruct its
progress."). But see BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 322, at 204 ("The goal of the
United States is not a weak and poor China; it is a China that is stable and
democratic, that does not upset the balance of power in Asia, and that plays within
the rules on such matters as trade and arms proliferation."); Lee H. Hamilton,
Introduction to BEYOND MFN, supra note 322, at 1, 5 ("The U.S. interest is served by
China's continuing economic development, for the sake of both improving the
material welfare of the Chinese people and fostering political liberalization.").
"I See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 223 (1996) ("By 1995, a broad consensus reportedly
existed among the Chinese leaders and scholars that the United States was trying to
divide China territorially, subvert it politically, contain it strategically and frustrate it
economically." (internal quotations omitted)); Hamilton, Introduction, supra note
334, at 7 ("[T]he United States must avoid creating the impression within China's elite
that it intends to bring down the current system or divide the country. That, of
course, is not the U.S. objective.").
336 Harry Harding, Breaking the Impasse over Human Rights, in LIVING WITH
CHINA, supra note 321, at 165, 172. But see Hamilton, Introduction, supra note 334, at
4 ("China's stability is in the U.S. interest.").
337 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; Yu, Succession by Estoppel, supra
note 177, at 100; see Robert Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System
Makes Sense for the World [hereinafter Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual
Property System Makes Sense], in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68, 83 (Michael B. Wallerstein et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGirs]
("Strong intellectual property safeguards seem likely to speed rather than retard
progress toward world-class achievement."); see also CORNE, supra note 129, at 1
("[Flor continued economic development, [China] needs to further amplify economic
linkages with West and Japan."); id. at 284 ("Law's overt purpose is to assist China's
modernization by replacing policy decree and customary practices with a stable
universal framework of normative behaviour.").
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products.338  It will increase foreign investment,339 thus creating new
jobs34° and facilitating technology transfer 4.3 1 It will also promote indige-
nous industries and technologies342 and will generate considerable tax
318 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
339 EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1994); Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L.
Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China, in PROTECTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 187, at 7, 8 (listing the loss of
foreign investment and know-how as a cost of counterfeiting); Antonio Medina Mora
Icaza, The Mexican Software Industry, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 337, at 232, 236 ("Intellectual property rights
protection in a country is a way to seek the trust of foreign investors in the country
that will allow its economy to grow."); Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean
Better Business Climate, J. CoM., Mar. 7, 1996, at IC, 1C (reporting on a World Bank
survey that demonstrates the correlation between intellectual property rights and
foreign investment); A.R.C. Westwood, Preface to GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 337, at v, vi ("Clearly, a company will
not be enthusiastic about doing business in a country unwilling to provide protection
for the intellectual content of its products-a concern now facing U.S. businesses as
they evaluate opportunities in the former Soviet Union."); see also Robert M.
Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of
Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261 (1997) (using foreign
investment as one of the variables in measuring intellectual property protection in a
less developed country); Mickey Mouse in China, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at D4
(reporting that Disney bought Mickey Mouse back to China after a self-imposed four-
year absence due to copyright infringements). But see A. Samuel Oddi, The
International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987
DUKE L.J. 831, 849 ("In the complex decisionmaking process of whether to invest in a
foreign country, the availability of patent protection seems unlikely to be a
determinative factor.").
340 Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 339, at 9; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOFTxvARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE ECONOMY 4 (1998)
(estimating that a 60% decrease in piracy would translate into more than 79,000 jobs).
341 MANSFIELD, supra note 339, at 20 ("[T]he strength or weakness of a country's
system of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect,
particularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by
many U.S. firms to that country."); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-
SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 214 (1998) (arguing
that an operational intellectual property regime will promote foreign investment);
Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 166, 175-76 (1994) (same).
342 See Robert P. Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and
Trade, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 239, 246 (1990) ("A recording industry flourished in Hong
Kong for the first time after passage of a copyright act protecting sound recordings;
the Indian software industry saw a growth surge after a copyright was extended to
software ...."); Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense,
supra note 337, at 72 ("There are reports that immediately after Mexico reformed its
patent law in June 1991, large numbers of patent applications were filed by Mexican
2001]
64 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1
revenues for the country.3 43 It may even help prevent the large variety of
domestic problems that would arise due to inadequate intellectual prop-
erty protection.
344
In addition, China needs to give and hazard its protectionist trade bar-
riers, such as quotas, import licensing, import substitution and local con-
tent policies, unnecessarily restrictive certification and quarantine
standards, and export performance requirements.34 5 It also needs to
eliminate the restrictions on foreign investment and trade contained in its
industrial policies and to provide full trading rights to foreign compa-
nies. 46 Given the significant difference between Chinese and Western
legal systems,3 47 it is also essential that China promote transparency by
publishing laws, regulations, and related measures and procedures and by
making available the informal administrative "guidance" or "approval"
used in its rulemaking.34 8
nationals."); id. ("A small but striking example of before-and-after shift comes from
Columbia where copyright protection for software took effect in 1989. More than 100
Columbian nationals have since produced application software packages that have
been registered with the copyright office, with hundreds more written but not
registered.").
143 Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 339, at 9; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
supra note 340, at 4 (estimating that a 60% decrease in piracy would translate into
more than $466 million in government revenues).
"I These problems include, among others, illnesses and deaths caused by
adulterated drugs and counterfeit products, higher prices businesses and educational
centers have to pay for to make up for the potential infringement by their fellow
citizens and organizations, the consumers' reluctance to purchase in the open market,
and brain drain. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
315 See id.; see also WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RisE OF CHINA: How
ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPER POWER 381 (1993) (discussing
China's protectionist trade barriers); see also id. ("China is trying to export like a
capitalist and import like a communist." (quoting statement of Ambassador Arthur
W. Hummel, Jr.)).
346 Bloch, supra note 322, at 214; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
347 See discussion supra Part II.F (discussing the difference between Chinese and
Western legal systems).
348 See Bloch, supra note 322, at 215; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92;
see also CHEN, supra note 8, at 85 ("There is no legal requirement for all guizhang to
be published, and some of it is in fact regarded as internal or not published.");
CORNE, supra note 129, at 72 ("Many banfa, guiding and guize are never promulgated
or issued to the public and are only intended for the eyes of government officials.
They are merely designated a serial number and then appear in the internal document
series of a certain department."); Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The
Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (1998) (arguing that the
lack of transparency in China will obstruct its accession to the WTO); Pearson, supra
note 322, at 170 ("[T]he trading system remained far from transparent, a problem
exacerbated by the still less-than-reliable accounting system and statistical
reporting.").
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China also needs to give and hazard its concept of absolute national
sovereignty.34 9 Although China has repeatedly emphasized the impor-
tance of this concept, the need for global cooperation has drastically
weakened the foundation of this principle.3 5 ° To resolve domestic
349 China considers state sovereignty as the most fundamental principle of
international law and society. Yu, Succession by Estoppel, supra note 177, at 88 &
n.207; see also CHINA RISING: NATIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE 181 (David S.G.
Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., 1997) ("China is the rearguard great power when it
comes to the erosion of state sovereignty."); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7
("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
Indeed, some commentators argued that "the trend toward international
agreements and the formation of international institutions are consistent with the
basic desire of government to maintain their sovereignty." Enrico Colombatto &
Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation
and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 926 (1996). As
Professors Colombatto and Macey explained:
All else equal, regulators would prefer not to cede or to share authority with
their counterparts from other countries. Thus, regulators in a particular country
generally vill not sacrifice autonomy by coordinating their activities with
regulators from other countries.... [H]owever .... technological change, market
processes, and other exogenous variables may deprive the regulators in a
particular country of the power to act unilaterally. Such change can cause
regulators acting alone to become irrelevant. When this happens, the regulators
in a particular country will have strong incentives to engage in activities such as
international coordination in order to survive.
Id.
,1o See David de Pury, Drawing National Democracies Towards Global
Governance, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ARTHUR DUNKEL 171, 171 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998)
[hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND] ("Global governance is what is needed
to make an increasingly global world economy function better and ensure sustainable
world-wide growth and development."); Harding, supra note 336, at 177 (stating that
the need for global cooperation has weakened the principle of national sovereignty);
John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime
of International Federalism, 18 CARDOzo L. REv. 903 (1996) (arguing that a new
regime of "international federalism" has replaced the regime of nation states); see
also ABRANi CHAYES & ANOTNIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEw SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995) ("[FIor
all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of
states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in
reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international
life."); id. ("Sovereignty, in the end, is status-the vindication of the state's existence
as a member of the international system. In today's setting, the only way most states
can realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various
regimes that regulate and order the international system."); STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (contending that states have never
been as sovereign as scholars have argued); DENNIS ROY, CHINA'S FOREIGN
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problems that have ramifications beyond national frontiers, states often
have to cooperate with each other."' Even the United States, which has
been known to favor unilateral actions, has had to and "is [still] going
through difficult adaptations to the demands of global institutions, inter-
national law, multinational companies, and transnational financial net-
works and the loss of exclusive national decision-making power
associated with them."3 52
Finally, China needs to give and hazard its focus on internal develop-
ment as it makes transition to a world power. 3  World power status is
glamorous, but it does come with a price. This price may entail the sacri-
fice of a country's own internal development, its sovereignty, and its deci-
sionmaking power. In the joint statement issued after the 1997 U.S.-
China Summit, the Presidents of China and the United States acknowl-
edged the two countries' "common responsibility to work for peace and
prosperity in the 21st century., 354 Given this significant responsibility,
China, like the United States, has to assume the role to maintain interna-
tional peace and order and has to set examples for other countries.355
RELATIONS 231 (1998) ("[S]tates are not the only important actors in international
relations, but must share the stage with non-government organizations, international
institutions, and multinational corporations."); ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND
COLLABORATION 27 (1962) ("Co-operation means sacrificing some degree of national
independence with a view to co-ordinating, synchronizing, and rendering mutually
profitable some of the political, military, or economic policies the co-operating
nations intend to pursue."); John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round Results and
National Sovereignty, in URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supra, at 293, 294 ("No
sensible persons today would agree that [absolute] sovereignty legitimately exists
anywhere in the world."). For a collection of essays discussing the decline of the
nation state and the implications of such a decline, see Symposium, The Decline of
Nations State and Its Effects on Constitutional and International Economic Law, 18
CARDOZO L. REv. 903 (1996).
351 These problems include, to name a few, illicit drug trafficking, refugees, illegal
immigration, environmental degradation, illegal arms sales, nuclear proliferation,
terrorism, bribery, and corruption. See Judith H. Bello, National Sovereignty and
Transnational Problem Solving, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1996) ("Many of
the most difficult problems that challenge nation states in the increasingly
interdependent world do not respect borders .... Nation states acting alone are
helpless to resolve or most effectively alleviate these problems.").
352 Lampton, supra note 322, at 123; see Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality and
Relativity of Human Rights: American Relativism, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 43, 66
(1998) (criticizing the United States's reluctance in ratifying international human
rights instruments).
3 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
354 Joint Statement, supra note 322, at 1681.
355 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
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B. The U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate Is Deceived with
Ornament
Shakespeare's teaching on deceptive appearance is particularly rele-
vant to the U.S.-China intellectual property conflict. To understand the
failure of the current intellectual property law reforms and ineffective-
ness of existing American intellectual property policy toward China, one
must be able to distinguish between appearance and reality. One must
also be vigilant, and sometimes even skeptical, when assessing the extent
of the Chinese piracy problem or its impact on the U.S. economyY 6
After all, "[a]ll that glisters is not gold" (2:7:65).
On appearance, China's piracy problem is attributable to its lack of
intellectual property laws. In reality, thanks to the United States's coer-
cive efforts in the past two decades, China has on its books one of the
most comprehensive intellectual property laws around the world. At a
breakneck rate, China has acceded to virtually all the major multilateral
intellectual property conventions available and has become a member of
WIPO. Indeed, Chinese copyright laws grant rights that are not available
under the U.S. counterpart, such as the right of integrity in one's work
regardless of the work's medium.3 5
7
On appearance, the United States's coercive foreign intellectual prop-
erty policy has been effective in facilitating immediate compliance and
inducing short-term concessions,358 such as those improvements made
during the first few months immediately after the signing of a new intel-
lectual property agreement. Such a policy has also successfully induced
China to introduce new laws and institutions along the Western model.
In reality, the coercive policy has very little success in eradicating the
Chinese piracy problem. In 1995, the United States lost only $1 billion of
annual revenues due to intellectual property piracy in China.359 By 1998,
this figure had doubled to $2 billion,36° despite the Chinese government's
356 See id.
357 Compare Copyright Law, supra note 59, art. 10(vi) (protecting the right of
integrity of all works), with Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (1994)
(protecting the right of integrity of only works of visual art). See also FENG, supra
note 18, at 94-101 (discussing moral rights under Chinese copyright law).
358 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 118; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 350, at
89 ("On the record, it cannot be said that unilateral economic sanctions imposed by
the United States have been uniformly ineffective in inducing other countries to fulfill
treaty obligations. In some issue areas they have worked at least moderately well in a
fair proportion of cases."); Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in
International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus 263, 313 (1992) ("Section 301 is fairly successful at inducing foreign
governments to modify their practices when they are accused of violating U.S. legal
rights.... [S]uccess is more likely with a GSP beneficiary .. ").
359 Tony Munroe, Action Aside, Chinese Intellectual Property Hasn't Slowed,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at B7.
360 Faison, China Turns Blind Eye, supra note 95.
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increased efforts to combat piracy and the public's heightened awareness
of intellectual property rights.
The U.S. foreign intellectual property policy fails for several reasons.
First, it "fail[s] to generate[ ] the type of domestic rationale and condi-
tions needed to produce enduring change."36' It also fails to promote the
underlying values that support voluntary compliance with the law.362 As
Portia cautions us, "to do good [were not as easy as] to know what were
good to do .... [One] can easier teach twenty what / were good to be
done, than one of the twenty to / follow [one's] own teaching" (2:2:12-
17). Laws alone are insufficient, no matter how well they are enforced.
They must be accompanied by a legal culture that fosters voluntary com-
pliance.3 6 3 In light of the entrenched antipathy toward laws and legal
process in China, such a legal culture is particularly needed.
361 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 118; see also CHAYEs & CHAYES, supra note 350, at
32 ("[T]he experience in the international arena is that unilateral sanctions in the
more coercive form of military or economic penalties are but infrequently and
sporadically deployed to redress violations of treaty obligations, and are not very
effective when they are."); SELL, supra note 341, at 177 ("If targeted countries do not
accept the value orientation preferred by the powerful state, and no politically
influential domestic constituency favors the new policies, one can expect
nonimplementation and robust domestic resistance."); id. at 212 ("The fact that
developing countries have not vigorously enforced these new policies suggests that
domestic opposition is still robust."); Geller, supra note 324, at 203 ("A full-scale
copyright law, backed by widespread values supporting its enforcement, would seem
more effective [than police measures]."); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States
Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273,
278 (1991) ("A durable agreement must be based on mutual gain and cannot be
imposed by the information-producing countries on the developing world.").
362 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92. These values include
legitimacy and morality. To provide legitimacy, the United States must abandon its
coercive policy, which drastically undercuts the legitimacy of intellectual property
rights. Such a policy makes the Chinese people suspicious of the willingness of their
government to adhere to and enforce the new legal regime forced upon their country.
To provide morality, the United States can educate the Chinese populace about the
rationales behind intellectual property protection and the wrongful nature of
appropriating other's intellectual property. The United States can also make the
Chinese aware of the benefits of intellectual property rights and the damages
inadequate intellectual property protection can inflict upon the growing Chinese
economy. Furthermore, it can alert the Chinese to the harmful effects of using
counterfeit products and make them aware that what looks like a bargain may end up
costing more in the long run.
363 Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 234 (1997); see CoRNE, supra note 129,
at 8 ("Law's effectiveness depends on shared social values. Law is apparently an
autonomous agency which depends on and mirrors particular social and cultural
conditions."); Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 106, at 616 ("Intellectual
property is nothing more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and
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Second, the U.S. policy ignores the sensitive and significant political,
social, economic, and cultural differences between China and the West.
364
It also ignores the various problems within the Chinese legal system, not
to mention the distinctive differences between Chinese and Western
laws.36 5 Among the current problems are the lack of rule of law, 66 lack
gates. People must believe in it for it to be effective."); Jessica Litman, Copyright
Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 237, 239 (1997) ("People don't obey laws that they don't believe in. It isn't
necessarily that they behave lawlessly, or that they'll steal whatever they can steal if
they think they can get away with it."); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53
U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 235 (1991) (examining the difference between the prevailing public
myth of copyright and existing copyright statute and case law); Faison, China Turns
Blind Eye, supra note 95 ("We take copyright violations very seriously .... but when it
comes to copying a disk, most Chinese people don't see what's wrong." (quoting Xu
Guoji, senior official in Shanghai's Industrial and Commercial Administration)).
364 See discussion supra Part II.A-.E (discussing the political, social, economic, and
cultural differences between China and the West).
365 See discussion supra Part II.F (discussing the distinctive differences between
Chinese and Western laws).
366 As one commentator explained:
Law's overt purpose is to assist China's modernization by replacing policy decree
and customary practices with a stable universal framework of normative
behaviour. However, in practice the reverse is occurring-law in its application
to society is being readjusted in accordance wvith extra-legal norms in the course
of implementation. There has been little inclination on the part of regulators and
the regulated to internalize the norms and ideals underlying the legal regime.
Enforcement patterns reflect whether or not one can attract the patronage of the
'right official' for the personalized 'quick fix' rather than codified substantive or
procedural norms.
CORNE, supra note 129, at 284-85. While the Chinese government has instituted a
series of reforms to promote the rule of law and professionalism in judges, lawyers,
procurators, and law enforcement officers, the courts are still marred by the limited
independence of the judicial branch, intertwining relationship between courts and the
Chinese Communist Party, the court's vulnerability to outside influence, the judges'
susceptibility to bribery and corruption, underfunding, abuse of government officials,
and local protectionism. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see also
ALFORD, supra note 4, at 118 ("[W]ithout a concomitant nurturing of the institutions,
personnel, interests, and values capable of sustaining a liberal, rights-based legality[,]
... freestanding foreign-derived rules on rarified private property rights, held in sig-
nificant measure by foreign parties, are, ultimately, of limited utility."); Berkman,
supra note 80 (arguing that promotion of the rule of law is needed to eradicate the
piracy problem). For comprehensive discussions of rule of law in China, see generally
CHINA's LEGAL REFORMS (Stanley Lubman ed., 1996); DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN
POST-MAO CHINA (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994); KEITH, supra note 217; LIMITS OF THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 205; STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL
REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); MURRAY SCOTT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF
LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC
PROSPECTS (1999); Stanley B. Lubman, Studying Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits,
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of transparency within the court system, 367 confusion caused by conflict-
ing laws and regulations,368 confusion and rivalry within the enforcement
apparatus,369 and corruption.37° Without reforms that are sensitive to
these problems, the piracy problem will likely continue.
Possibilities, and Strategy, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 293 (1991) (discussing how Chinese laws
are regarded as an instrument to enforce policy).
367 See CORNE, supra note 129, at 54 ("Issued by the implementing authority itself,
[administrative rules and circulars] are not necessarily published and are inherently
changeable, subject as they are to the whims of agency officials."); SHIZHONG DONG
ET AL., TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA: THE CURRENT
COMMERCIAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 5 (1992) ("[T]here are unpublished
guidelines promulgated by the Supreme People's Court of the PRC or by the higher
People's Courts that are usually followed by the lower courts when deciding cases.").
368 See Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals, supra note 125, at 153 (citing as
example the lack of coordination between the trademark law and the Regulations on
the Administration of the Registration of Enterprise Names); Gregory S. Kolton,
Comment, Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China:
A Review and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 415, 450 (1996) ("Chinese law is a confusing array of laws and regulations;
there may be no law on point or the laws that do exist may contradict one another.").
369 See MILTON MUELLER & ZIXIANG TAN, CHINA IN THE INFORMATION AGE:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM 47 (1997) ("China's
administrative structure fostered self-reliance within each ministry. Department
heads had every incentive to expand their own empires and little incentive to contract
out for services that could be provided by others."); Chow, supra note 95, at 31-33
(describing the rivalries among the various parallel government entities charged with
public enforcement against counterfeiting); Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals,
supra note 125, at 154 (pointing out the difficulty in coordinating between requests,
actions, and decisions when a case involves more than one intellectual property
claim); id. ("If the intellectual property owner wants to appeal the administrative
decisions to a court, he may have to appeal to different divisions. And it is also not
entirely clear which procedures he should follow. He may very well end up in a civil
procedure for one claim and an administrative litigation procedure for the other
claim.").
370 See BROWN, supra note 229, at 130 ("[J]udges in China, like many civil servants
in the world do not receive high compensation which renders the 'wayward,' at least
susceptible to bribery and corruption."); Chow, supra note 95, at 30-31 ("Some local
enforcement officials ask for payments, case fees, or gifts such as mobile phones from
trademark owners in exchange for conducting enforcement actions."); see also id. at
37 ("Issues over whether there has been adequate funding of the courts has raised
concerns that effective judicial administration is hampered and more subject to
corruption where 'outside' economic support may induce court officials to seek
political and economic support, exposing them to political influence."). In the last
few years, China has made a significant effort to combat corruption. See China Issues
New Codes on Prosecution of Corruption, CHINA Bus. INFo. NETWORK, Sept. 17,
1999, available at 1999 WL 17731146; Anthony Kuhn, China Executes Ex-Official for
Corruption, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at Al (reporting on the execution of a former
vice chairman of the National People's Congress who was convicted of receiving five
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Third, the United States fails to educate government officials, judges,
and the general populace about the benefits of and rationales behind
intellectual property rights.3 71 At present, many Chinese officials, espe-
cially those at the local level, do not understand the necessity and urgency
of protecting individual intellectual property interests.372 To many of
these people, intellectual property laws were, more or less, unjustly
forced upon the country by the United States, rather than legitimately
introduced by their leaders. Once international attention is diverted and
the pressure from their leaders dissipates, these officers will loosen their
enforcement of these "unjust" laws.373 Moreover, most Chinese judges
lack experience and expertise in intellectual property cases. 374 The acute
shortage of lawyers, in particular intellectual property lawyers, has also
made it difficult for businesses to obtain advice and services that would
help them protect and enforce their intellectual property rights.3 75
Finally, the United States fails to rally the support of Chinese intellec-
tual property holders. It also fails to develop a lobby that aims to protect
their own interests.376 As the American foreign antitrust policy has
million dollars in bribes); Tom Korski, China Premier Pledges Drive Against
Corruption, Economic and Copyright Crimes, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily
(BNA), at D2 (Mar. 5, 1997) ("More than 400 senior Communist officials have been
imprisoned or executed for corruption in the past six months, by official estimate,
while 2,522 state employees have been fired for 'disciplinary reasons.' ... Chinese
prosecutors initiated probes into more than 78,000 corruption cases last year,
according to state agencies."). Unfortunately, like the intellectual property piracy
problem, the Chinese government has yet to succeed in this area.
371 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
372 Hu, supra note 105, at 105; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 130, at 37 ("The
failure to reduce or eradicate piracy of intellectual property in China is also due to the
serious misconceptions of the very notion of ownership by the Chinese people and by
their government leaders.").
373 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
374 This lack of experience and expertise becomes even more devastating in light of
China's inquisitorial judicial system. Under the inquisitorial system, judges must
gather facts on their own. They must also search a confusing array of laws and
regulations to determine which law to apply. A judge who has inadequate training or
experience will likely be incompetent to perform these difficult tasks. See Kolton,
supra note 368, at 450; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
375 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
376 As commentators explained:
[U]ltimately, the strongest voices in China are always Chinese, and the most
convincing arguments for development and enforcement of strict [intellectual
property rights] protocols in China have come from those Chinese organizations
which are starting to discover that they have intellectual property worth
protecting. More and more MNCs are finding that one of the best ways to fight
Chinese pirates is to seek out or help create Chinese organizations which share
the same interest.
Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 313, at 417; see HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS,
INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
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demonstrated, "the sustainability of the new direction in developing
countries will depend on both the emergence of politically powerful
domestic constituencies committed to the new direction, and the ability of
interested private parties to mobilize these constituents to uphold and
enforce these policies." '377 Without a well-organized intellectual property
lobby, China lacks the essential domestic constituencies that are needed
to push for and to sustain continuous intellectual property law reforms
and enforcement efforts. 7
On appearance, the coercive intellectual property policy is promoting
the United States's economic interests. In reality, unilateral sanctions
tend to hurt American businesses without any guarantee of change.
37 9
Today, goods produced in the United States are also produced in Europe
TIONS 239 (1997) (arguing that the legislature would likely to adopt a proposal that it
does not fully understand when it can depend on one or more informed domestic
groups to signal it about the proposal); see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 333, at
331 ("[U]nlike Western countries, developing countries have few strong lobbies of
inventors, authors or companies that would benefit from strict intellectual property
laws or the enforcement thereof."); Eric M. Griffin, Note, Stop Relying on Uncle
Sam!-A Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection in the People's Republic of
China, 6 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 191 (1998) ("Intellectual property is simply too
new a concept within China to have any strong lobbies of inventors, authors, or
companies.").
377 SELL, supra note 341, at 216; see also Gary M. Hoffman & George T. Marcou,
Combating the Pirates of America's Ideas, 7 COMPUTER LAW. 8, 12 (1990) ("The local
recording industry in Indonesia, for example, helped significantly in convincing the
Indonesian government to pass an effective copyright law."). The difference between
the foreign intellectual property and antitrust policies clearly demonstrates the sharp
distinction between overt coercion and persuasion. See SELL, supra note 341, at 13.
378 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
379 Bloch, supra note 322, at 206; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see
also CHAYES & CHAYEs, supra note 350, at 22 ("[I]f we are correct that the principal
source of noncompliance is not vilful disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity
or priority, then coercive enforcement is as misguided as it is costly."); Mark A.
Groombridge, China's Accession to the World Trade Organization: Costs and Benefits,
in CHINA'S FUTURE: CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT 165, 178 (Ted
Galen Carpenter & James A. Dorn eds., 2000) [hereinafter CHINA'S FUTURE] ("If one
looks at the history of using economic sanctions as a weapon... there is a clear and
consistent trend: multilateral sanctions sometimes work; unilateral sanctions almost
never do."); W. Bowman Cutter et al., New World, New Deal; A Democratic
Approach to Globalization, FOREIGN A-Fr., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 80, 92 (arguing that
unilateral economic sanctions not only failed to achieve their goals but have cost the
United States about $20 billion in lost exports, 200,000 jobs, and the goodwill and
trust of its allies abroad). But see Richard W. Parker, The Problem with Scorecards:
How (and How Not) to Measure the Cost-effectiveness of Economic Sanctions, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 235 (2000) (pointing out the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness
of economic sanctions and the methodological challenges confronting empirical
studies regarding economic sanctions); see also Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Linkage and
Human Rights, in URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 350, at 241, 243
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and Japan. As "the growth prospects for the U.S. economy . . have
become increasingly dependent on exports, 380 a confrontational policy
will hurt American businesses significantly. On the one hand, the uncer-
tain trade relations will induce risk-aversive American businesses to limit
their business in China to avoid risks. On the other hand, due to their
unreliability as long-term suppliers as a result of turbulent U.S.-China
relations, many American businesses will be replaced by their foreign
competitors. 8 ' Even worse, the trade threats, repeated conversion
attempts, and constant bullying have sparked a new resurgence of nation-
alism and xenophobia in China that may result in "day-to-day bureau-
cratic actions that hold back, divert, or delay action on U.S. companies'
permits, applications, and bids." '382 If these sentiments continue to grow,
they may even lead to boycotts of American products or harassment of
American businesses. 8 3
At the global level, a coercive policy will threaten the integrity of the
international trading system and may even lead to its collapse.3 84 It
would also lead to criticism from other countries, thus alienating the
United States from its trading partners. 85 Moreover, such a policy may
(arguing that moral absolutists are willing to suffer economic harm even though the
sanctions may not result in any policy changes).
380 Bloch, supra note 322, at 205; see also Jeffrey E. Garten, Business and Foreign
Policy, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 67, 69-70 ("[T]he health of the American
economy is more closely linked to foreign markets than ever before. The country can
no longer generate enough growth, jobs, profits, and savings from domestic
sources.").
381 See OVERHOLT, supra note 345, at 381.
382 Bloch, supra note 322, at 209.
383 To highlight these possibilities, one commentator entitled a chapter of his book
"To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic." GEREMIE R. BARM8, IN THE RED: ON
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CULTURE 255-80 (1999).
384 Makoto Kuroda, Super 301 and Japan, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra
note 63, at 219, 220-21; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see Helen Milner,
The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301 Provision, in
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 63, at 163, 176-77 ("Aggressive, bilateral
reciprocity violates central tenets of the postwar international trading system."); see
also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 350, at 100 ("The central lesson the drafters [of
GATT] took from interwar history was that unilateral action on trade questions and
disputes led ultimately to the collapse of the international trading system."); Leaffer,
supra note 361, at 297 (arguing that unilateral action "tend[s] to fragment the world
trading system... [by creating] resentment, particularly among Third World countries
who view imposed bilateral agreements as a species of colonialism"); id. (arguing that
the United States's unilateral sanctions "run counter to U.S. long-term interests for a
healthy, stable trade environment"). But see William Safire, Smoot-Hawley Lives,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1983, at A23 (arguing that protectionism may be the only
solution to unfair competition from foreign countries).
385 Cheng, supra note 322, at 1979; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see
also GATT Bill Brings Major Reforms to Domestic Intellectual Property Law, 11 Int'l
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lead to unrevised adoption by emerging democracies which are constantly
looking to the policies of Western democracies, in particular the United
States, for guidance in their economic transition. 86 The United States
has taken a tremendous effort to create the TRIPs Agreement and to
build an international intellectual property system. Ironically, its foreign
intellectual property policy is attempting to destroy what it has worked so
hard to achieve. 8 7
In fact, the repercussions of the existing coercive policy are not only
limited to the trade arena. By demonstrating that a country should rely
heavily on pressure and ultimata to protect its economic interests, the
existing coercive policy backfires and jeopardizes the United States's
longstanding interests in promoting human rights and civil liberties in
China. It also discredits the very important message that one should
respect rights and the legal process.3"' Even worse, it provides China
with "a convenient legitimization for repressive measures [the Chinese
Trade Rep. (BNA) 50 (Dec. 21, 1994) (noting the dissatisfaction of the less developed
countries over the United States's ability to impose Special 301 sanctions despite their
compliance with TRIPs); David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual
Property Rights: The Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 909 (1989)
("It is indeed hard to see why many states should accept new multilateral
commitments in [the intellectual property] area if they remain vulnerable to unilateral
actions.").
386 ROBERT W. McGEE, A TRADE POLICY FOR FREE SOCIETIES: THE CASE
AGAINST PROTECTIONISM 160 (1994) (footnotes omitted); Yu, From Pirates to
Partners, supra note 92; see also Whitmore Gray, The Challenge of Asian Law, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 5-6 (1995) ("After the Second World War, however, a new era
of global interaction of legal systems developed. U.S. economic dominance reinforced
the idea that U.S. legal institutions and, particularly, recent U.S. substantive law,
should be considered as normal models for modernization.").
387 Assafa Endeshaw, Commentary: A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China
Conflict on Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 337-38 (1996); Yu,
From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see also Oddi, supra note 339, at 874 (arguing
that the American unilateral actions and its existing approach toward the protection
of patents and mask works "ha[ve] raised a significant question of its continued
commitment to the principle of national treatment").
388 Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 2, at 143; Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see Berkman, supra note 80, at 42 ("If the system
requires action by the powerful elite within the government, the Party, or both to
ensure enforcement, rule of law is replaced by rule of men."); Robert Burrell, A Case
Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of Copyright on China by the West, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 195, 198 (Lionel Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis
eds., 1998) ("[The Western approach toward China] suggests that the western
governments are more concerned with property rights than with the more
fundamental rights of China's population."); see also J.H. Reichman & David Lange,
Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private
Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMiP.
& INT'L L. 11, 48 (1998) ("Coercion is . . . a delicate, risky, and possibly
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authorities] intended to take in any event while simultaneously con-
straining America's capacity to complain about such actions.,
389
Apart from the Americans, the Chinese also need to distinguish
between appearance and reality. Blinded by its skepticism toward West-
ern institutions, China fails to understand the merits of intellectual prop-
erty rights or to take advantage of the intellectual property law reforms
that are currently introduced. Although the Chinese economy has not
reached the stage where information goods and services will become a
major sector, a well functioning intellectual property regime will allow
China to trade effectively with other Western countries, thus gaining their
acceptance in the international community. In addition, such a regime
will allow China to take advantage of the new globalization trends and e-
commerce opportunities. It will also provide the substantial capital
needed for the modernization process.
In fact, while China is undergoing modernization, the harmonization
process will provide China with a full grasp of the Western intellectual
property regime. This grasp will help the Chinese leaders understand the
principles behind Western economic systems and anticipate the problems
that may occur during the critical transitional period. It will also allow
the leaders to assess the strengths and weaknesses of a market economy
and to design an economic development strategy that matches China's
present conditions.39
Unlike what many Chinese have believed, intellectual property rights
are not only reserved for countries that have advanced technology.39'
Western technology is undeniably far more advanced than what is cur-
rently produced in China. However, different countries have different
technological needs.392 A product or technology that is suitable to a
counterproductive strategy, one that could easily backfire on those governments that
succumb to this temptation.").
389 Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 2, at 144-45. For example,
to comply with the Western demands to curtail piracy, the Chinese authorities have
enlisted the help of some of their toughest lav enforcers, including those who are
notorious for gross human rights violations, to clean up the pirate factories. See id. at
143. In addition, to create a deterrent effect and to demonstrate to the West their
eagerness in eradicating the piracy problem, these authorities have enforced the death
penalty and life imprisonment on infringers in severe cases. See ALFORD, supra note
4, at 91 (stating that China has imposed death penalty on at least four individuals, life
sentences on no fewer than five others, and imprisonment on some 500 people for
trademark violations); Tom Korski, China Sentences Three to Life in Prison for CD
Piracy in Harshest Sanction So Far, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at
D2 (Dec. 11, 1997). Even though the piracy figure may have dropped, the number of
human rights violations has risen. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
390 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
391 Id.
392 See Kitch, supra note 341, at 172 ("The developing countries have their own,
unique needs.").
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Western developed country may not be suitable to China. Thus, China
still has to provide adequate intellectual property protection in order to
create incentives for domestic authors and inventors to invent, commer-
cialize, and market their products. In fact, such protection will allow con-
sumers to identify their favorite local products and may even help China
"open up market opportunities in export markets."3 93
Furthermore, the Chinese culture is not completely incompatible with
Western intellectual property notions. 94 Consider, for example, the Con-
fucian tradition of interaction with the past.395 Even though the Chinese
civilization emphasizes this tradition, Chinese poets and literary theorists
have disagreed as to the extent of reproduction.396 Indeed, "as Confucius
demonstrated in undertaking to edit the Classics and to comment on
them in the Analects, transmission... entailed selection and adaptation if
it was to be meaningful to oneself, one's contemporaries, and one's suc-
cessors." '397 Thus, traditional Chinese culture does not call for verbatim
reproduction. Rather, it calls for transformative use of preexisting works
that is tailored to the user's needs and conditions. Such use, and the abil-
ity to do so, will demonstrate the user's comprehension of and devotion
to the core of the Chinese civilization and his or her ability to distinguish
the present from the past through original thoughts.
398
393 Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 89, 104
(R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988); Yu, From Pirates to Partners,
supra note 92; see also Kitch, supra note 341, at 168 (arguing that inadequate
trademark protection encourages competition policies that reduce the
competitiveness of local products in export markets); China: Famous Beijing Roast
Duck Restaurant Secures Trademark, CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, Jan. 20, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 5617961 (describing the importance of trademark protection to
Beijing Quanjude Roast Duck Restaurant, which is world renowned for its roast
ducks).
394 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92. Compare XIANFA art. 20 (1982)
(amended Mar. 29, 1993) ("The state promotes the development of natural and social
sciences, disseminates knowledge of science and technology, and commends and
rewards achievements in scientific research as well as technological innovations and
inventions."), and id. art. 47 ("The state encourages and assists creative endeavors
conducive to the interests of the people that are made by citizens engaged in
education, science, technology, literature, art and other cultural work."), with U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
395 See supra text accompanying notes 96-105.
396 See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 26-29 ("[O]ver time, Chinese poets and literary
theorists have expressed a myriad of views as to the very question of what constituted
appropriate interaction -with the past." Id. at 26).
397 Id. at 25; see YAO, supra note 96, at 50 (noting that Confucius's editing and
commentaries have added value to the classics).
398 Cf. ALFORD, supra note 4, at 29.
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This emphasis of transformative use is similar to what the United States
Supreme Court pronounced in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.399 In
Campbell, a music publisher brought a copyright infringement action
against the rap band, 2 Live Crew, for its salacious rap parody of the song
"Oh, Pretty Woman." Emphasizing that transformative works are impor-
tant to promote the constitutional goal of copyright, the Court held that
the rap band's rendition of the song constituted fair use and did not
infringe upon the publisher's copyright.
40 0
Finally, abiding by a law-based intellectual property regime would pro-
tect China against further bullying by the United States and other West-
ern developed countries. At the moment, because China is not a member
of the WTO, the West has a lot of discretion over what policies and
actions they can take when they trade with China. Unfortunately, "dis-
cretion.., can become arbitrariness, and worse than injustice is arbitrari-
ness, the negation of law."40 1 As Judge Richard Posner pointed out
insightfully, an unpopular alien like Shylock would naturally "mistrust a
jurisprudence that gave judges a broad discretion to mitigate the rigors of
legal rules, for he could expect any discretion to be exercised against
him."4 2 The majority may not need the law to protect its rights because
it has numbers to prevail in the political realm; the minority, however, has
to rely on the law, for the law may be its only protection.4 3 If China
abides by a law-based regime, the regime may deter foreign governments
from undertaking arbitrary actions that are mainly designed to alleviate
domestic political pressure.
40 4
C. The Two Countries Should Strive for Harmony
Shakespeare's teaching on interdependence and his platonic worldview
are important to the development of Sino-American relations,40 5 in par-
399 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
400 See id. at 579 ("[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at
the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright.. . ." (citation and footnote omitted)).
401 KoRNsTEIN, supra note 231, at 74.
402 POSNER, supra note 122, at 97; see also KORNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 74
("[For such a victim of discrimination [like Shylock], it is entirely logical and
reasonable [for him] . . . to trust in the apparent severity of a rigid but certain
interpretation of law than in the discretion of a system that has already shown its
bias.").
403 POSNER, supra note 122, at 97.
404 See Editorial Surprise! A Deal with China, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1996, at A22
(arguing that the eleventh-hour compromise during the negotiation of the 1995
Agreement had helped the Clinton administration gain its "domestic political
mileage").
405 For recent discussions of China's foreign policy, see generally BERNSTEIN &
MUNRO, supra note 322; CHINA AND THE WORLD, supra note 334; CHINA'S FUrTURE,
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ticular how the two countries conduct their foreign intellectual property
policies. While harmony promotes cooperation and maximizes the utility
of scarce natural resources, discordance alienates nations and creates ten-
sions and confrontations. Thus, both countries should embrace the pla-
tonic worldview in developing their bilateral relations.
Needless to say, being the only remaining superpower after the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union, the United States is a very important player
in both the global economy and world politics. 406 The United States is
also a very important trading partner to China, absorbing a third of
China's exports.40 7 A healthy and harmonious relationship with the
United States is therefore very important and beneficial to China. If
bilateral relations deteriorated and trade wars took place, the confronta-
tion would disrupt China's modernization process and would very likely
put an end to its continuous economic growth. This economic downturn
would alienate the diasporic Chinese communities4°s and would force
China to "retreat into a new kind of isolationism., 4 9 Not only would
supra note 379; CHINA JOINS THE WORLD, supra note 322; CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Thomas W. Robinson & David Shambaugh eds., 1998);
WARREN I. COHEN, AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO CHINA: A HISTORY OF SINO-
AMERICAN RELATIONS (4th ed., 2000); HARRY HARDING, A FRAGILE
RELATIONSHIP: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA SINCE 1972 (1992); MICHAEL H.
HUNT, THE GENESIS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY (1996); ANDREW J.
NATHAN & ROBERT S. Ross, THE GREAT WALL AND THE EMPTY FORTRESS:
CHINA'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY (1997); RoY, supra note 350; OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-
CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 332.
406 HENRY R. NAU, THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S DECLINE: LEADING THE WORLD
ECONOMY INTO THE 1990'S (1990); Samuel P. Huntington, The U.S.-Decline or
Renewal?, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1988/1989, at 76; Jacek Kugler & A.F.K. Organski,
The End of Hegemony?, 15 INT'L INTERACTIONS 113 (1989); Yu, From Pirates to
Partners, supra note 92. But see Hso, supra note 33, at 959-60 ("Although the United
States was generally considered the only remaining superpower, its strength was
compromised by its large national debt, debilitating budgetary deficit, and serious
domestic problems."); PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS:
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CoNFLiCT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987) (discussing
the relative decline of the American economic and military power).
407 Bloch, supra note 322, at 198.
408 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see also HUNTINGTON, supra note
335, at 170-71 (describing the importance of disaporic Chinese communities).
409 MICHAEL YAHUDA, HONG KONG: CHINA'S CHALLENGE 4 (1996).
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China fail to regain its past glory,410 but it might remain dominated by the
West in the rest of the twenty-first century.411
By the same token, China is an important trading partner to the United
States,41 2 providing an attractive market that contains one-fifth of the
world population.413 If China's current economic development contin-
ues, China will become one of the three largest economies in the world by
the early twenty-first century.414 China thus will be more important to
the United States than Japan, Mexico, Canada, or Russia.41 5 Indeed, in
the years to come, China may even join the United States as a super-
410 See BERNSTEIN & MuNRo, supra note 322, at 4 (arguing that China considers
its legacy to take up the great power role); id. at 56 ("The last half century in short
saw China acquiring the conditions for renewed historic greatness."); Hso, supra note
33, at 991 ("There is a new confidence in the Chinese psyche, and many believe that
the country's destiny is on the ascent and that it is time for China to assert its own
'Manifest Destiny."').
411 See Michael B. Mcelroy & Chris P. Nielsen, Energy, Agriculture, and the
Environment: Prospects for Sino-American Cooperation, in LIVING WITH CHINA,
supra note 321, at 217,248 ("China's rise to superpower status will mark the end of an
era, the centuries-long monopoly of world economic and political power by nations of
the West.").
412 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see OVERHOLT, supra note 345, at
365 ("China presents the United States with the greatest opportunities of the coming
generation, for instance, the largest market in the 1990s for aircraft, power plants, and
telecommunications .... ").
413 See NATHAN & Ross, supra note 405, at 17 (explaining the importance of
China's demographic size); see also ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. I,
ch. 8 (Penguin Books 1986) (1776) ("The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any
country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants."). But see Endeshaw, supra
note 387, at 333 ("[E]ven if China enforces United States intellectual property rights
according to the recent agreement and establishes a level playing field, the demand
for United States movies and software will not emerge from the general populace.").
414 Daniel A. Sharp, Preface to LIVING WrTH CHINA, supra note 321, at 9. But see
Samuel S. Kim, Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD, supra note 334, at 3, 7 ("[B]ecause of the localizing pressures from below and
new risks and challenges (e.g., rising unemployment, expanding floating population,
growing income inequality, mounting environmental pressures, incomplete market
reforms, trade frictions), China will not so easily become the economic superpower
that many have predicted."); Mann, supra note 322 (arguing that China's economic
explosion has created a remarkable buildup of inventories of low-quality goods that
were produced but will never be sold).
415 Sharp, supra note 414, at 9. But see Gerald Segal, Does China Matter, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 24 (arguing that China's importance in the global economy
and world politics is overexaggerated); NATHAN & Ross, supra note 405 (arguing that
China is a vulnerable power whose most pressing security problems are powerful
rivals at its own borders).
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power in the world.416 As President Clinton pointed out, "the role China
chooses to play will powerfully shape the [twenty-first] century." '417
In military terms, China is also very important to the United States.
Despite criticism of the backwardness of Chinese military forces,418
"[a]ny long-term peaceful solution to the conflicting territorial claims in
the South China Sea will require China's active cooperation." '419 Because
China holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, the
United States needs China's support, through either an affirmative vote
or an abstention, in order to gain U.N. support of its peacekeeping initia-
tives.42 ° Past initiatives included forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait
and maintaining peace in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia. Further-
more, China has the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction, such
as missiles, nuclear technology, and chemical weapons.421 Its ability to
export these deadly weapons overseas therefore makes China strategi-
cally important to the United States.422
To promote harmony with this emerging power, the United States must
abandon its confrontational policy. "[D]iplomacy, by its very nature,
requires tact; it cannot succeed if the other party is discountenanced and
416 Ezra F. Vogel, Introduction to LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 321, at 17, 18.
417 Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Introduction to OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHmNA
RELATIONS, supra note 332, at 1 (quoting President Clinton's Remarks on U.S.-China
Relations in the 21st Century).
418 See NATHAN & Ross, supra note 405, at 137-57 (discussing the backwardness of
China's military forces); Segal, supra note 415 (same). But see BERNSTEIN & MUNRO,
supra note 322, at 64-65 ("[T]he essential measure of any country's military strength is
not its absolute power, but its power relative to others, and in this sense China is
already by far the most powerful country in Asia, and it is rapidly becoming even
more powerful."); see also Richard D. Fisher, Jr., The Accelerating Modernization of
China's Military, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE: STRATEGIES FOR U.S.
RELATIONS WITH CHINA 97 (Kim R. Holmes & James J. Przystup eds., 1997)
[hereinafter BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE] (noting the impressive growth
of military capabilities of the People's Liberation Army). See generally CHINA'S
MILITARY FACES THE FUTURE (James R. Lilley & David Shambaugh eds., 1999) for a
collection of essays examining China's military power and its implications for security
in East Asia.
419 James Lilley, Trade and the Waking Giant-China, Asia, and American
Engagement, in BEYOND MFN, supra note 322, at 36, 55; Yu, From Pirates to Partners,
supra note 92.
420 Lilley, supra note 419, at 54-55; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92.
421 JAMES MANN, ABOUT FACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CURIOUS
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 228 (2000).
422 See id. ("China could succeed in demonstrating its strategic importance to the
United States by threatening to sell dangerous weapons overseas."); see also id.
("China was now important to the United States not because of the help it could
provide (against the Soviet Union), but because of the potential harm it might do (by
exporting missiles and nuclear technology).").
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left humiliated." '423 The existing policy and on-and-off relations not only
humiliate and alienate China, but also impair the success of American
businesses in competing against their Japanese and European counter-
parts for the Chinese market.424 Thus, the United States should assess
China's emerging world power status, reexamine the basic assumptions of
the existing international order, and work together with China to forge a
new order that would "bring about productive cooperation with the least
cost and disruption to the [existing] global system."42
The "constructive strategic partnership" model, which the Chinese and
American leaders pronounced after the U.S.-China Summit in 1997, pro-
vides the model environment for nurturing such a new international
order.426 Instead of challenging the other's "core values" or competing
423 DE BARY, supra note 124, at 9.
424 See Bloch, supra note 322, at 206 ("[T]he Chinese government will react to
sanctions by becoming even more hostile to the United States and by switching from
U.S. products to European and Japanese ones."); China and France Will Study
Developing a 100-Seat Jet, N.Y. Tmnvs, Apr. 12, 1996, at D2 (reporting that China
gave a European consortium the rights to develop a new hundred-seat airliner in
response to the United States's trade threats); Tony Walker et al., Li Peng Backs
Trade with "More Lenient" Europeans, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 1996, at 1, ("If the
Europeans adopt more co-operation with China in all areas, not just in economic
areas but also in political and other areas, then I believe the Europeans can get more
orders from China." (statement of Chinese Premier Li Peng)); Craig R. Whitney,
China Awards Huge Jet Order to Europeans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at Al
(reporting that Chinese Premier Li Peng went to France to sign a $1.5-billion order
for thirty short-haul Airbus planes, instead of Boeing planes); see also Bloch, supra
note 322, at 209 ("Among the biggest beneficiaries of America's crackdown on
copyright piracy in China... are Bertelsmann of Germany and Sony of Japan.");
Garten, supra note 380, at 71 ("If Boeing does not play by China's rules, Airbus will.
If AT&T does not meet Brazilian requirements, Alcatel would be happy to help."); id.
("Unilateral sanctions only put U.S. firms at a major disadvantage vis-A-vis their
rivals."); Lampton, supra note 322, at 137 (arguing that the Japanese and European
competitors seek to "promote their own commercial advantages by portraying
Washington as the sole factor preventing China's entry" into the WTO); Haiying
Zhao, Sino-U.S. Economic Relations Across Time and Space, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-
CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 332, at 207, 216 ("Given the current world economic
landscape, the United States has to compete with Europe and Japan in the emerging
Chinese market, and China has to compete with other developing countries in the
U.S. market."); Cheng, supra note 322, at 1978 ("Repetitive threats of trade sanctions
might cause China to lose patience with the United States and switch to Europe,
Japan, and Russia for trade and technology transfers."); David E. Sanger, U.S. Blames
Allies for Undercutting Its China Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1996, at Al (reporting
that the Clinton administration accused Europe and Japan of exploiting the United
States's efforts to force China to respect trade accords).
425 Lampton, supra note 322, at 122.
426 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92. Since the announcement of the
partnership, commentators and policymakers have downplayed the significance of the
new model. While some regarded the partnership as "more symbolic than
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against the other under a zero-sum game,427 the model recognizes the
other's sensitive differences and calls for a resolution of those differences
in a nonconfrontational manner.428 The new model also allows for an
efficient dialogue between the two countries, thus helping the other
understand its present and future strategic intentions and national objec-
tives. This dialogue will also help reduce the mutual suspicion between
the two countries.429
To establish this dialogue, both China and the United States must
understand each other better43° and "deal with [the other] as it exists and
is becoming, not as some imagine it or hope it to be."43' To this end, the
substantive," some refused to speculate and contended that the partnership "lacks a
clear definition." Nevertheless, by creating a "principled" position, the partnership
model has significant implications when viewed within the context of Chinese
negotiating behavior. See generally OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra
note 332, for an excellent collection of essays discussing the 1997-1998 U.S.-China
Summits and the constructive strategic partnership model.
427 See Yebai Zhang, Can a "Constructive Strategic partnership" Be Built Up
Between China and the United States, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra
note 332, at 142, 144 ("[A] partnership is quite different from the big-power relations
of the past; it is a new pattern of relations among major powers who possess different
histories, cultures, social systems, and levels of economic development together with
broad common interests and deep differences.").
428 Xinbo Wu, China and the United States: Toward an Understanding on East
Asian Security, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 332, at 69, 83.
429 Xinghao Ding, Basis for a Constructive Strategic Partnership Between China and
the United States, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 332, at 157,
164.
430 Ding, supra note 429, at 161; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see
also MILNER, supra note 376, at 20 ("[T]he uncertainty created by incomplete or
asymmetric information leads to outcomes that prevent optimal levels of exchange or
that foster conflict. In other words, incomplete information leads to inefficient
outcomes."); id. at 259 ("[W]hen assessing other countries' behavior, policy makers
should make sure they understand the domestic situation their foreign counterparts
face."); ARTHUR STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 58 (1990) ("[I]t is universally suggested that the result of
misconception is conflict that would have been otherwise avoidable. Although
international conflicts are often attributed to misperception, international
cooperation never is.").
431 Hamilton, Introduction, supra note 334, at 4. As Professor Ren explained:
An image is a perception of a reality. In this sense, there is no "real image."
Under normal conditions, how an individual acts toward an object is determined
by his or her image, or perception, of that object. Such images are rooted in
personal beliefs and attitudes and shaped by experience. This property of image
makes it difficult for changes to take place. Furthermore, an image "may cause
people to make self-serving attributions and permit them to believe what they
want to believe because they want to believe it."
Ren, supra note 332, at 247, 248 (quoting Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivational
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 487 (1990)).
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two countries need to foster more exchanges (in particular educational
and cultural ones) between academics, professionals, and government
officials.432 They also have to organize joint conferences, seminars, and
research projects that help identify the common interests of and differ-
ences between the two countries. 433 Given the significant differences
between the two countries, these exchanges and joint projects will help
the other understand its position, intention, and national objectives. They
will also help reduce the mutual suspicion between the two countries and
be conducive to maintaining a stable, healthy, and harmonious bilateral
relationship.
In addition to joint projects, the U.S. government needs to encourage
and sponsor research related to China. So far, American scholars, policy-
makers, the mass media, and the general public have very limited under-
standing of China, in particular its political institutions and
decisionmaking processes434 and how it conducts its foreign affairs.
4 35
432 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see Ding, supra note 429, at 167
(arguing that both China and the United States should encourage more exchanges at
every level of government and society, especially educational and cultural exchanges,
to help understand the other better); Gregory P. Fairbrother & Gerard A. Postiglione,
Teaching About China in America: Shaping the Perspectives of a Generation, in
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 332, at 267 (arguing for the
incorporation of China-related content in the U.S. social-studies curriculum); Yu,
From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see also Fairbrother & Postiglione, supra, at
432 ("Schools have the potential to influence the formation of public opinion about
China and improve relations at the citizens' level by teaching specific information
about issues important in present-day China and U.S.-China relations and by
enhancing students' abilities to assess reports in the popular media objectively.");
China: Sino-US Seminar on Intellectual Property Rights Closes, CHINA Bus. INFo.
NETWORK, Sept. 21, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13494566 (reporting on a joint
seminar between Chinese and U.S. experts in Chongqing that explored the relations
between intellectual property protection and economic development).
433 See Ding, supra note 429, at 167; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92;
China Fair of Inventions, New Technologies Opens in US, CHINA Bus. INFO.
NETvoRK, Sept. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17730900 (reporting on the China Fair
of Inventions and New Technologies, an event co-sponsored by the State Intellectual
Property Office of China and the US-China Council for International Exchange, Inc.
to promote better understanding and cooperation between the United States and
China in the intellectual property area); see also YVES L. Doz & GARY HAMEL,
ALLIANCE ADVANTAGE: THE ART OF CREATING VALUE THROUGH PARTNERING 80
(1998) (emphasizing the importance of creating an interface so that the partners can
learn from each other).
434 See David Bachman, Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy, in CHINA
AND THE WORLD: NEw DIRECTIONS IN CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS 31 (Samuel
Kim ed., 1989) ("[Domestic factors] have had a greater impact than international
factors in shaping Chinese foreign policy."); Kenneth Lieberthal, Domestic Forces and
Sino-U.S. Relations, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 321, at 254, 274-75 ("[T]he
inability of each nation's leaders.., to understand and empathize with the domestic
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Increased funding for research in this area would provide the United
States with the information needed to overcome the obstacles in negotiat-
ing with and transacting business in China. It would also provide the
American government with the capacity to make a more accurate assess-
ment of the conditions in China. To help create incentives for research in
these areas, the American government can "cultivate and reward its for-
eign service officers, commercial counselors, military officers, and intelli-
gence analysts who have expertise on China." '436
Finally, China and the United States can join together to develop a new
international intellectual property regime. One should, however, not
confuse this new regime with a universalized Western intellectual prop-
erty regime. The American government "sometimes confuses its natural
policy preferences with 'international norms" 43" and ignores the interests
of other countries, in particular the less developed countries. Due to
variations in level of wealth, economic structure, technological capability,
political system, and cultural tradition, states' interests and goals differ
widely, 39 and "[n]o two countries have the same pressures and goals.""
political constraints confronting the other side.., limited both the ability and the
desire of each leadership to accommodate the other."); Kenneth Lieberthal, Domestic
Politics and Foreign Policy, in CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE 1980S 43 (Harry
Harding ed., 1984) ("[Each of China's domestic political campaigns] has had clear and
direct implications for its posture toward the rest of the world."); see also BERNSTEIN
& MUNRO, supra note 322, at 105-29 (describing China's progress in mastering
American domestic politics).
435 Michel Oksenberg & Elizabeth Economy, Introduction to CHINA JOINS THE
WORLD, supra note 322, at 1, 39; see QUANSHENG ZHAO, INTERPRETING CHINESE
FOREIGN POLICY 9 (1996) ("[T]he study of Chinese diplomatic history has become
fairly well developed, the study of Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking remains
very underdeveloped, and the study of China's foreign relations is barely on the radar
scope." (quoting Kenneth Lieberthal)); see also RICHARD H. SOLOMON, CHINESE
NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: PURSUING INTERESTS THROUGH 'OLD FRIENDS' (1999)
(noting the peculiarities of Chinese negotiating behavior); Lucian W. Pye,
Understanding Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The Roles of Nationalism and
Pragmatism, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE, supra note 418, at 211
(noting the difference between American and Chinese negotiating behavior).
46 Oksenberg & Economy, supra note 435, at 39; Yu, From Pirates to Partners,
supra note 92.
437 Lampton, supra note 322, at 133; see also ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 80 (1996) ("[T]he US drive for
stronger protection of IP is more in the direction of devising a new legal regime that
answers to its needs than to accommodate within the present conventions upcoming
global trends in technology creation and use.").
438 See Burrell, supra note 388, at 198 (arguing that the Western approach toward
China "fails to respect other voices and other traditions and instead posits the moral
superiority of a value system which is far more recent than the tradition it seeks to
condemn").
439 RYAN, supra note 313, at 191.
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Thus, the new regime should take into consideration the political, social,
economic, and cultural differences between China and the West." 1 In
particular, it should "address the difficulties of reconciling legal values,
institutions, and forms generated in the West with the legacy of China's
past and the constraints imposed by its present circumstances.",44 2
In constructing this regime, the legal specialists of the two countries
need to pay special attention to the structural and ideological assump-
440 Id. at 201; see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 333, at 333 ("Fundamental
differences in concepts of ownership and legal regimes provide at least some
explanation as to why it has been so difficult to draft a multilateral intellectual
property agreement. A favorable agreement for one country could be unfavorable
for another country.").
441 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92; see ENDESHAW, supra note 437, at
47 (arguing that less developed countries may be able to modernize if "they manage
to grasp the internal dynamic that operates in each of them and devise appropriate
economic and technological polices, without neglecting social and political aspects");
id. at 98-142 (outlining a proposal for an intellectual property system in non-industrial
countries); Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO,
TRIPs, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L.
333 (2000) (arguing that countries must "agree to disagree" during their negotiation
of a multilateral intellectual property regime); Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of
Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation?,
29 N.Y.U. J. INrr'L L. & POL. 109, 129 (1997) ("Differentiation... looks desirable in
that it permits countries in the Latin tradition to retain a system that responds to their
own cultural perceptions of creation and protects the moral and economic rights of all
interested parties."); Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in
Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 337, at 89 (arguing that countries should tailor their
intellectual property system by taking in to account their economic needs, productive
and research capabilities, and institutional and budgetary constraints); Oddi, supra
note 339, at 866-74 (outlining a proposal for a patent system in less developed
countries); Robert M. Sherwood et al., Promotion of Inventiveness in Developing
Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration, 39 IDEA 473 (1999)
(explaining how to restructure the patent administration in ways that can maximize
the contribution of inventors to economic growth and sustained development);
Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note 337,
at 68 ("The first characteristic of the uniform system being proposed is that the
specific intellectual property systems being proposed is that the specific intellectual
property systems of individual countries need not be identical."); David Silverstein,
Intellectual Property Rights, Trading Patterns and Practices, Wealth Distribution,
Development and Standards of Living: A North-South Perspective on Patent Law
Harmonization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM 156 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994) ("[A]
truly successful IP system must be culturally-specific and responsive to the different
economic and social realities of each country."); id. at 171 ("[I]t cannot be taken for
granted that a Western IP system will be either beneficial to or successful in other
countries with different cultures.").
442 ALFORD, supra note 4, at 2.
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tions built within the Western intellectual property regime. The existing
Western regime tends to "value the raw materials for the production of
intellectual property at zero, 44 3 ignoring rare and irreplaceable raw
materials like folkoric works, works of cultural heritage, and biological
and ecological know-how of traditional peoples. 44 The Chinese civiliza-
tion has over 4000 years of history and is made up of the majority Han
Chinese and a great variety of minority cultures,445 bringing with them
rich tradition, indigenous art, and native medical knowledge.446 The loss
of these cultures and cultural knowledge is not only a loss to the Chinese
civilization, but to all humanity.
447
443 BOYLE, supra note 119, at 126 (emphasis omitted).
444 See Bellagio Declaration, in BOYLE, supra note 119, at 192-95. Most recently,
some countries and policymakers have emphasized the need for a "cultural
exception" in multilateral agreements. See, e.g., Council Directive 89/552 on
Television Without Frontiers art. 4, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 26 (requiring that 50% of
audiovisual products broadcast over European television to be of European origin);
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, art. 2106, 32
I.L.M. 289, 703 (1992) (providing the cultural industries exemption); William
Drozdiak, With Deadline Looming Before Trade Talks, U.S., France Trade Blame,
WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 19993, at A14 (reporting that the French Cultural Minister
argued that culture could not be included in any global trade deal lest it leads to "the
mental colonization of Europe and the progressive destruction of its imagination");
Thomas Bishop, France and the Need for Cultural Exception, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 187 (1997) (justifying the need for the cultural exception in an international
trade agreement).
445 "The largest of the fifty-six minority groups are the Zhuangs (15.4 million), Hui
or Chinese Muslims (8.6 million), Uygur (7.2 million), Yi (6.5 milion), Tibetans (4.5
million), Miao (7.3 million), Manchus (9.8 million), Mongols (4.8 million). Bouyei (2.1
million), and Koreans (1.9 million)." JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE
POLrrIcs: AN INTRODUCTION 176 (6th ed. 1999).
446 See generally VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996)
for a collection of essays examining the protection of indigenous knowledge.
447 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (stating that cultural artifacts are
the "cultural heritage of all mankind"); Bishop, supra note 444, at 187 ("Each
country, although it needs to be open to the cultures of other lands, has a right-even
a duty-to protect and develop its own culture. This disappearance of one country's
culture cannot be made up by another's gain; the result would be an irretrievable loss
for all humanity."); Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American
Cultural Property, 73 IND. L.J. 723, 769 (1997) ("[Cultural property] helps us to
understand other cultures and creates a sense of connection, a world-wide culture or
common heritage."); J.H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL.
L. REv. 339, 349 (1989) (arguing that cultural property promote "participation in a
common human enterprise"); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 92 (arguing
that the loss of minority cultures and their cultural knowledge is not only a loss to the
Chinese civilization, but to all humanity).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Merchant of Venice is a very rich play. Different people come up
with different interpretations and responses. While some may agree that
China is the Shylock in the international intellectual property community,
some may find this analogy far-fetched. Nevertheless, all of us would
tend to agree that those problems facing Shakespeare in his time are still
prevalent today in the twenty-first century. "[A]s long as anxieties about
racial, national, sexual, and religious difference continue to haunt the way
we imagine ourselves and respond to others, Shakespeare's words will
remain 'not of an age, but for all time."' 4 Borrowing ideas from The
Merchant of Venice, this Article hopes to challenge readers to rethink the
U.S.-China intellectual property conflict. The Chinese piracy problem
has been troubling the West for more than a century. Perhaps it may be a
good idea to look outside the law for insights and solution.
448 GROSS, supra note 239, at 229; see also WARD, supra note 292, at 2 ("The
debates which engage legal and political theorists today are the same as those which
troubled Shakespearean England.").

